Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society by Weinstock Netanel, Neil
Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society
Neil Weinstock Netanelt
CONTENTS
I. THE EXPANSION OF COPYRIGHT HOLDER RIGHTS
A. Troublesome Areas of Copyright Expansion
1. D uration .....................
2. Personal Uses .................
3. Transformative Uses .............
B. Further Expansion by Contract ........
II. THE NEOCLASSICIST APPROACH TO COPYRIGHT .............. 306
A. Two Approaches to Copyright Economics ............... 308
B. The Neoclassicist Approach .......................... 311
1. Neoclassicist Propery Theor and Its Application to
Copyright .................................... 314
a. Universality ............................... 314
b. Concentrated Ownership ..................... 317
c. Exclusivi ' .' .............................. 319
d. Transferability . ............................ 321
2. The Marginality of Law .......................... 321
C. The Neoclassical Market Paradigm Versus Copyright's
Democracy-Enhancing Goals ......................... 324
III. THE MINIMALIST CRITICS OF COPYRIGHT EXPANSION .......... 336
IV. THE DEMOCRATIC PARADIGM .............
A. Democratic Governance and Civil Society" .
B. Civil Societ; the State, and the Market ...
C. Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society .
1. Copyright's Production Function ....
t Assistant Professor, University of Texas School of La%% I vould hke to thank the follov Ing persons
for their helpful comments and suggestions regarding this Article Peter Brown. Willie Forbath. Mark
Gergen, Wendy Gordon, Marci Hamilton, Doug Laycock. Bnan Leiter. Mark l..mle). Jessica Litman.
Ronald Mann, John Robertson, Charles Silver. Eric Talley and the participants of the Uni'crsity of Tcxas
School of Law Faculty Colloquium and Junior Faculty Roundtable at which I presented earlier drafts of
this Article. My thanks also to Brett Swanson for his research assistance
283
284 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 106: 283
2. Copyright's Structural Function ................... 352
a. An Independent Expressive Sector ............... 352
b. Imposition of Limits ........................ 362
3. Summary ................................... 363
V. DOCTRINAL OUTCOMES IN THE DIGITAL PUBLIC SQUARE ........ 364
A. Copyright's Duration ............................. 366
B. Personal Uses .................................. 371
C. Transformative Uses .............................. 376
D. Displacement of Copyright by Contract ................ 382
VI. CONCLUSION ..................................... 386
Copyright and Democracy
Copyright law strikes a precarious balance. To encourage authors to create
and disseminate original expression, it accords them a bundle of proprietary
rights in their works. But to promote public education and creative exchange,
it invites audiences and subsequent authors to use existing works in every
conceivable manner that falls outside the province of the copyright owner's
exclusive rights. Copyright law's perennial dilemma is to determine where
exclusive rights should end and unrestrained public access should begin. If
copyright is cast too narrowly, authors may have inadequate incentives to
produce and disseminate creative works or may be unduly dependent on the
support of state or elite patrons. If copyright extends too broadly, copyright
owners will be able to exert censorial control over critical uses of existing
works or may extract monopoly rents for access, thereby chilling discourse and
cultural development.
Digital technology threatens to upend copyright's already uneasy
accommodation of public access with private ownership. Once a creative work
is freely available online, anyone can, with a few clicks of a mouse, make
perfect digital copies and limitless digital variations, and can electronically
distribute them to the ends of the earth. If unauthorized and widespread, such
user activity could radically undermine traditional copyright markets. At the
same time, however, digital technology provides copyright owners with the
technical means to restrict access to, and uses of, digitized works to a far
greater extent than is possible in the analog and hard copy world. The
systematic deployment of such technological fences would raise the specter of
all-consuming copyright owner control.
Fueled by digital technology's destabilizing potential, an extraordinarily
bitter battle is raging in Congress,' the courts,2 law reviews, Internet
1. See Nil Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R, 2441 Before the Subcomm on Courts
and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciay. 104th Cong. (1996) (regarding proposed
legislation to amend Copyright Act to make clear that nght of public distnbution applies to computer
network transmissions and to impose criminal penalties on circumvention of encrypted protection of
copyrighted works).
2. See MAI Sys. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir 1993) (holding that copy is made
when work is booted into RAM for longer than very brief period); Religious Tech. Ctr v Netcom On-Lmnc
Communications Servs., Inc.. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that elcctronic bulletin board
operator and Interet access provider are not directly liable, but under ceamn circumstances may be
contributorily liable, in connection with Usenet subscriber's posting of infnnging message to Usenet
newsgroup); Sega Enters. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding electronic bulletin board
system operator directly liable for users' uploading and downloading of infringing copies). Playboy Enters
v. Frena. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (same).
3. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway
The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators. 13 CARDOZo AmTS & E.%T LJ 346
(1995); Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the "Information Superhighwa'" Authors. Etplotters,. and
Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1466 (1995); 1. Trotter Hardy. Propern (and Cop'right) in
Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming Jan. 1997); Jessica Litman. The Exclusive Right to Read.
13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 29 (1994); Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia Ann Krauthaus. Cop~right on
the Information Superhighway: Requiem for a Middleweight. 6 STAN. L. & PoL'Y RE", 25 (1994). Pamela
Samuelson, Digital Media and the Changing Face of Intellectual Proper'y Law. 16 RLt"rGEs Co:,u'trrER
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discussion groups, 4 and numerous international fora5 over the purpose and
scope of copyright as we enter the digital age. On one side are U.S. business
leaders, government officials, and others who have called for expanded
copyright protection to support commercial development of the much-heralded
National and Global Information Infrastructures. 6 These proponents of an
expansive copyright have drawn heavily upon emerging scholarship that
applies an amalgam of neoclassical and new institutional economic property
theory to copyright. This "neoclassicist" approach posits that, far from simply
inducing the creation and dissemination of new expression, copyright serves
as a vehicle for directing investment in existing works.7 Neoclassicists would
accordingly treat literary and artistic works as "vendible commodities," best
made subject to broad proprietary rights that extend to every conceivable
valued use.8 In this manner, neoclassicists contend, market pricing can direct
& TECH. L.J. 323 (1990); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyright in Cyberspace: Don't Throw Out the
Public Interest with the Bath Water, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 403.
4. See generally discussion on cni-copyright (visited Oct. 18, 1996) <gopher://gopher.cni.orgll Il
cniwg/forums/cni-copyright>, and cyberia-I (visited Oct. 18, 1996) <http://mailmunch.law.cornell.
edu/listservs/cyberia>.
5. See, e.g., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASS'N, WIPO WORLDWIDE SYMPOSIUM ON THE IMPACT
OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY ON COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS (1993); European Comm'n, Green
Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society (last modified Sept. 8, 1995)
<http:llwww2.echo.lu/legal/en/ipr/ipr.html>.
6. See, e.g., INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE; THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 137-38 (last modified Sept. 1995) <http:llwww.uspto.gov/web/ipnii> [hereinafter Nil
WHITE PAPER]; see also Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149, 156-57 (1992) (citing perception that greater intellectual
property protection will enhance national prosperity as central factor in fueling dramatic expansion in scope
of intellectual property over last two decades); Robert W. Kastenmeier & David Beier, International Trade
and Intellectual Property: Promise, Risks, and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285 (1989) (detailing
growing importance of intellectual property to U.S. balance of trade and ultimately successful efforts by
U.S. business leaders to include enforceable requirements for intellectual property protection within General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).
7. I will refer broadly to this selective combination of neoclassical and new institutional economic
property theory as "neoclassicism," even though self-proclaimed "new institutional" theorists generally
distinguish themselves from, and, indeed, are critical of, what they define as neoclassical economic theory.
See infra text accompanying notes 118-21. Similarly, I will refer broadly to copyright scholars who have
expounded the neoclassicist approach as "neoclassicists," even though many have taken other approaches
as well. See infra note 22.
8. The phrase is from Wendy J. Gordon, Assertive Modesty: An Economics oftlItangibles, 94 COLUM.
L. REv. 2579, 2579 n.l (1994) (stating that intellectual property law is fundamentally "a mode of
converting mental labor into a 'vendible commodity' (citation omitted)). See also Frank H. Easterbrook,
Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 108, 118 (1990) (maintaining that
"[elxcept in the rarest case, we should treat intellectual property and physical property identically in the
law").
Professor Gordon presented the neoclassicist approach in an early article on copyright's fair use
defense. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1605 (1982) [hereinafter Gordon, Fair Use].
To a limited extent in that article, and to a far greater extent in her subsequent work, she has argued that
creative expression may serve important nonmonetizable interests and that copyright owners should not be
entitled to capture all social value derived from such expression. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right
in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J.
1533 (1993) [hereinafter Gordon, Self-Expression] (setting forth critique of copyright expansion based on
Lockean natural rights theory); infra text accompanying notes 228-33 (questioning efficacy of Professor
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resource allocation for the marketing and development of existing creative
expression in an optimally efficient manner.
On the other side, numerous critics have expressed serious misgivings over
the political, cultural, and economic ramifications of expanded protection.' In
so doing, many such critics have espoused, in one form or another, what might
be termed a minimalist position. In resisting further copyright expansion, they
have proffered various approaches that would severely reduce existing levels
of copyright protection. Some minimalist critics follow the same criterion of
allocative efficiency as the neoclassicists, but reach diametrically opposed
conclusions. They insist that the production of original expression is not
inherently more valuable than any other potential use of society's resources,
and thus that copyright protection must be set at a level that accounts not just
for public access to expression, but also for the social cost of drawing
resources away from other potential uses.'0 Other critics phrase copyright's
incentive rationale in minimalist terms. They recognize that authors' expression
may have unique social value, but question whether the copyright incentive is
truly necessary to induce its production and dissemination at an optimum
amount and cost." Some minimalists tout the notion that copyright is an
outdated impediment to "truth and exploration" in the digital universe.' They
argue that whatever copyright's value in the hard copy world, it simply has no
place on the Internet. 3 Others eschew such utopianism, but insist nevertheless
that longstanding, predigital limitations to copyright owner prerogatives must
be maintained even as digital network technologies radically alter traditional
Gordon's attempt, in her article on fair use, to limit expansionist tendency of her earl) nctxlaasicst
position).
9. See Litman, supra note 3; Zimmerman, supra note 3; Pamela Samuelson. Tie Copsrilht Grab.
WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 134; see also Nil Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearingi on H R 2441 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Juduiarl. 104th Cong
(1996) (statement of Members of Digital Future Coalition) (Feb. 15. 1996) (opposing enactment of Nil
White Paper recommendations into law). Indeed, many cntics have argued cogently that. een sithout
further expansion, copyright has already become an instrument of private censorship, of the clcation of
property rights over public access to the expressive foundations for challenging established social and
cultural norms. See, e.g., James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Infonnation: Copi-right. Spleens. Blackmail.
and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1413, 1467-69 (1992); Gordon. Self.Erpresion. supra note S. Peter
Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativwi. 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ET
LJ. 293, 295 (1992); David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Mart) Copsright and the Constrt tion of
Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, LAW & Co\T,ItP PROBS.. Spring 1992. at 139. Jessica Litman.
The Public Domain, 39 EroRY L.J. 965 (1990); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman. Information Aj Speech.
Information As Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights. 33 W%t & MARY L REV
665 (1992); Brief of Amici Curiae Concerned Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 18. Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (No. 92-1292) (tarmng of cop)nght osncrm" propcnsity
to seek "private censorship through copyright" and urging Court to establish First Amendment decnse for
parody).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 255-57
11. See infra text accompanying notes 258-62
12. See Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPs Agreement: Imperialistic. Outdated. and Oterprote(lie. 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 625-27 (1996) (criticizing "hackers' %ieu that cop)nght i, outdated
impediment to "truth and exploration").
13. See infra text accompanying notes 263-68.
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copyright markets. Although these critics generally purport to seek the
retention of existing levels of protection, their proposed adherence to predigital
"free use zones" would significantly undermine copyright's support for the
autonomous creation and dissemination of expression in the digital
environment. "
This Article presents a conceptual framework for copyright that stands in
opposition to both the expansionism of neoclassicist economics and the
minimalism of many critics. That framework, which I will label the democratic
paradigm, emphasizes that copyright is in essence a state measure that uses
market institutions to enhance the democratic character of civil society. In
supporting a market for authors' works, copyright serves two democracy-
enhancing functions. The first is a production function. Copyright provides an
incentive for creative expression on a wide array of political, social, and
aesthetic issues, thus bolstering the discursive foundations for democratic
culture and civic association. The second function is structural. Copyright
supports a sector of creative and communicative activity that is relatively free
from reliance on state subsidy, elite patronage, and cultural hierarchy. The
democratic paradigm requires that copyright protection be sufficiently strong
to ensure support for copyright's production and structural functions. But at the
same time, it would accord authors a limited proprietary entitlement, designed
to make room for-and, indeed, to encourage-many transformative and
educative uses of existing works.
In contrast to the neoclassicist approach, the democratic paradigm
emphasizes that copyright, like many institutions of civil society, is in, but not
entirely of, the market. As I will argue, neoclassicism cannot serve as the basis
for copyright doctrine because copyright's primary goal is not allocative
efficiency, but the support of a democratic culture. Moreover, despite the
Sisyphean efforts of some copyright scholars to confine neoclassicism within
a democracy-enhancing framework, a copyright law driven by neoclassical
economic property theory would give copyright owners such far-reaching
control over productive uses of existing creative works that it would unduly
constrain the robust debate upon which democratic self-rule depends.
At the same time, I will argue that much of the counteroffensive against
copyright's precipitous expansion is misconceived. By adhering to a minimalist
position, many critics have failed to account for the need to maintain
autonomous, self-reliant authorship, especially in the face of rapidly changing
markets. I will emphasize in contrast that "sustained works of
authorship"15 -books, articles, films, songs, and paintings-form a central
part of democratic discourse, and that a robust copyright is a necessary (though
14. See infra text accompanying notes 269-70, 399-401.
15. See Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 1499 (coining term "sustained works of authorship").
[Vol. 106: 283
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not necessarily sufficient) condition both for the creation and dissemination of
that expression and for its independent and pluralist character.
The idea that copyright is in some way bound up with democratic
governance is not new. In adopting the Constitution's Copyright Clause' 6 and
enacting the first federal copyright statute, the Framers were animated by the
belief that copyright's support for the diffusion of knowledge is "essential to
the preservation of a free Constitution."" Modem copyright jurisprudence
contains a similar theme. It posits that the public education and discourse that
undergird a democratic polity require a robust market for original works of
authorship. 8 As the Supreme Court affirmed a decade ago: "[T]he Framers
intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.""
But the absence of a more rigorous, systematic understanding of how
copyright supports democratic institutions has left this democratic theme
vulnerable to both sides of the current debate over copyright's future. It has
enabled neoclassicists to recast copyright as a mechanism for allocative
efficiency, importing a theory of property that fails adequately to account for
our fundamental, nonmonetizable interests in expressive diversity and informed
citizenship.20 And it has left the critics without a coherent and convincing
conceptual framework for countering copyright expansion while still providing
for the robust public subsidy needed to underwrite authors' central role in our
system of free expression.
The democratic paradigm that I will develop responds to copyright's
continuing distention, but does so more selectively than have many of the
critics. Reasserting copyright's fundamental principles requires a copyright that
is sufficiently robust to support both copyright's production and structural
functions. To that end, it requires that copyright be adapted to new
technological means for disseminating authors' works and to the coming
upheavals in the markets for many such works that will accompany the large-
16. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17. In calling for the enactment of the first federal cop)right statute in 1790. a Senate committee
underscored the central importance for the fledgling democracy of authors' contributions to the store of
knowledge, resolving that ""[Iliterature and [s]cience are essential to the prescration of a free
Constitution."' BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATEN 'T AND COPYRIGHT LA. 137 (1967)
(quoting U.S. Senate Journal. Ist Cong. 8-10. U.S. Annals of Congress. Ist Cong 935-36 (972 m some
copies)). President Washington used similar language in his address to Congress in support of the statute
See infra text accompanying note 339.
18. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN. I COPYRIGHT § 2.2.1, at 2.10 (2d ed 1996); see also Barbara Ringer. Tho
Hundred Years of American Copyright Law, in AMERICAN BAR ASS'.. TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF ENGLISH
AND AMERICAN PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW 117, 118 (1977) ("c knos,. empirically. that
strong copyright systems are characteristic of relatively free societies ")
19. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.. 471 US 539. 558 t1985) (holding that
unauthorized publishing of copyright protected memoirs was violation of copyright). see also Pierre N
Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105. 1135 (1990) ("Although copyright often
results in suppression of speech, its underlying objectives parallel those of the first amendment -)
20. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets. 42 UCLA L REv 949. 963 (1995)
(rejecting market metaphor in freedom of speech jurisprudence and noting that "[slpech is an interaction
arguably akin not to sales but to government").
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scale electronic distribution of pictures, sound, and text in digital form." To
extend copyright's limited monopoly blithely over all new uses may unduly
burden the public domain, but unless changing markets are accounted for in
redefining authors' exclusive rights, copyright's engine for free expression will
be inadequately fueled.
Before addressing the best means to respond to copyright's expansion, it
will be necessary to set forth more precisely the manner in which copyright
has expanded. Part I briefly describes the three most controversial areas of
copyright expansion, with an emphasis on their ramifications for the digital
network environment: (1) the lengthening of the copyright term; (2) the
extension of copyright to personal uses, including online "browsing" of
protected expression; and (3) the constriction of authors' liberty to borrow
from existing works in creating their own. Part I also examines the possibility
of systematic contractual displacement of traditional limitations to copyright
protection, an area of particular relevance to electronic distribution and online
access.
Part II focuses on the principal theoretical support for copyright's
continuing expansion, a combination of neoclassical and new institutional
economic property theory. As I will discuss in Part II, such neoclassicist
economics posits that social resources are best divided among private property
owners who enjoy the absolute right to exclude nonowners and to exploit or
dispose of their property as they wish. Neoclassicism applies to authors'
expressive creations the same rarified market model that it applies to staples
of commerce. It insists, accordingly, that copyright owners be given broad,
exclusive rights over all valued uses of literary and artistic works and that
prospective users must pay the owner's price except in anomalous cases of
insurmountable market failure.
To be certain, the most thoughtful proponents of the neoclassicist approach
among intellectual property scholars make a careful attempt to cabin their
analysis within a framework that recognizes copyright's democracy-enhancing
goals.22 But as I will discuss in Part II, this attempt is ultimately
21. For a discussion of anticipated upheavals in traditional copyright markets as a result of digital
network distribution, see PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 197-236 (1994); Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805
(1995); John Perry Barlow, The Framework for Economy of Ideas: Rethinking Patents and Copyrights in
the Digital Age, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 83; Esther Dyson, Intellectual Value, WIRED, July 1995, at 136. See
also Doreen Carvajal, Book Publishers Worry About Threat ofInternet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1996, at Al.
For a more conservative view of the inroads that digitization will make in markets for hard copy texts, see
WALT CRAWFORD & MICHAEL GORMAN, FUTURE LIBRARIES: DREAMS, MADNESS & REALITY (1995).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 188-91. In addition, these scholars have sometimes presented
views of copyright that, at least in part, fall outside of the neoclassicist approach. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein,
Copyright, LAW & CONTEMP. PROS., Spring 1992, at 79, 80, 86 (emphasizing copyright's support for
author's creative autonomy); Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 8 (presenting natural rights approach to
copyright that emphasizes need to limit copyright owner rights to far greater extent than neoclassical
economic analysis); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial Exchange: A
[Vol. 106: 283
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unsuccessful. To the extent that they employ a neoclassical market model as
their analytic baseline, even these scholars are pushed in the direction of a
broad, absolutist copyright. They are inclined to treat limitations on copyright
owner prerogatives as isolated deviations from a marketplace norm, rather than
as a fundamental component of copyright's democracy-enhancing equation.
Ultimately, given the universalist thrust of economic property theory and the
seeming value-neutral simplicity of the neoclassical market model, neoclassicist
analysis tends to relegate to the margins the less monetizable public interest
in expressive diversity and political competency.2"
Part I summarizes and critiques the minimalist positions of many critics
of expansion. It concludes that those critics, in one form or another, give an
impoverished account of copyright's production function and overlook
copyright's important structural function. As such, the minimalist position
would lead to a truncated scope of protection that would lend inadequate
support for copyright's constitutive goals.
Part IV sets forth my proposed conceptual framework for redirecting
copyright toward its core understanding of public benefit, that of fortifying our
democratic institutions by promoting public education, self-reliant authorship,
and robust debate. More precisely, this democratic paradigm views copyright
law as a state measure designed to enhance the independent and pluralist
character of civil society. Part IV begins by examining the importance of civil
society for democratic governance. It emphasizes the need for state support for
democratic association, including the selective use of market institutions to
support citizens' political competency, political autonomy, and associational
diversity. Part IV then sets forth the role of copyright, as one such measure,
in supporting a democratic civil society. It asserts that copyright-supported
public discourse constitutes a vital component of civil society and that
copyright promotes the democratic character of that discourse by underwriting
an independent expressive sector and setting limits on private control of
creative expression.
Part V revisits the troublesome areas of expansion discussed in Part I,
describing in each instance how the democratic paradigm suggests different
solutions than the neoclassicist and minimalist approaches. Like any
jurisprudential framework, the democratic paradigm raises certain issues and
Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1570, 1613 (1995) (favonng precmpion of industr)- :dc standard
contracts that effect "'wholesale subversion of an important federal policy")
23. For a powerful argument that the rhetoric of law and economics tends to marginalize the values
required for human flourishing generally, see MARGARET JANE RADIN. CONrESTED CO I ODmEs 79-94
(1996). See also SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA. TIlE REFORm OF THE
AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 22-23 (1992) (noting neoclassical tendency to focus on individual
transactions and neglect broader social policy); Robert W. Gordon. Unfrrezing Legal Reali Critcal
Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195 (1987) (pointing out that free market choice model of
contract law fails to account for true nature of individual relationships and autonomous choices)
1996]
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points in certain directions; it does not lead mechanically to particular doctrinal
results. My focus in Part V, therefore, will be to highlight a few possible,
logically consistent applications of the paradigm, not to insist that a democratic
copyright must necessarily resemble my description in every detail.
I. THE EXPANSION OF COPYRIGHT HOLDER RIGHTS
Absent massive government or private subsidy, some measure of copyright
protection is necessary to support a viable sector of authors and publishers
engaged in the creation and dissemination of original expression. Unlike most
goods and services, creative and informational works can be enjoyed by
unlimited numbers of persons without being consumed.24 This means that, as
a general rule, once a work is produced, the marginal cost of disseminating it
to the public, whether in hard copy or electronically, approaches zero.2
5
Copyright protection is necessary because, in its absence, unbridled
competition from free riders who are able to copy and distribute the work
without paying copyright royalties would drive the price for user access to its
near-zero marginal cost.26 This free rider problem, in turn, would greatly
impair author and publisher ability to recover their fixed production coStS.
27
In a world without copyright, only authors unconcerned with monetary
remuneration would produce creative expression and only publishers with no
need for financial return would invest in selecting, packaging, marketing, and
24. For example, many persons may read a book, listen to a radio program, or view a painting without
preventing others from doing the same or in any way diminishing the value of the work. In some instances,
in fact, given network effects, the more people that enjoy a work, the greater may be its value for each
user. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Netvork Effects, J. EcON. PERSP.,
Spring 1994, at 93. However, this might not always be the case with every type of creative work. For
example, in determining basic prices for various uses of their photographs, stock photo agencies typically
give considerable weight to the idea that much of a photograph's value lies in its "freshness"; the more
people that view a photograph, the more its "freshness" is believed to have been consumed. See
Timestream, Inc., Licensing Still Images: Some Basic Information for Multimedia Producers, at app. C (last
modified Sept. 1994) <http:llwww.timestream.comlweb/infollicense.html>.
25. See Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293, 295 (1970).
26. Such copying competitors are "free riders" in the sense that they do not share in the copyright
owner's costs of creation, initial production, and marketing. Since competitors generally would copy only
those works that have proven to be a success, they also "free ride" on the copyright owner's efforts to
select which works to produce.
27. See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1661, 1700
(1988). In markets in which copyright owners enjoy lead time advantages or are able to distribute
qualitatively superior copies, they might be able to obtain some financial return despite unhindered copying.
But digital technology has the potential to erase these advantages. It enables copiers, quickly and
inexpensively, to make and disseminate perfect quality reproductions. In addition, as consumer copying
becomes easier, cheaper, and of higher quality, as is the case with digital technology, the authors' ability
to recover fixed costs may be threatened by nonpurehasing consumers no less than by free riding
competitors. As a result, copyright protection is all the more important in the digital environment, except
to the extent that copyright owners can (and, as a matter of public policy, should) rely on technical means
to prevent unauthorized copying or are able to recover their investment from the provision of peripheral
services rather than the sale of expressive content. See infra text accompanying notes 353-56.
1996] Copyright and Democracy
making such expression available to the public?2 Without copyright, creative
expression would likely be both underproduced and, no less importantly,
underdisseminated.
But copyright is an imperfect remedy for the free rider problem that would
otherwise plague the market in creative expression. While copyright may
provide a necessary incentive, it does so at the cost of burdening whatever uses
of copyrighted expression fall within the scope of the owner's copyright.
Copyright operates by creating an artificial scarcity in copies or other means
of gaining access to an expressive work and by giving the copyright owner a
monopoly in the market for such access.29 As a result, copyright owners are
able to charge substantially more than the marginal cost for access to
expressive works.30 Consequently, some people who would have been willing
to purchase access at somewhat more than its marginal cost, but at less than
the supracompetitive price, now will not purchase it at all.3 1 The result is a
deadweight loss to society. 2
28. My reference here and elsewhere to "publishers" is meant to connote an) person or entity that
engages in selecting creative expression and making it available to the public Publishers would thus
include, in addition to print and music publishers: sound recording, multimedia, film. and television
producers; digital content providers; art gallery owners: and othcrs.
29. Access might be in the form of the purchase or rental of a hard copy (book or CD). clectronic
access (TV, radio, or electronic database), or onsite public performance or display (mosie or museum)
30. The size of this potential monopoly surcharge will be a function of the extent to w.hich other works
might substitute for the work in question and the extent to which the copyright owner can engage in price
discrimination. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Acceis Paradigm. 49 VA%
L. REV. 483, 520-21 (1996); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law. 94 Mtot L REV
1197, 1205 (1996). Digital technology significantly enhances copyright owner ability to engage in price
discrimination. First, it enables users to be charged for each discrete use when the use takes place As a
result, the copyright owner may determine a differential use fee on a daly or hourly basis for each type
of use. Second, digital technology accords content providers with an unprecedented ability to build. sell.
and use individual consumer profiles. Once consumer preferences arc identified, usn could be charged
a greater amount for those uses and types of works that they most value. See GOLDSTEIN . supra note 21.
at 8, 178-79, 202; see also A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Inforrnanon Ocean Living With
Anonymit; Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & Cost. 395. 450-88 (1996) (tdiscussing
digital payment systems and consumer profiles).
31. In theory, perfect price discrimination would make it possible for the creator to produce both the
work and the optimal number of copies. Of course, this would also enable the producer to capture all of
the consumer surplus. See Demsetz, supra note 25. at 301-04 (discussing possibilities for price
discrimination in sale of public goods). Of course, perfect price discrimination would also bring copyright
owners a maximum share of consumer surplus since they could charge each consumer the full amount she
would be willing to pay for access to the work.
32. Defined in terms of traditional welfare economics, deadweight loss consists of tswo component-.
(1) the extent of the lost satisfaction experienced by each consumer who is unable to purchase the product
because of its monopolistic price; and (2) the number of consumers %% ho experience such loss See Lunney.
supra note 30, at 564. The copyright monopoly also enables the copyright owner to capture a large share
of the consumer surplus with respect to a work, especially when the owner can engage in discriminatory
pricing. However, economists generally see this as solely a matter of distribution. without any appreciable
effect on allocative inefficiency. See Fisher. supra note 27, at 1702 Richard Posner has noted that the
social costs of monopoly pricing for intellectual property are essentially no different than the indispensable
demarcation and enforcement costs of using a property rights system to allocate any resource, and has
maintained that so long as the benefits of establishing the property system exceed its cost., it will be and
should be established. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 35. 39-40 (4th ed 1992)
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 106: 283
Given this tension between copyright benefits and costs, the question of
how much incentive is appropriate is central to copyright policy and
jurisprudence. It is against the background of this policy dilemma that
copyright's continuing expansion must be evaluated.
Today's copyright owners enjoy an unprecedented ability to restrict
personal uses of copyrighted expression and to constrain subsequent author
borrowing from existing works in the creation of new ones. While such
expansion may, at least to some degree, serve as a beneficial incentive for the
dissemination of creative expression,33 it also poses the danger of chilling
discourse and cultural advancement, thus defeating copyright's essential
democratic purpose. A bloated copyright frustrates copyright's democracy-
enhancing goals in two basic ways. First, on too many occasions, copyright
owners have sought to use their proprietary entitlements blatantly to suppress
political, social, or personal criticism. A number of published cases, which one
may assume are only the tip of the iceberg, are especially disturbing. The
Church of Scientology has recently invoked copyright to prevent critics from
bringing allegedly corrupt Church practices to public scrutiny.3 J.D. Salinger
and Howard Hughes each brought a copyright infringement action to suppress
33. Expansion that has, on the whole, been more beneficial than troublesome includes the extension
of copyright protection to new forms of expression and new means of dissemination. The first federal
copyright statute, the Copyright Act of 1790, extended protection only to books, maps, and charts. See Act
of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, I Stat. 124, 124. However, copyright law now provides incentives for the
creation and dissemination of a broad range of cultural expression, including works of visual art, music,
architecture, choreography and others, like sound recordings, photographs, and film, that did not exist in
1790. An 1802 amendment to the copyright law added engravings and prints. See Act of Apr. 29, 1802,
ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171. The 1831 copyright law revision added musical compositions. See Act of Feb. 3,
1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436. An 1865 amendment added photographs. See Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126,
§ I, 13 Stat. 540. The Copyright Act of 1870 added paintings, drawings and statues. See Act of July 8,
1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212. The Copyright Act of 1976 broadly protects all "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). As originally enacted, the Act also enumerated seven categories of
works of authorship, including (I) literary works, (2) musical works, (3) dramatic works, (4) pantomimes
and choreographic works, (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, (6) motion pictures and other
audiovisual works, and (7) sound recordings. In 1990, an eighth category, architectural works, was added,
pursuant to the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, tit. 7. § 701, 104 Stat. 5133 (1990) (codified
at 17 U.S.C. § 101 note). Today's copyright law also recognizes important means of disseminating
expression other than simply printing and distributing copies. These include public performance and public
display. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)-(5) (1994). They also encompass new technological means of
dissemination, including cinema, phonorecords, broadcast, and electronic reprography. The showing of films
at the cinema and the broadcast of fixed or simultaneously recorded works on television or radio constitute
a public performance of such works within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). Under section 106(l) of
the Copyright Act, the right to make copies includes the reproduction of works in phonorecords and
technological means of reproduction such as electronic reprography. For an extensive discussion of the
application of copyright to new technological uses of works of authorship, see NATIONAL COMM'N ON NEw
TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 82 (1979) [hereinafter CONTU].
Copyright's extension into these areas underwrites a rich and varied system of culture and dialogue. In
today's multifarious market, to limit copyright to its original parameters would be to consign it to oblivion.
34. See. e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Cal. 1995).
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the publication of biographical material.35 Walt Disney Productions obtained
an injunction against the publication of a counterculture comic book that
sought to contest Disney's all-American .. world of scrubbed faces, bright
smiles and happy endings"' by depicting Mickey Mouse engaged in various
illicit activities.36 A Minneapolis police officer brought suit to prevent a
newspaper from exposing his racist fable, which had appeared in a police
department newsletter.37
Second, expanded copyright imposes an ever more burdensome "tax" on
audiences and subsequent authors.3' Expanded control may increase the
private cost of reading, viewing, and listening to authors' expression to such
an extent that, in some cases and for some people, access becomes
prohibitively expensive.39 Although digital technology may make possible
highly refined price discrimination that could, in theory, alleviate this problem,
the prospect of a regime in which consumers are charged for each and every
digital use has raised serious concerns about its potential distributional
impact.40
An overly expanded copyright also constitutes a material disincentive to
the production and dissemination of creative, transformative uses of preexisting
expression. Indeed, a broad, expanded copyright may, in effect, stifle
35. Salinger was successful. See Salinger v. Random House. Inc.. 811 F2d 90 (2d Cir 1987) (holding
that biographer's quotations from Salinger's unpublished letters did not constitute fair use) Hughes %as
not. See Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) (Oacating prcliminary
injunction restraining distribution of biography of Hughes that incorporated material from scneis of
magazine articles, copyright in which had been acquired by Hughes's holding compan) )
36. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F2d 751. 753 (9th Car 1978) (quoting Note, Panrdi
Copyrights and the First Amendment, 10 U.S.F. L. REv. 564. 571 (1976))
37. See Belmore v. City Pages Inc.. 34 U.S.P.Q.2d tBNA) 1295 (D Minn 1995)
38. The metaphor of copyright as a "tax" has a long and established pedigree. extending back to
Thomas Macaulay's pronouncement, on the floor of Parliament in 1841 in opposition to a bill to lengthen
the copyright term, that copyright imposes a "tax on readers for the bounty of snters, " TitomAs
MACAULAY, SPEECHES ON POLMCS AND LITERATURE 177 (New York. EP Dutton & Co 1924 I IS-Ilt
39. The extent to which copyright may pose significant barrers to reader, %iecr. or listener access
will depend on a number of factors. including the degree of copyright owner market poser for any gi'cn
consumer use of a particular work (which is itself largely a factor of the substitutabilaty of altemati'.e u s
and works), copyright owner ability and willingness to engage an price discrimination based on consumer
ability to pay, the percentage of total retail cost that as attributable to copyright, and the asailabality of
copyrighted material that is available without any direct consumer payment through adsertiser.supported
broadcasting, public libraries, and other sources. Much theoretic and empirical sork needs to be done to
determine more precisely how much of a "tax" copyright really imposes on consumers of %anous t) pcs of
works and how much of a barrier to access such a "tax" represents.
40. See Nil Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R 2441 Before the Subt-onm on Courr
and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary. 104th Cong (1996) ( statement of American
Association of Law Libraries. American Library Association, Association of Research Libraries. Medcical
Library Association, Special Libraries Association) (expressing concern that copyright o%sner ability to
impose universal user charges "will take us a very long way towards becoming a nation of information
haves and information have-nots") (last modified Feb. 8. 1996) <httpllssva annctldkcilegslal
librarie.htm#ala>; Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change A Democratic Approich to Copiright
Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENr. L.J. 215. 264-67 (1996) (maintaining that digital
distribution and discontinuation of libraries' provision of free access to information may esacerbate
socioeconomic inequality); Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 410 (discussing possible chilling effect on
students, scholars, and library users of having to pay for each use)
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transformative uses in a way that parallels, but is far more systematic than the
problem of private censorship. All creative expression involves borrowing from
earlier works, to one degree or another, whether in the form of literal or near-
literal quotation (as in T.S. Eliot's pastiche of literary greats in The Waste
Land), reformulation of basic plot (as in West Side Story's adaptation of
Romeo and Juliet), or influence of style (as in the genre of Impressionist
painting)." To the extent that copyright in an author's potential source
material requires payment for the quotation, reformulation, adaptation, or
parody of that material, some such transformative uses will never transpire.42
In a very real sense, it does not matter whether a transformative use is silenced
by deliberate copyright owner suppression or secondary author inability or
unwillingness to pay the copyright owner's price. Regardless of the reason, the
resulting harm to cultural development and expressive diversity is the same:
transformative expression has been muted.
Significantly, the social harm resulting from this silencing of
transformative expression goes far beyond the loss to consumers who would
otherwise have paid to read, view, or listen to it. Robust public debate, the
spread of knowledge, and the questioning of cultural hierarchy are of
paramount importance to a democratic society. To the extent that these
activities bolster democratic institutions, all citizens benefit from their
occurrence.4 3 Accordingly, as a citizen of a democratic society, I benefit from
the ability of secondary authors to reformulate and challenge the social
meaning of cultural icons, to expose corrupt or racist practices of powerful
41. For a comprehensive study of artistic influence, see GORAN HERMERtN, INFLUENCE IN ART AND
LITERATURE (1975). For a more succinct, but highly useful discussion, see RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND
LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 343-51 (1988).
42. Especially given copyright owner ability to demand supracompetitive license fees, a market powcr
enhanced by according owners broad exclusive rights, would-be transformative authors often will be unable
or unwilling to pay the copyright owner's price. See Lunney, supra note 30, at 521-22 (discussing
enhanced market power from broad copyright protection). In some cases, due in part to persistent market
imperfections, secondary authors will be unable to recover their costs from consumers of their work. In
others, they might possibly be able to recover their license fee, but they will be unable or unwilling to bear
the substantial risk of failing to do so. In still others subsequent authors might, in theory, be willing to pay
the copyright owner's price, but not the additional costs of negotiating and obtaining a license. For a further
discussion of market impediments to transformative use licenses, see Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEx. L. REV. (forthcoming May 1997). Paul Goldstein
contends that "transaction costs will commonly hobble the making of nontransformative copies . . . to a
far greater degree than they will transformative copies." GOLDSTEIN, supra note 18, § 10.2.2, at 10:43.
Even if once true, this is often no longer the case, and certainly will not be so in the digital network
environment. With the emergence of collective photocopy licensing, digital tracking, and automatic
electronic payment, transaction costs for simple, nontransformative copying will drop to next to nothing,
But even in a digital environment, transformative uses will often require individual assessment and
negotiation, since copyright owners will want to ensure that the particular transformative use that is
proposed will not interfere with their development plans or run contrary to their views.
43. Even from a completely atomistic, self-interested point of view, individuals benefit from
democracy, because democratic government is generally a better guarantee of individual autonomy and
freedom from oppression than are other forms of government. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, Broadcasting,
Democracy, and the Market, 82 GEO. L.J. 373, 387-88 (1993) (arguing that democratic government is
necessary, although not sufficient, condition for individual autonomy).
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institutions, and to publish biographical material about public figures even if
I never personally purchase or even see the transformative work. Given its
significant role in democratic discourse, transformative expression-particularly
transformative expression that is not controlled by the owner of the source
material--carries a social value far in excess of the aggregate price that
consumers would pay for personal access to transformative works. 44 And an
analogous claim can be made with regard to copyright's tax on readers,
viewers, and listeners. Given the interest of a democratic society in an
educated citizenry and an inclusive, national culture, when some persons are
unable to acquire access to expressive works, the harm is arguably not just to
them as individuals, but to society as a whole.
This is not to say that copyright expansion need necessarily be curtailed
in each instance. Expansion's detrimental effects on users might in many cases
be offset by increased encouragement of the creation and dissemination of
original expression. Each area of copyright expansion must therefore be
critically examined in light of copyright's essential democratic purposes.
A. Troublesome Areas of Copyright Expansion
The most troublesome areas of expanded copyright protection for cultural
expression may be divided into three basic sorts: duration, personal uses, and
transformative uses.
45
44. In economic terms, transformative expression can be said to yield social benefits that remain
external to the decisions of market actors. More strongly, one could argue that transformativc expression
is what Charles Taylor has called an ~irreducibly social good." a good whose value cannot be measured
or described in terms of the metric of individual preferences, but rather derives from shared meanings and
collective decisionmaking. See Charles Taylor, Irreducibly Social Goods, in RATlONAtrTY. INDIVIDLALS',t
AND PUBLIC POLIcY 45 (Geoffrey Brennan & Cliff Walsh eds.. 1990). For the purposes of my argument.
it makes no difference whether the benefits of transformative expression (or. for that matter, of copyright
as a whole) are seen as irreducibly social goods or intractable externalities. The point in either case is that
market transactions in a broad, proprietary copyright cannot be relied upon to further or reflect the public
interest in expressive diversity, whether that public interest is seen as an organic '% hole or as an aggregation
of individual preferences.
45. A fourth troublesome area of copyright expansion. but one that does not directily invole cultural
expression, is the extension of copyright protection to computer programs. wAhich primanly sers a
utilitarian function rather than directly communicating an idea to a reader, listener, or obser, er tOf course.
computer programs may be used as tools for communication, much like pens. paint brushes, or motion
picture projectors. Their immediate purpose, however, is to direct the functions of a computer, not to
communicate to humans.) Computer programs are ostensibly protected as literar) works. but courts have
effectively accorded them a quasi-sui generis protection that better comports with their functional nature
See Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concening the Legal Protection of Computer Programs. 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2359-61 (1994). The extension of copyright protection to computer programs. first
by Congress and then, at the insistence of the United States, in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property, is an anomalous case, arising from the strong perceived need for protection and
the ready availability of copyright in domestic and international arenas. See id. at 2348 n 146 it has been
sharply and extensively criticized by courts and commentators. See. e.g.. Computer Assocs lnt'l. Inc v
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 704 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that "'the essentially utilitanan nature of a computer
program ... complicates the task of distilling its idea from its expression**); td. at 712 (regarding much
software copyright case law as "the courts' attempt to fit proverbial square peg in a round hole").
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1. Duration
The first, and most straightforward, area concerns the duration of copyright
protection. The Constitution's Copyright Clause and the public benefit rationale
for copyright that it embodies dictate that the copyright owner's exclusive
rights be limited in time. 6 If copyright's purpose is to promote learning and
discourse, then at some point the public must be able freely to copy, modify,
and reformulate the works that have become a part of its cultural matrix. 7
Mindful of this need, Congress limited copyright to a once renewable 14-year
term in the first federal copyright statute, the Act of May 31, 1790.48 Since
then, however, the copyright term has increased slowly, but markedly. In 1831,
Congress doubled the original term49 and, as part of the general copyright
revision of 1909, it doubled the renewal term.50 That maximum 56-year term
remained in force until the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, which
extended the duration of the copyright owner's exclusive rights to the life of
the author plus 50 years.5
There is now legislation pending before Congress that would further
lengthen the copyright term to the author's life plus 70 years. 52 Proponents
of the legislation argue that term extensions reflect the increasing economic
value of copyrighted works and that without exclusive rights in the
marketplace, publishers will not invest in the restoration and dissemination of
old works in either digital or hard copy format. 3 Critics maintain that a
Samuelson, supra, at 2310. This Article will focus solely on the issue of copyright expansion in the area
of cultural expression.
46. The Copyright Clause empowers Congress to secure authors' exclusive rights for "limited times."
See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
47. As David Nimmer has cogently stated, under copyright's traditional public good rationale, "works
are relegated to the public domain to become the heritage of all humanity and copyright is simply a
temporary way station to reward authors on the road to that greater good." David Nimmer, The End of
Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1416 (1995).
48. Under the 1790 Act a copyright could be renewed for a second fourteen-year term if the author
was still living at the expiration of the first term. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124.
49. See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
50. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080.
51. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994). In the case of works made for hire or works where the author is
not identified at all or by his real name, the copyright endures for a term of 75 years from the work's first
publication or 100 years from its creation, whichever is shorter. See id. § 302(c). Works created, but not
published or copyrighted prior to January I, 1978, and works in which copyright already subsisted on
January 1, 1978, are protected for different terms pursuant to sections 303 and 304, respectively. See id.
§§ 303-04.
52. See H.R. 989, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 483, 104th Cong. (1995).
53. See Copyright Term Extension Bill Gets Mixed Reaction in House Hearing, 50 Pat., Trademark
& Copyright J. (BNA) 282, 283 (1995) [hereinafter Mixed Reaction] (testimony of Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks Bruce Lehman); Copyright Term Extension Bill Is Praised at Committee Hearing, 50 Pat.,
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 589, 590 (1995) [hereinafter Bill is Praised] (testimony of Commissioner
of Patents and Trademarks Bruce Lehman). Proponents also argue that the extension is desirable to
harmonize U.S. law with a recently adopted European Union directive to its member countries to set their
copyright terms at the life of the author plus 70 years so that U.S. copyright owners will not be deprived
of additional European royalties. See Mixed Reaction, supra, at 282 (testimony of Deputy U.S. Trade
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further diminution of the public domain would seriously hinder the creation of
new works and would impose costs on the public that are not warranted by the
incentive rationale.54
2. Personal Uses
The second controversial area of expansion is the extension of copyright
to personal uses of cultural works. Until the advent of photocopiers, VCRs,
cassette recorders, and other consumer copying equipment, copyright's
principal concern was the infringing competitor who might invest the large
sums required to print and sell unauthorized copies to the public. The rare
individual who took the trouble to hand copy all or part of a book for her own
use posed no real threat to the publisher's ability to market the author's work.
The same was true of individuals (or even institutions like used book stores
and libraries) who sold or lent used copies. The purchase or borrowing of a
used copy, some time after the work came onto the market, was unlikely to
substitute for the purchase of a new copy. 5 Partly as a result of this de
minimis market harm and partly out of a desire to avoid unwarranted intrusion
on individuals' private affairs and property rights, handwritten home copying
of published works and the disposition of lawfully acquired copies have not
traditionally been deemed to constitute an infringement of copyright. 6
With readily available consumer electronics and digital technology,
however, individual consumers are now able to make perfect copies of many
cultural works at virtually no cost. If left unchecked, massive consumer
copying could undermine publisher markets no less than could infringing
Representative Charlene Barshefsky); Bill is Praised, supra, at 590 (testimony of Register of Copyrights
Marybeth Peters).
54. See Mixed Reaction, supra note 53. at 283 (testimony of Prof. Dennis Karjala). Bill is Praised.
supra note 53, at 591 (testimony of Prof. Peter Jaszi).
55. Indeed, in the early years of copyright relatively few individuals could afford to acquire books on
a regular basis and, accordingly, sales to libraries made up a significant source of publisher revenue. See
CATHY DAvIDSON, REVOLUTION AND THE WORD: THE RISE OF THE NOvEL IN AMERICA 27-28 (1986)
56. Although there is no reported case that explicitly holds as such. authorities have generally
concurred that, except perhaps in unusual circumstances, a single handwritten copy of a protected published
work made for the copier's own private use would be noninfnngement under the fair use doctrine or de
minimis infringement doctrine. See, e.g., American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.. 60 F.3d 913. 916
(2d Cir. 1994) (distinguishing systematic copying by company scientists from "copying by an individual.
for personal use in research or otherwise (not for resale)," which. "under the far use doctinne or the de
minimis doctrine... might well not constitute an infringement"): Williams & Wilkins Co v. United States.
487 F.2d 1345, 1350 (Ct. Cl. 1973) ("[lI]t is almost unanimously accepted that a scholar can make a
handwritten copy of an entire copyrighted article for his own use."); cf. MELvit-E B. NittER & DAvID
NIMMER, 3 NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[E]. at 13-253 (1995) (hereinafter NImtsER ON COPYRtGHTI
(recognizing that court might be impelled by "force of custom" to find that personal, handwritten copy
would constitute noninfringing fair use, but arguing that such result could "not be reconciled with the
rationale for fair use"). Under the "first sale doctrine." codified in section 109 of the Copyright Act. the
owner of a copy of a protected work is generally free to sell, lend. or otherwise dispose of that copy.
without the authority of the copyright owner. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994).
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competitors.57 Electronic borrowing can also substitute for the acquisition of
copies in ways that borrowing a used hard copy could not. With current,
rapidly developing technology, library patrons can view digitized and
electronically stored works from the comfort of their homes whenever and as
often as they wish, even at the same time that many other patrons are viewing
the same works.58 With the spread of such technology, which bypasses the
temporal and physical limitations of hard copy borrowing, many more people
will be able to gain access to cultural works without purchasing them. In fact,
given easy and inexpensive access to electronic libraries, there might be little
reason for most people to have their own copy of many types of works.59
In light of these developments, copyright owners have pushed to extend
the reach of their exclusive rights to incorporate personal copying, secondary
dispositions of purchased copies, and electronic borrowing. Thus far their
success has been sporadic. Although the matter is far from settled, courts have
generally declined to find personal copying as infringing.60 Congress has
established a royalty scheme for digital audio recording, under which copyright
owners receive a fee from the sale of digital recording equipment and
media.6' But in return, Congress prohibited copyright owners from bringing
infringement actions for noncommercial consumer recordings of music. 62 In
addition, pursuant to the "first sale" doctrine, purchasers continue generally to
enjoy the freedom to dispose of purchased copies as they wish. Congress has
thus far given copyright owners control over secondary dispositions only in the
areas of computer program and sound recording rentals, where the dangers of
renter copying are particularly apparent.63
On the other hand, Congress has provided, under the Copyright Act of
1976, that the copyright owner's exclusive right of public display would extend
57. See Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 1477-78.
58. See Jan Olsen, Cornell University's Albert R. Mann Library: A Prototype for Today's Electronic
Library, LIBRARY Hi TEcH, Dec. 1994, at 31, 32-37.
59. Cf. Volokh, supra note 21, at 1809-17 (predicting that hard copy distribution of record albums
will be replaced by commercial digital delivery of consumer-selected songs, of which in some instances
consumers will purchase copy of the delivered music and in others, including pay-per-play and custom-mix
radio transmission, they will not).
60. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), the Supreme Court
held that home videotaping of television programs for purposes of "time-shifting," or watching a program
after it has been broadcast, was a noninfringing fair use. More recently, the Second Circuit amended its
opinion in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), to clarify that its
holding that archival copying by Texaco research scientists was an infringement did not extend to
individual copying "for personal use in research or otherwise," which, the court recognized, "might well"
be noninfringing "under the fair use doctrine or de minimis doctrine." Id. at 916.
61. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003-07 (1994).
62. See id. § 1008.
63. See id. § 109(b); see also Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, arts.
II, 14, reprinted in SELECTED STATUTES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON UNFAIR COMPETITION,
TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT 410, 415-16 (Paul Goldstein et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter TRIPs]
(requiring member states to accord commercial rental rights in computer programs, cinematographic works.
and sound recording in certain circumstances).
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to a library's provision of remote electronic access to digitized works. 61
Moreover, in what may well portend further copyright expansion, the Clinton
Administration's White Paper on Intellectual Property and the National
Informational Infrastructure maintains that the private copying of electronically
stored works, and even the viewing of a work on a computer screen without
downloading it, should not generally be permitted without the consent of the
copyright owner.65 The NII White Paper also concludes, in contrast to the
spirit if not the letter of the first sale doctrine, that the unlicensed electronic
transmission of a work from one person to another does and should constitute
an infringement, even if the transmitter has simultaneously deleted his copy
from his computer.66 If the Nil White Paper position is adopted by Congress
or the courts, the electronic equivalents of browsing through a magazine at a
newsstand, lending a book to a friend, or borrowing a book from a library
would fall within the province of the copyright owner's exclusive rights.67
3. Transformative Uses
The third troublesome instance of copyright expansion sharply constricts
the extent to which authors may borrow from existing works in creating their
own. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, authors were free to borrow
from existing works as long as they made their own substantial contribution
64. Under the Copyright Act, "-[to *display' a work means to show a copy of it. either directly or by
means of a film, slide, television image, or any other device or process." 17 U.S-C § 101 (1994) tcmphasis
added). The House Report accompanying the Act makes clear that "display" ould apply to remote
electronic access. It states that the term includes "the transmission of an image by electronic or other
means, and the showing of an image on a cathode ray tube. or similar viewing apparatus connected with
any sort of information storage and retrieval system." H.R. REP. No. 94.1476. at 64 (1976) The Report
further notes that "the display of a visual image of a copyrighted work would be an infnngement if the
image were transmitted by any method (by closed or open circuit television, for example, or by a computer
system) from one place to members of the public located elsewhere." Id. at 80
65. According to the White Paper, given the current state of computer technology, '.ic% ing material
on a computer screen, even without downloading it, constitutes copying. See NIl WtirrE PAPER. supra note
6, at 66. The White Paper grants that personal copying may constitute a fair use under current law, but
strongly suggests that technological means of tracking transactions and licensing should lead to reduced
application and scope of the fair use doctrine. See id at 82 (technological tracking and fair use). id at 84
(copyright owners should not be "taxed" to provide universal access). id at 88 (electronic ordering and
payment may become effective substitute for interlibrary loan). Taking the more restrictisc approach on
an issue which has yet to be definitively decided in the courts, the White Paper would also impose on the
user the burden of persuasion and coming forward with evidence of fair use See id at 73 n 229 For a
discussion of judicial treatment of this issue. see infra note 232.
66. The White Paper contends that such a transmission actually constitutes the making of a new copy
of the work, rather than the transfer of the transmitter's copy. and as such the first sale doctrine does not
apply. See Nil WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 92-94. Ostensibly. the White Paper recognizes that some
such transfers may be a noninfringing fair use, see id. at 93. but the White Paper would sharply restrict the
availability of fair use; see supra note 65.
67. According to the authors of the White Paper. its position has already been adopted by the courts
in decisions holding that booting works into computer RAM constitutes the making of a copy. See Nil
WHTrrE PAPER, supra note 6, at 65 n.204 (citing MAI Systems Corp v. Peak Computer. Inc. 991 F2d 511.
519 (9th Cir. 1993)).
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and did not displace demand for the original work in its original form.68 In
one landmark case, for example, the German translator of Uncle Tom's Cabin
defeated Harriet Beecher Stowe's copyright infringement action against him;
the court held that the translation was a new work and not merely a
reproduction of the original.69 The principle that copyright is delimited by
what the defendant has contributed began to erode in the late nineteenth
century, however, and has continued steadily to crumble through the twentieth
century.
70
The Copyright Act of 1976 now accords copyright owners a broad,
exclusive right to prepare derivative works based on the original. 7' These
include translations, arrangements, versions in other media, and "any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. 72 In addition,
courts have liberally construed the exclusive right of reproduction, holding that
it may encompass defendants' works that, while not literally copying or even
paraphrasing any of the original's expression, evoke the same "total concept
and feel. 73 Given these loose standards, a leading copyright commentator
concludes-with good reason-that if Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet were
protected by copyright today, the Broadway musical West Side Story might
well be found to infringe it.74 Finally, a defendant, such as the creator of a
multimedia CD-ROM, who has copied a small portion of a preexisting work
and incorporated it as a small portion of his work, may likewise run afoul of
the reproduction right in the original.75 Under today's rule of "fragmented
68. As Benjamin Kaplan correctly notes, the infringement problem in pretwentieth-century adaptation
cases was answered, in contrast to today's approach, "by looking not so much to what the defendant had
taken as to what he had added or contributed." BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT
17 (1967). In fact, eighteenth-century English judges, including Lord Mansfield, generally lauded the
defendants' "improvements" as "extremely useful" and "meritorious." Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 139
(K.B. 1785); Burnett v. Chetwood, 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (Ch. 1720); Newbery's Case, 98 Eng. Rep. 913 (Ch.
1773).
69. See Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514).
70. The 1870 Copyright Act provided that "authors may reserve the right to dramatize or to translate
their own works." Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 212 (1871). The 1909 Act added the right
to make adaptations and other versions of certain types of original works. See Act of March 4, 1909, ch.
320, § l(b), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075. For a synopsis of the 1909 adaptation provisions, see Paul Goldstein,
Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA 209, 214 (1983). The
Copyright Act of 1976 expands this right by according authors the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works based upon any type of copyrighted work. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994). It defines "derivative
work" broadly to include "a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted." Id. § 101. For an insightful and detailed discussion of courts'
gradual move from a focus on defendants' contributions to a view that copyright owners are generally
entitled to control any use of expression from which they might profit, see Lunney, supra note 30, at
534-40.
71. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994).
72. Id. § 101 (definition of "derivative work").
73. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding that
defendant's imitative greeting card may be infringing even though it copied neither copyrighted text nor
copyrighted artwork).
74. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 56, § 13.03[A]il][b], at 13-36.
75. See, e.g., Tin Pan Apple Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1791 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
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literal similarity," the defendant's contribution would be deemed irrelevant to
the prima facie case of copyright infringement.76 In short, like the producers
of West Side Story, T.S. Eliot would today run afoul of copyright were not The
Waste Land a pastiche of centuries old material.
As all authorship involves a degree of borrowing from earlier works,
7
an overly broad copyright represents an unacceptable burden on creative
expression. Given this concern, a number of commentators and litigants have
asserted that copyright should be subject to First Amendment limitations,
principally to ensure that authors may incorporate existing expression as
necessary for the critical commentary and expressive diversity upon which
democratic governance depends. Courts have steadfastly rejected First
Amendment defenses to copyright infringement claims, for the fundamental
reason that copyright doctrine itself is said to contain core limitations on
copyright owner prerogatives that more than adequately protect First
Amendment values.79 Perhaps unwittingly, however, judicial reliance on
copyright doctrine to reject First Amendment defenses has resulted in a sleight-
of-hand. As copyright has evolved, its internal limitations on copyright owner
prerogatives have themselves been vitiated by copyright expansionism. As a
result, the copyright law safeguards that have made First Amendment defenses
seem overly intrusive and unnecessary have in fact been only sporadically
effective in protecting First Amendment values.80
(declining to hold, as matter of law, that defendant's digital sampling of words "Hugga-Hugga" and "Brr"
from plaintiff's song constituted noninfringing copying of noncopyrightable material): Jarvis v. A & M
Records, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812, 1817-19 (D.NJ. 1993) (denying defendant's motion for summary
judgment on grounds that genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether sounds and phrases "ooh."
"moves," and "free your body" were significant to song from which they were digitally sampled and
regarding fact that "[t]he two songs were utterly unlike and reached completely different markets" as
irrelevant to question of infringement).
76. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 56, § 13.03(A][2], at 13-49. The modern position
regarding the irrelevance of the defendant's contribution was cogently stated by Learned Hand: "[N]o
plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate." Sheldon v Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936).
77. As Terry Eagleton puts it: "[A]II poems can be read as rewritings of other poems." TERRY
EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUcTION 183 (1983).
78. See Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Consttutional Limutanons on the Protecton
of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1979); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment. 70
COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Melville B. Nimmer. Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L REv. 1180 (1970); L Ray Patterson, Free Speech.
Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987).
79. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.. 471 U.S. 539. 560 (1985) (explaining that
First Amendment protections are "already embodied in the Copyright Act's distinction between
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas"); Roy Export Co. v. CBS. 672 F.2d 1095.
1099 (2d Cir. 1982) ("No circuit that has considered the question ... has ever held that the First
Amendment provides a privilege in the copyright field distinct from the accommodation embodied in the
'fair use' doctrine.").
80. In addition to relying on the safeguards as a whole in dismissing calls to reevaluate the First
Amendment copyright relationship, Congress and the courts have approved the erosion of each internal
safeguard in turn, while relying on the other safeguards to take up the slack. See Jessica Litman. Copyright
and Information Policy, LAW & CON'rMP. PROBS., Spring 1992. 185. 204-06 (1992).
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Copyright doctrine purports to limit the scope of protection, and thus to
maintain an acceptable degree of transformative expression and discursive
exchange, in three principal ways. First, copyright law limits the duration of
protection. Even if the copyright owner's exclusive rights are somewhat
onerous, the work will eventually fall into the public domain. As the copyright
term gets longer and longer, however, this limitation becomes highly
attenuated. Indeed, a copyright term lasting the life of the author plus seventy
years would often freeze in place proprietary barriers to public access for a
century or more.
Second, copyright doctrine posits a dichotomy between protectible
expression and unprotected ideas. While a work's aesthetic form falls within
the province of the copyright owner's exclusive rights, the ideas that the work
evokes or seeks to convey are free for all to use.8' In theory, therefore, even
copyright owners' extensive control over "expression" would not constrain the
free exchange of "ideas." But while the idea/expression dichotomy makes
sense in principle, it is notoriously malleable and indeterminate.82 Indeed,
much of copyright's expansion into the area of derivative uses of existing
works reflects a recharacterization as protected expression of what used to be
considered public domain ideas.
Finally, copyright's fair use doctrine provides that in some circumstances
even the appropriation of expression will not constitute an infringement.
83
The application of the fair use doctrine requires a case-by-case analysis of
factors, including the purpose and character of the defendant's use, the nature
of copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion used, the
effect of the use on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,
and any other factor that the court may deem appropriate.8 Commentators
have bemoaned the seeming absence of consistent, principled application of the
fair use doctrine.85 More significantly, Congress and the courts have narrowed
the scope of the fair use privilege, converting it from a standard that left
81. The idea/expression dichotomy is codified in section 102(b) of the Copyright Act, which provides:
"In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it
is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994); see also Alfred
C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's
"Total Concept and Feel", 38 EMORY L.J. 393 (1989).
82. As Judge Learned Hand said, the line between idea and expression "wherever it is drawn, will
seem arbitrary." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930). As a result, Hand
noted thirty years later that "[tlhe test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague." Peter Pan
Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
83. The fair use doctrine is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
84. See id. The factors set forth in the statute are not exclusive. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 587-88 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); American Geophysical Union v.
Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881, 886 (2d Cir. 1994).
85. See, e.g., 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 56, § 13.05[A), at 3-156 to 3-159 (analyzing fair
use factors and concluding that their "infinite elasticity" results in their "inability to resolve difficult
questions"); Fisher, supra note 27, at 1668-69, 1692-95 (describing equitable nature of fair use doctrine,
but concluding that doctrine as it stands is incoherent).
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considerable room for copying as part of an effort to create a new work to a
standard that permits such reuse only in isolated cases.'s
B. Further Expansion by Contract
Even to the extent that copyright's internal limitations do preserve a space
for personal uses and discursive exchange, copyright expansionists would
accord copyright owners an opportunity to circumvent those limitations through
digital technology and contract. The revolution in digital technology and
computer networks raises the very real possibility that in the not-too-distant
future much expression will be available primarily or solely online. A person
who buys a book generally has no contractual relationship with the author,
publisher, or bookseller regarding how the person may use the book. The
buyer's rights to read the book, make notes in it, copy expression or ideas
from it, or dispose of it through sale, rent, or gift are all determined by the
nature and scope of the copyright owner's exclusive rights in the literary work
embodied in the book and the buyer's property rights in book itself. Yet if the
same person wishes to access a text that exists only in digital format in an
electronic database, he may well have to do so by entering into a subscription
contract or other agreement with the database proprietor. In that event, the
database proprietor may condition access on the reader's binding promise to
refrain from using the text in ways that would constitute a fair use or that
would be simply be beyond the limits of the copyright owner's exclusive
rights. The database proprietor might also obtain the contractual near
equivalent of copyright protection-or more-for texts that are in the public
domain.8
Similar efforts by computer software manufacturers to include such terms
in "shrinkwrap licenses" accompanying hard copies of consumer computer
software have generally failed on grounds of copyright preemption or failure
of mutual assent.88 But the Seventh Circuit has recently upheld the
enforceability of such a license,89 and there is a move afoot, supported by the
NII White Paper, to make them generally enforceable. 90 Moreover, database
access contracts would more closely resemble the standard contractual meeting
of the minds than do shrinkwrap licenses and thus might have a greater chance
86. See Lunney, supra note 30, at 546-52.
87. For a discussion of these phenomena and their potential ramtfications. see GOlDSThl,'. supra notc
21, at 223-34; Jane C. Ginsburg. Copyright irlthout alls7. Speculations on Literars Propern in the
Library of the Future, REPRESENTATIONS. Spnng 1993. at 53. 59-64. Mark A Lemlc). Shrinki.raps in
Cyberspace, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 311 (1995).
88. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkw rap Licenses. 68 S CAL_ L REV 1239.
1249-50 (1995).
89. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Ctr 1996)
90. An amendment to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to cocr such licenses i, under
consideration by the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code and the amcndmcnt is
supported by the White Paper. See Nil WHrr' PAPER. supra note 6. at 58-59
19961
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of surviving the contract law challenges that have until recently thwarted
shrinkwrap licenses. 9' The enforceability of such database access contracts
will likely depend on whether they are held void against public policy, given
copyright law and First Amendment limits on the private monopoly over
expression, or whether their enforcement in state court is held preempted by
the Copyright Act.92 If the White Paper position is accepted, access contracts
that exceed copyright limits would survive such challenges. Touting the
efficiency benefits of online licensing, the White Paper argues that state
statutes that recognize the validity of "on-line licenses-even those licenses
which cover the exclusive rights of the copyright owner-would not usurp
Federal power and should be upheld.' 93
II. THE NEOCLASSICIST APPROACH TO COPYRIGHT
There are many reasons for copyright's expansion, including technological
development, power politics (both domestic and international), and the
transformation of the United States from a net importer to a major exporter of
intellectual works.94 In combination with these factors, the perceived
theoretical justifications for copyright have continued to weigh heavily in
decisions of judges, legislators, and policymakers regarding the nature and
extent of copyright protection. Naked self-interest can only go so far in
shaping the contours of a legal regime. The most robust policy ideas are
informed by a cogent rhetorical framework that eases their way to general
acceptance." For that reason, competing theories have loomed large in the
controversy over copyright's scope.
An approach to copyright based on a blend of neoclassical and new
institutional economic property theory has emerged as the principal theoretical
91. See Joel Rothstein Wolfson, Information Transactions on the Information Superhighway: lt's Not
Just Software Law Anymore, 6 J. PROPRIETARY RTS., Nov. 1994, at 2, 2-3. But see John B. Kennedy &
Shoshana R. Davids, Web-Site Agreements Do Not Wrap Up IP Rights, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 23, 1995, at C3
(concluding that many current World Wide Web site agreements are probably unenforceable because they
are not sufficiently conspicuous and do not require site visitors actively to manifest assent after having
opportunity to review license terms).
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994); see also David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public
Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. Prr. L,
REv. 543, 594-95 (1992) (asserting that software shrinkwrap licenses should be preempted).
93. NIl WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 58-59.
94. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the United States was a net importer of copyrighted
works, primarily books from Great Britain. Largely as a result, the United States did not accord domestic
copyright protection to foreign works until Congress enacted the International Copyright Act of 1891, 26
Stat. 1106, and even then it imposed, as a condition for protection, compliance with U.S. registration,
notice, and deposit requirements and the American manufacture of "any book, chromo, lithograph or
photograph." Id. § 3. Today, however, the United States is the world's largest exporter of copyrighted
works. See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 12.5 (1989).
95. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought, 46 VAND. L. REV. 305,
308-09 (1993).
96. See generally Symposium, Intellectual Property Law Theory, 68 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 583 (1993)
(treating intellectual property law from philosophical, economic, and artistic perspectives).
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support for copyright expansionism. Eminent intellectual property scholars,
including the author of a leading copyright treatise, have espoused the
neoclassicist approach to copyright.9 7 The approach has animated a line of
cases that would dramatically expand copyright owner prerogatives," and its
97. Stanford Law School Professor Paul Goldstein'scopyright treatise views cop) rght principally trom
an economic perspective and employs neoclassical analysis frequently (although not e,,clus-sel) See
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 18, §§ 1.14.2.3-.4, at 1-51-57 (maintaining that compulsory licenses. exemptions.
and liability rules that detract from copyright owners' full property rights should be einployed spanngl>.
if at all, because of their detrimental effect on owner investment in existing %%orks and disruption ot pricing
mechanism by which consumers signal what works they want) Professor Goldstein insoks the
neoclassicist approach more expressly in his recent provocative and captliating account of cop) right's inner
workings from Gutenberg to the digital age. See GOLDSTEIN. supra note 21. at 176-79. 217-24. 236
A number of scholars assert that a misguided natural rights approach, together with sestiges of
nineteenth-century Romanticism, has pushed copyright in the direction of a full common law property right.
a right that is immune to claims of public access. See. e.g. JAMES BOYLi. SIAAS. SOMr's.,R,. AD
SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUc-nON OF THE INFORMATION SOcIEY 51-59 019961. MARK Rost,.
AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993); Jaszt. supra note 9. Peter Jaszi, Tostard
a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "'Authorship". 1991 DUKE LJ 455 [hereinafter Jaszi.
Toward a Theory]; Litman, supra note 9, at 965-66. see also Gordon. Self-Extpressfon. supra note 8. at
1540 (pointing finger at misinterpretation of Lockean natural rights theory) This claim is wholly
unconvincing. Aside from an early and sporadic influence, the notion that authors are entitled, as a matter
of natural right, to a reward for their intellectual labor, let alone to a full proprietary right in their creatise
product, has been rejected repeatedly and in no uncertain terms by both Congress and the courts See e ,
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.. 114 S. Ct. 1023. 1029 (1994) ("We hase often recognized the monopoly pnsileges
that Congress has authorized, while 'intended to motivate the creatise activsit of author, and insentors, by
the provision of a special reward,' are limited in nature and must ulimatel sers¢ the public good "i
(quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios. Inc., 464 U S 417. 429 (1984)) In addition. esen when the
idea of giving a reward to authors is presented as a secondary rationale for cop) right. as stated either as
an inducement to creative production, see. e.g.. United States \ Paramount Pictures, Inc . 334 U S 131,
158 (1948) ("It is said that reward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the public ot the
products of his creative genius."), or as a "fair return." Harper & Row. Publishers. Inc % Nation Enters.
471 U.S. 539, 545-46 (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp \ Aiken. 422 U S 151, 156 41975).
"commensurate with the services rendered." Mazer v. Stein. 347 U S 201. 219 (1954), a formulation that
envisions a limited claim to compensation, not a broad proprietary entitlement For a fuller esplication of
this point, see Marci A. Hamilton, Appropriation Art and the hnnnent Decdie ii Authorial Control over
Copyrighted Works, 42 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 93. 98-112 (1994) (arguing that those who assert material
natural rights/Romanticism influence are "batting at a straw man"). Neil Netanel. The Law and Literature
Attack on the Law of Literature: Should Copyright Be Deconstructed (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author) (arguing that claim of influence of Romanticism on early and subsequent copyright
doctrine is highly exaggerated).
98. The leading case is Harper & Row Publishers. Iic. v Naron Enterpri5ses. 471 U S 539 (1985)
(holding that story in The Nation composed of quotes. paraphrases. and facts draw n exclusisely from
manuscript by former President Gerald Ford was not fair use under Copyright Act) In that case the
Supreme Court in effect recognized, under the rubric of copyright. an expansise proprietary right to capture
the full economic value of the initial release of information. Twice citing to an article in which Professor
Wendy Gordon explicitly laid out a neoclassicist view of copyright and fair use. see Gordon. Fair Use.
supra note 8, the Court ruled that the fair use "exception" would be available only in highly cireumscribed
instances of bilateral market failure. See 471 U.S. at 559. 566 n 9 Fair use. the Court stated, is
inappropriate unless a "-reasonable copyright owner [would) have consented to the use' giscn the
"'importance of the material copied or performed from the point of viei of the reasonable copsritht
owner."' Id. at 550 (quoting ALAN LATMAN. FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHT WORKS 15 119581. reprinted lii
STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 779 (1963)); see also ProCD. Inc. %. Zeidenberg. 86 F3d 1447. 1449 i7th Cir
1996) (upholding enforceability of "shrinkwrap licenses" that proscribe user copying of uncop)nghtable
material); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco. Inc.. 37 F.3d 881. 897-99 (2d Cir 19941 (holding that
availability of workable market for joumal-article photocopy licensing through establishment of collectise
licensing organization militates against fair use for unlicensed photocopying. esen apart from any showing
of lost subscription revenue); Salinger v. Random House. Inc.. 811 F2d 90. 99-100 (2d Cir 1987) (holding
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influence is apparent in the NII White Paper's analysis and
recommendations.99
A. Two Approaches to Copyright Economics
It is important at the outset to distinguish the neoclassicist approach from
the economic incentive rationale for copyright. In addressing the theoretical
foundations for intellectual property, courts and commentators often present
economic analysis as a single monolithic whole.1' ° The economic analysis
of intellectual property, however, encompasses at least two conceptually
distinct approaches.' 0 ' While each approach purports to take wealth
maximization and allocative efficiency as its organizing principle, their
respective applications of this principle diverge sharply. Most importantly for
our purposes, the incentive approach tends to look critically at copyright's
expansion, questioning whether greater protection is necessary to provide an
economic incentive for the production of creative works. The neoclassicist
approach, on the other hand, has pushed economic analysis in the opposite
direction. It supports expanded intellectual property rights and a diminished
public domain. The neoclassicist approach appears to have gained the upper
hand, and now dominates the field of copyright economics.
The incentive approach seeks to explicate intellectual property's traditional
incentive rationale in economic terms. Beginning with the Statute of Anne of
1709, copyright statutes have been based on the unproven intuition that authors
and publishers will not make works available to the public unless they can
prevent others from making copies, at least for a limited time."'2 The
approach, which dates back to Adam Smith, has generally found justification
for this intuition in economic theory.'0 3 It posits, along the lines discussed
that author was entitled to protect potential market for his unpublished letters, even though he disavowed
any intention to publish them during his lifetime).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67, 90-93.
100. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled
Standards, 70 MINN. L. REv. 579, 596-600 (1985); Fisher, supra note 27, at 1700-04; Alfred C. Yen,
Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 518 (1990).
101. For a historical account of economic approaches to copyright, see Gillian K. Hadfield, The
Economics of Copyright: An Historical Perspective, 38 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1 (1992). For a
brief account of opposing approaches to the economic analysis of the law generally, see Nicholas Mercuro
& Steven G. Medema, Schools of Thought in Law and Economics: A Kuhnian Competition, in LAW AND
ECONOMics: NEW AND CRMCAL PERSPECTIVES 65 (Robin Paul Malloy & Christopher K. Braun eds.,
1995).
102. See An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the
Author's or Purchasers of Such Copies, During the Times Therein Mentioned, 1709, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (Eng.).
103. Adam Smith lauded the temporary monopoly granted to authors and their assigns under the
Statute of Anne as an efficient means of stimulating book production: "[I]f the book be a valuable one the
demand for it in that time [i.e., the copyright period] will probably be a considerable addition to his [i.e.,
the author's] fortune. But if it is of no value the advantage he can reap from it will be very small." Adam
Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence; Report of 1762-63, in ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE
AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 754 n.69 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., 1976) (1776).
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in Part I, that copyright is necessary to prevent free riders from undermining
the market in creative expression. This support has usually been qualified,
however, by a concern for copyright's social cost. Incentive theorists
emphasize that copyright carries with it some of the problems of monopoly
pricing, and they question the desirability of expanding copyright beyond the
minimum necessary to provide authors with an incentive to produce.'
Neoclassicists label the incentive approach "crude" and "two-
dimensional."'05 They do not deny that copyright may serve as a necessary
production incentive, but in their eyes copyright is much more. Under the
neoclassicist approach, copyright is primarily a mechanism for market
facilitation, for moving existing creative works to their highest socially valued
uses. Copyright can best serve this goal, neoclassicism suggests, by enabling
copyright owners to realize the full profit potential for their works in the
market.'6 In maximizing their profit, neoclassicists argue, copyright owners
will both rationalize the "development" of existing creative works and sell
exploitation entitlements to those who are best able to satisfy public tastes.'"7
For neoclassicists, copyright enables owners to charge users for access to
creative work public goods not so much to preserve author incentives as to
determine what creative works are worth and thus to create a guide for
resource allocation. 108
Accordingly, the neoclassicist approach focuses less on the precarious
balance between reader and writer than on perfecting markets for all potential
uses of creative works for which there may be willing buyers. While the
incentive approach sees copyright as a limited grant, neoclassicists envisage a
regime of broad, fully exchangeable property rights in creative products, with
104. See. e.g., Sterk, supra note 30, at 1204-08.
105. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Ments of Copiright Th7e Challenges of
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory. 41 STAN. L. REv. 1343. 1435-49 1989) arguing that
economic approach to copyright that points to "author's entitlements as the starting point from shtch
markets evolve" is superior to one that asks whether copyright incento e is necessar) to pro ide consumers.
with works they would otherwise not have); Robert P. Merges. Are You Making Fun of .le' Votes on
Market Failure and the Parody Defense in Copyright. 21 AIPLA QJ 305. 306 01993) (noting that
economic literature on copynght has "progressed beyond the point %%here a crude 'mcenti%e story passcs
for analysis in every case"); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson. On the Complet Etonomus of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 842 (1990) (stating that newer economic approach to patent goes far
"beyond the two-dimensional analysis of incentives and dead%%eight loss")
106. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 236.
107. See. e.g., Gordon, supra note 105, at 1393: see also Robert C Denicola. ititutional Publhtt
Rights: An Analysis of the Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols. 62 N C L RE'v 603. 637-41 t 1984)
(arguing that trademarks serve to organize efficiently development and exploitation of existing imentions).
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System. 20 1 L. & ECO% 265 (1977) (applying
similar analysis to patents).
108. For neoclassicists, therefore, intellectual property is less about creating an artificial scarcity in
intellectual creations than about managing the real scarcity in the other resources that may be emplo)ed
in using, developing, and marketing intellectual creations. See Kitch. supra note 107. at 275-76. see also
I HAROLD DErMsETZ OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND THE FIRM: THE ORGANIZATION OF EcoOMtIC Ac-Tvrr
39 (1988) (discussing valuation-of-resource-use rationale for requinng payment for use of public good).
Demsetz, supra note 25, at 295-96 (same).
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the goal of achieving allocative efficiency.'0 9 While incentive theorists
struggle to find just the right amount of copyright protection required to give
an adequate production incentive, neoclassicists eschew such policymaking
uncertainty in favor of assigning copyright owners maximum rights and leaving
the allocation of those rights up to the market.
The neoclassicist approach, in essence, justifies allowing copyright owners
to garner monopoly rents on the grounds that doing so will, through the pricing
system's capacity to signal consumer preferences, enable copyright owners to
develop and market expressive works in ways that consumers want. Aside
from the dubious economic premises of this argument," 0 the neoclassicists'
baseline vision of a broad, absolute copyright gives rise to an increased danger
that blatant copyright owner censorship and an overly burdensome tax on users
will inhibit expressive diversity and the advancement of knowledge.
To be certain, neoclassicist copyright scholars are generally mindful that
market dictates will sometimes conflict with copyright's democracy-enhancing
goals."' Indeed, most of those whom I have, for ease of reference, labelled
"neoclassicists" have, on some occasions, considered nonmarket values and
approaches as well. But as I will show, when these scholars have advanced a
neoclassicist approach, their attachment to the market paradigm has ultimately
frustrated their efforts to account for copyright's democracy-enhancing goals.
Moreover, and herein lies the true danger, courts and policymakers who
have adopted the neoclassicist paradigm have generally overlooked the more
nuanced, contextualized account that thoughtful scholars have sought to
advance."2 As in other areas of the law, neoclassicism has exhibited a
109. I have found only two intellectual property scholars who have noted the propensity of
neoclassicist economics to support a broad proprietary copyright akin to that which might result from a
belief that authors deserve exclusive control over their creations as a matter of natural right. See
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 178-79; Hadfield, supra note 101, at 41-46.
110. The neoclassicists' economic premises are faulty in at least two basic respects. First, as Glynn
Lunney and others have pointed out, assuming the efficacy of the pricing system model, a broad proprietary
copyright may well lead to the mix of expression that consumers of expression prefer, but it would draw
resources away from nonexpressive productive activity, thus resulting in an inefficient allocation of
resources overall. See infra text accompanying notes 255-57. Second, as numerous studies have shown,
there are significant discrepancies between the pricing system model and markets' actual operation. See
infra text accompanying notes 241-48.
Ill. See infra text accompanying notes 188-91.
112. A prime example is the Supreme Court's decision in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985), relying, at least in part, on Wendy Gordon's neoclassicist analysis of fair use.
See supra note 98. In that analysis Gordon sought to argue that consumptive uses, not just transformative
uses, may sometimes qualify for fair use. See infra note 228 and accompanying text. In presenting her
argument in neoclassicist terms, however, she imposed restrictive conditions on fair use, positing that it
should be available, at least in the absence of fundamental, overriding nonmonetizable interests, only when
the defendant proves that the market failure is insurmountable, that transferring control over the use would
serve the public interest, and that the copyright owner's incentives would not be substantially impaired. See
infra notes 229-33 and accompanying text. Picking up on Gordon's neoclassicist market model and the
restrictive conditions that flowed from it, the Supreme Court denied fair use to The Nation's transformative
use of some 300 words from President Ford's memoirs over strident objections from the dissent that the
Court was recognizing a proprietary right of public officials "to capture the full economic value of
information in [their] possession," thus stifling "the robust debate of public issues that is the 'essence of
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powerful allure. Its rarified price system model promises a seemingly hermetic
and simple framework for mechanically resolving fundamental tensions
between competing values and interests." 3 But as we shall see in the case
of copyright, the neoclassical model both sidesteps the persistent irregularities
of real world markets and errantly reduces complex issues of public policy to
readily assessable bilateral transactions, glossing over intractably external
social benefits and costs of market actor decisions.
B. The Neoclassicist Approach
The neoclassicist approach has roots in late nineteenth-century marginal
utility theory. Marginal utility theory represented a fundamental shift from the
classical conception of property as the embodiment of previously committed
investment and labor to an identification of property with the ability to capture
future profits. 114  Its emergence coincided with, and appears to have
contributed to, early extensions of copyright's scope." 5 Neoclassicism has
ascended to prominence during the last three decades-a period of marked
intellectual property expansion-with the Chicago school's application of
self-government."' Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 591 (Brennan. J . disscnting) (citation omited) With
potentially far-reaching implications, the Court ruled as well that fair use should be available only in
isolated cases of market failure and in the absence of any adverse effect on the potential market for the
copyrighted work not only from the use in question, but also from others like it. See id at 549-50. 568
113. Neoclassical scholars purport to recognize that the price system model is only that a model that.
because it provides a simplified account of social reality, may be a relatively workable predictise tool for
a limited universe of issues. See. e.g., GEORGE J. STIGLER. THE TIHEORY OF PRIcE 5 3d ed 1966)
("Clearly a general theory must ignore a thousand detailed vanations or it cannot possibly be general Yet
only general theories are useful."); see also Herbert Hovenkamp. Positivism in Law & Economics. 78 CAL
L. REv. 815, 817 (1990) (noting neoclassical law and economics' positivist predisposition tosard 'stnppcd-
down models that account for few of the world's facts but have great predictise poswer. ocr complex
models that account for everything but make prediction difficult-). The problem is that this limitation is
too often relegated to the margins when scholars employ the pnce system model to analyze complex real-
world public policy issues. That tendency is exacerbated, moreover. shen policymakcrs and lawmakers.
faced with the daunting task of making decisions regarding complex and often controscrsial issues. see the
model as a simple, value-neutral tool for enabling them to do so. See Michael S. Jacobs. An E.ssas on the
Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REv. 219. 237-38 (1995) (discussing attraction
of neoclassical price theory's seeming coherence, ease of applicability, and valuc-ncutrlity to courts
addressing antitrust issues). Numerous commentators have underscored the methodological shortcomings
and implicit normative posture of neoclassical law and economics and the pnce s) stcm model See. e g.
MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRMCAL LEGAL STUDIES 114-85 (1987) (canvassing critiques b) CLS and
other scholars); C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law. 5 PNiL & PL B AFF 3.
4 (1975) (noting methodological inconsistencies and conservative ideology in Chicago school of law and
economics); J.M. Balkin, Too Good To Be True: The Positive Economic Theor- of Last. 87 COLt %I L
REV. 1447, 1454 (1987) (noting conservative ideology in Chicago school of law and economics) My
primary focus in this Article will be on how neoclassicism supports an expanded copyright, not on the more
general issues surrounding neoclassical law and economics.
114. See Hovenkamp. supra note 95. at 324-25.
115. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the conversion of cop) right from a mere
right to prevent literal or near literal copies to a set of exclusive rights that included the right to make
adaptations of a work in other languages or media. The notion that property rights could attach to the
interest in fully developing and exploiting the market value of an underlying asset appears to have
supported this development. See Netanel, supra note 97. manuscript at 29-30. 32. 34.
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economic analysis to legal institutions."t 6 Neoclassical economics views a
system of universally applied and clearly defined property rights as a
cornerstone of market efficiency. As we shall see, it is the neoclassical sense
of allocative efficiency, with its reification of claims to market potential, its
emphasis on universal, concentrated, exclusive, and exchangeable property
rights, and its subordination of law to market ideals that helps to spur
copyright's untoward expansion.'
The neoclassicist approach to copyright also borrows from new
institutional economic theory." 8 New institutional economic theorists often
place themselves apart from neoclassical law and economics. In particular, they
criticize the neoclassical tendency to rely on formal models that treat economic
agents (including individuals and firms) as rational maximizers, willing to
pursue consistent ends by efficient means." 9 In addition, where neoclassical
models tend to treat transaction costs as exogenous and relatively
circumscribed impediments to ideal market exchange, 20 new institutional
theorists emphasize the centrality of transaction costs, and view the desire to
116. See generally R.H. Coase, Law and Economics at Chicago, 36 J.L. & ECON. 239 (1993). For a
brief discussion of the intellectual property expansionism in recent decades, see Gordon, supra note 6, at
151-52.
117. The inclusion of copyright within the post-Coasean neoclassical umbrella began with Harold
Demsetz's landmark essay setting forth the basic tenets of neoclassical property theory. See Harold
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 347 (1967). Demsetz
sought to demonstrate in that essay that property rights arise in conditions of resource scarcity to internalize
the externalities associated with excessive use and to facilitate transfers to the most efficient users by
reducing negotiating costs. As such, claimed Demsetz, property rights serve to ameliorate the inherent
inefficiencies in common ownership of scarce resources. Toward the essay's close, Demsetz argued that
copyright serves a similar function. See id. at 359. Intellectual property, asserted Demsetz, exists in order
to internalize the positive externalities of creating intellectual works. By according property rights in such
works, copyright and patent concentrates the social benefits of original expression and invention in authors
and inventors, giving them a greater incentive to engage in creative activity. See id. In addition to
reworking copyright's traditional incentive rationale in neoclassical terms, Demsetz maintained that
marketable rights in intellectual property enable the external effects of new creations on existing works to
be internalized as well. When a new creation makes an old one obsolete or more valuable, those effects
"can be called to the attention of the originator of the new [creation] through market negotiations." Id, All
such "problems of externalities," Demsetz concluded, "are closely analogous to those which arise in the
land ownership example." Id. For a further attempt to justify intellectual property rights within the
framework of economic property rights theory by analogizing such rights to ownership in land and the
privatization of the commons, see Roger E. Meiners & Robert J. Staaf, Patents, Copyrights, and
Trademarks: Property or Monopoly?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 911, 916, 919, 923 (1990).
118. For a comprehensive survey of new institutional economic theory, see THRAINN EGOERTSsON.
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS (1990).
119. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND EcONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 3 (1990) (describing inadequacy of neoclassical model in explaining economic performance
outside of markets in developed countries); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM 45 (1985) (critiquing neoclassical faith in pricing to bring about optimal resource allocation,
arguing that far more attention needs to be paid to institutional dynamics, bounded rationality, and other
factors that hinder utility maximization); Eirik G. Furubotn & Svetozar Pejovich, Property Rights and
Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature, 10 J. ECON. LIT. 1137, 1138, 1146-53 (1972) (surveying
shift from viewing firms as single profit-maximizing units to studying them as complex organizations
composed of utility maximizing individuals).
120. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 32, at 51 (maintaining that ideal Coasean bargaining is possible
"whenever the transaction cost is less than the value of the transaction to the parties").
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Whatever their differences, however, for our purposes new institutional
economic property theory is more of a supplement than a rival to its
neoclassical counterpart. Like their neoclassical counterparts, new institutional
theorists posit that broad, clearly defined property rights are desirable for
economic efficiency.12 2 In fact, while neoclassical analysis has shied away
from property rule norms where high transaction costs would prevent market
exchange, new institutional theorists assert that property rules may be desirable
even in such cases because property rules are said to induce market actors to
establish institutions that will reduce transaction costs." Like neoclassical
law and economics, new institutional property theory also tends to elevate
market exchange over the implementation of public policy through law.' '
In particular, new institutional theorists view property rights as more the
product of private arrangement and negotiation than of legislative efforts to
further fundamental social goals. '"
I cannot, within the scope of this Article, do justice to the complexity and
intertwined relationship of neoclassical and new institutional economics.
Indeed, especially since the neoclassicist approach to copyright draws upon
those aspects of new institutional economics that are supplemental rather than
rival to the neoclassical school, I will not attempt further to extricate one
school from the other. Rather, I will refer to the amalgam of neoclassical and
new institutional property theory as "neoclassicism." 126
121. For a salient, in-depth analysis of how the dnse to economize transaction costs has shaped legal
and economic institutions, see WIL AMSON, supra note 119
122. See EGGERTSSON, supra note 118. at 326-27 (asserting that broad. clearly defined. and readily
transferable property rights are critical to economic prosperity). GARY D UBECAP. COTRACTIG FOR
PROPERTY RIGHTS I (1989) (stating that focus of property rights institutions literature "'largel) has been
on how various property rights arrangements affect behavior. shich ranges from the sasteful practice-
associated with open-access or common pool settings to the % ealh-maximizing actions possible ,.ith secure
private property rights").
123. Compare Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed. Proper% Rulej. Liablhrl Rule, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral. 85 HAR% L Ri- 1089. 1106 (1972) targuing that high
transaction costs militate towards liability rule rather than property rule). itth James E Kner & Stesart
J. Schwab. Property Rules and Liabltht Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light. 70 N Y U L REV 440.
464 (1995) (maintaining that judicial refusal to inter ene by %%ay of damages s% hen market negotiations fail
would encourage parties to learn how to reduce transaction costs)
124. See Furubotn & Pejovich. supra note 119. at 1157. see also Jacobs. supra note 113. at 222
(noting that, whatever their differences. Chicago school and ne' instiiutional economics theorists "'bloth
agree that economics is 'the essence of antitrust* and that protecting consumer sclfare. concceid in
allocative efficiency terms, should be the exclusise goal of competition la%%") (quoting Jonathan B Baker,
Recent Developments in Economics That Challenge Chicago School tltew . 58 A%--ITR. ST Ui 645. 646
(1989)).
125. See, e.g., LIBECAP, supra note 122. at I I (defining process of defining and adjusting property -as-
rights as "contracting" for property rights and as including both pnate bargaining and lobbying efforts)
126. What I have labelled "neoclassicism" is often referred to in the economic literature as "'property
rights theory." See, e.g., Furubotn & Pejovich, supra note 119 1 hase chosen my label in order to
emphasize the approach's roots in neoclassical (or "'Chicago school") la and economics and to distinguish
it from natural law approaches that contend that authors hase an inherent property right in their creations
The latter distinction is particularly important because many commentators hase erroneously attributed
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1. Neoclassicist Property Theory and Its Application to Copyright
The nature and scope of a property rights system are not etched in stone.
Private property rights may extend to some resources and not others and may
encompass varying degrees of exclusivity, enforceability, transferability, and
rights of action over physical and intangible goods. The neoclassicist
conception of property reflects neoclassicist perceptions of property's central
role in promoting allocative efficiency.'27 In neoclassicist theory, property
rights are fundamental to market formation and operation. They enable (or
induce) market actors to reduce negotiation costs and internalize
externalities.'28 They also play a vital part in the valuation of resources
through the pricing system, purportedly leading to the allocation of those
resources to their highest valued uses.'29 But property rights can only serve
these functions if they are relatively broad and clearly defined. 3 ' More
particularly, given the neoclassicist understanding of property's role in
promoting allocative efficiency, neoclassicists tend to favor a general
conception of private property rights as universal, concentrated, exclusive, and
transferable.13' As neoclassicists will readily admit, no entitlement will ever
fully embody these attributes. 32 But the attributes nevertheless remain a
baseline standard for neoclassicist property theory and its application to
copyright.
a. Universality
Given the inherent inefficiency of the public domain in the neoclassical
scheme, neoclassicists posit that, ideally, all scarce resources should be owned,
or ownable, by someone.'33 Scarce resources that are not subject to
copyright's expansion to the vestiges of an authors' property rights theory based in Lockcan natural law
and Romanticism. See supra note 97.
127. For a succinct survey of neoclassicist property theory literature, see Louis De Alessi & Robert
J. Staff, Property Rights and Choice, in LAW AND ECONOMICS 175 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1989); Furubotn
& Pejovich, supra note 119. Seminal examples of neoclassicist property theory include YORAM BARZEL.
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989); POSNER, supra note 32, at 31-85; Demsetz, supra note
117.
128. See Demsetz, supra note 117, at 355-58.
129. See Furubotn & Pejovich, supra note 119, at 1141.
130. See id. at 1141, 1144-45; cf CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE
HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 209-10 (1994) (discussing some commentators' market-
oriented preference for "crystalline specifications of [property] rights" over "muddy doctrines." which
"unduly obfuscate commercial transactions").
131. "Universal" means that, ideally, all economic value should be subject to rights of private property.
"Concentrated" means that all rights in a given resource are best held by a single owner. "Exclusive" means
that the owner may generally, at his sole discretion, prevent others from using the resource. "Transferablc"
means that the owner's ability to market resource uses is essential to the owner's right of property.
132. See, e.g., BARZEL, supra note 127, at 2-4, 64-67.
133. See POSNER, supra note 32, at 34; Demsetz, supra note 117.
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individual control are, in effect, deprived of their social value.i4 Such
resources may be used, but they will necessarily be used in ways that neither
reflect nor enhance their social value. This is in part because social value is
defined tautologically in terms of the price that a purchaser would pay to put
a resource to a given use. It also reflects the neoclassical assumption that
ownerless resources will be exploited without regard to the externalities arising
from their use.1 3
5
The criterion of universal ownership applies not just to each resource in
gross, but to every conceivable aspect, attribute, and use that people value with
respect to that resource. Unless owners realize the full potential value for their
property on the market, some use of that property will not be moved to its
highest value. To the extent that a resource's owner does not or cannot exert
exclusive control over a given use of the resource, that use effectively falls
into the public domain and its value is lost. For example, if landowners have
no right to exclude low-flying aircraft, then neither landowners nor airlines will
take the social value of the land's noise-sensitive uses into account in their
respective resource allocation decisions. 36 Likewise, since most restaurants
seldom charge an additional price for eating at peak hours or for the time a
customer spends at the table, customers who might value those uses more
highly cannot acquire them and the uses are thus allocated inefficiently.'
17
Significantly, the criterion of universality applies as well to future uses of a
resource. As Richard Posner argues, speculation regarding the possible value
of future uses is an integral part of a price-based system of efficient resource
allocation. 38 Accordingly, ownership should generally include the right to
hold a resource without using it or to sell at present the right to use the
resource at some future time. As a general rule, therefore, neoclassicism
strongly favors a regime in which all economic value is subject to rights of
private property. 139
Applying the universality principle to copyright, neoclassicists argue that,
absent incurable market failure, the holder's exclusive rights should encompass
the economic value of all uses to which an author's work is currently put or
may be put in the future.' 0 Neoclassicists maintain that copyright should
134. See BARZEL, supra note 127. at 71.
135. See. e.g., Demsetz. supra note 117. at 356
136. This is not to say that according a right to exclude 1o'k oserflights would n.ecssarl) be the most
efficient result in our positive transaction cost world. Where man) landow ners are in the flight path. as
would be the case near any urban airport, each landowner swho could exclude the aircraft %ould hasc an
incentive to act as a holdout and thus the airline would be unable to bu) the nght See Pos-,.R. supra note
32, at 64-65.
137. See BARZEL, supra note 127, at 66-67. To some extent, of course, the need for customers to sat
for a table at peak hours is tantamount to paying a price for eating at that time
138. See POSNER, supra note 32. at 47-48.
139. Transaction costs, holdout problems, and strategic bargaining ma) militate against application of
this ideal in many situations.
140. The economic value of authors' expression lies in a m)nad of potential consumptise and
transformative uses. A motion picture may be screened in a moie theater. siesd on teletsion ta off-air
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lend blanket support to owner ability to engage in price discrimination among
various users, so that owners can obtain their full complement of consumer
surplus. 4 ' A copyright owner, for example, might not only require a
payment each time a work is accessed online, but might also charge different
users different amounts for the same use, relying on consumer profiles to exact
a greater amount for those uses and types of works that an individual consumer
values the most.
t42
Similarly, neoclassicists contend that authors who use existing expression
transformatively in creating new expression should generally also have to pay
full market price for this use. 43 They argue that copyright's proprietary
entitlement should extend to such derivative works, even as they admit that the
derivative right is generally unnecessary to enable authors and publishers to
recover their fixed costs in connection with the original work.' 44 According
to the neoclassicist market model, those who hold such a broad proprietary
right will invest in original works that can be most readily developed into
derivative works that consumers want, like novels that are especially well-
suited to screen adaptation or motion pictures with characters that can readily
be spun off into merchandise.
45
Significantly, parallel to Posner's characterization of speculation on future
value as an integral component of proprietary entitlement, neoclassicists also
maintain that a copyright owner's unwillingness to license a particular use in
order to serve long-term business goals is no reason to accord others a right
of access. 4 6 For neoclassicists, copyright must enable owners to coordinate
broadcast, cable transmission, or video cassette), shown at a school, or, in the not too distant future,
accessed online through a computer network. The motion picture may also serve as the basis for sequels,
novelization, dramatization, television series, character merchandising, parody, and critique.
141. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 178-79; see also Demsetz, supra note 25, at 302 (maintaining
that price discrimination in markets for public goods like television programs is consistent with perfect
competition, whereas it is not with private goods).
142. See supra note 30.
143. See. e.g., Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 8, at 1634, 1640-41. By "full market price" I refer to
an ex ante price negotiated with the copyright owner, as opposed to a compulsory license or ex post
damage award based on administrative or judicial determination of harm.
144. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18
J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 354 (1989). But cf. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 18, § 5.3, at 5:79 ("Derivative rights
enable prospective copyright owners to proportion their investment to the returns they hope to receive not
only from the market in which their work will first be published, but from other, derivative, markets as
well.").
145. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 18, § 5.3, at 5:79; Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 8, at 1605-06.
146. See, e.g., Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 8, at 1628 n.151 (asserting that out-of-print status of work
should not generally justify uncompensated fair use where that might injure copyright owner's future
market for second printing); id. at 1634 (stressing that "refusals to grant permission to license should
ordinarily be honored"). In those cases in which the copyright owner chooses not to license for
"noneconomic reasons," such as out of a desire to avoid criticism or parody, Gordon suggests that fair use
should be available, since in those cases it is unlikely that a license will ever be available on the consensual
market. See id. at 1633; see also Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding harm
to possible future market for unpublished letters even though author had no present intention to publish
them during his lifetime); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 E.2d 1061, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977) ("The fact that the
Rosenberg letters have been out of print for 20 years does not necessarily mean that they have no future
market which can be injured.").
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product development and to determine investment timing as well as investment
direction. 47 Only in that manner, they contend, will copyright owners exploit
authors' expression in a manner that best maximizes social welfare, as
measured by the satisfaction of prevailing consumer tastes. '
b. Concentrated Ownership
While the universality principle requires that all scarce resources be owned
by somebody, the neoclassical principle of concentrated ownership favors the
concentration of all incidents of ownership in any given scarce resource in a
single person. Neoclassicists posit that divided ownership is inherently
inefficient because it requires coordination and negotiation to insure that each
owner develops his share of the resource without interfering with or detracting
from the value of the remaining attributes.'49 As Richard Epstein puts it:
The usual articulation of common-law rules-that ownership entails
with it possession, use, and disposition-is an effort to overcome the
problem of subsequent transactions costs by giving a single person the
control over all relevant aspects of a single thing. The assignment of
these three rights to a single person thus prevents the bargaining
breakdown that could arise if one person were entitled to exclusive
possession of land or chattels that only another person could sell."'
Like the other neoclassicist principles, the single owner paradigm is not
absolute. Among other things, it is in tension with the notion of specialization,
the idea that efficiency is best served when each resource attribute is
147. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 144. at 354-55 (claiming that dcn',ati'c right enables
owner to control timing of publication).
148. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 8. at 1605-06. Trotter Hardy adds yet another dimension to
the notion that a broad proprietary copyright is justified by the need to reduce negotiating costs See
generally Hardy, supra note 3. Professor Hardy notes that as part of the copyright law revision process,
Congress has, over the years. held frequent and prolonged heanngs and has taken the testimony of
numerous government officials, experts, and interested persons These hearings have led Congrcss to enact
various limitations and exceptions to copyright owners' exclusive rights. See id. manuscript at 50-55 Hardy
views these limitations and exceptions as a form of group ownership, akin to the communal ow% ncrship of
land that Demsetz cites as inherently inefficient. See id. manuscript at 50; see also Demsetz. supra note
117, at 350-58. Taking a cue from the neoclassicist characterization of the legislative arena as an extension
of the market, Professor Hardy then argues that congressional efforts to hear dtffcrent interest groups and
viewpoints represent "the massive transaction costs of group ownership of copyright property Hardy.
supra note 3. manuscript at 53. Finally, building on Demsetz's view that private property regimes serve
largely to overcome the transaction costs of getting large groups to agree on the disposition of common
resources, Hardy recommends that rights in informational works should be "privatized- See id manuscript
at 60. By "concentrating more of [such rights] in the hands of authors." he asserts. -the number of
copyright stakeholders could be greatly reduced and group ownership costs greatly lessened " Id
149. See. e.g., BARZ.E. supra note 127. at 86; POSNER. supra note 32. at 66. 71
150. Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalines. and the Single Owner One More Salute to Ronald
Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 562-63 (1993).
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transferred to the person who can best exploit it.' 15 But at least as a starting
point, single ownership remains the neoclassicist ideal.
The single owner paradigm has been highly influential in the neoclassicist
approach to intellectual property. In an often cited early article, Edmund Kitch
argued that patent law serves not so much as an incentive to invention, but as
a prospect system, that, like a regime of mineral claims, enables the first comer
to manage subsequent investment in developing the resource.152 Because a
patent holder holds an exclusive right to his claim, anyone who wishes to
improve the invention or to invest in increasing its commercial value will have
to deal with the patent holder. As a result, the patent holder is in a position "to
coordinate the search for technological and market enhancement of the patent's
value so that duplicative investments are not made and so that information is
exchanged among the searchers."'
' 53
Copyright has traditionally been of much narrower scope than patent, in
part reflecting the idea that our strong interest in expressive diversity overrides
any possible efficiency advantage in giving one person broad control over all
transformative uses of an existing work of authorship. 154 But neoclassicists
have argued that all incidents of copyright ownership should be concentrated,
at least as an initial matter, in a single owner in order to promote economically
rational management of expressive resources. Wendy Gordon argues, for
example, that concentrating rights in copyright owners requires prospective
users to bargain with them. 55 A more diversified rights structure would
impede the development of a licensing market because, to the extent that
151. See BARZEL, supra note 127, at 86; cf. ARMEN A. ALCHIAN, ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK 143
(1977) (emphasizing that possibility of specialization is primary advantage of private ownership over
public).
152. See Kitch, supra note 107, at 265-66; see also Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure
and Prisoner's Dilemma in Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 853, 855 n.13 (1992) (citing
Kitch for proposition that copyright may be necessary, even when authors would create without economic
incentive, "to facilitate or organize post-creation dissemination of the work").
153. Kitch, supra note 107, at 276.
154. Kitch's prospect model, in which control over product development is concentrated in a single
owner, is also of doubtful efficacy as applied to patents. As Mark Lemley points out: "Expecting one
party-original inventor or not-to perfectly identify the potential uses of a new invention, how it might
be improved, and who can best improve it is simply not realistic." Lemley, supra note 42, manuscript at
68-69.
155. See Wendy J. Gordon. Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21
J. LEGAL STUD. 449,472-73 (1992). Interestingly, in another article, which approaches intellectual property
more from the perspective of moral norms than neoclassical economics, Gordon suggests that Kitch's
prospect model may be inappropriate to copyright since "central control would unduly inhibit creative
adaptations." Gordon, supra note 6, at 247. Paul Goldstein favors giving copyright owners broad derivative
rights but has suggested that the Copyright Act should not deprive infringing derivative authors of a
separate copyright in their additional creative efforts, as that diminishes their incentives to create new works
based upon copyrighted materials. See Goldstein, supra note 70, at 239-52. I would submit that, by making
unauthorized derivative works an infringement and subjecting infringing derivative authors to property rule
damages and injunction, the Copyright Act so substantially impairs such derivative authors' incentive to
create such new works that depriving them of their own copyright, while probably overkill, has little
additional incentive-impairing effect. For a further discussion of the balance of incentives between existing
work owners and derivative authors, see infra Section V.D.
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prospective users have rights to use existing works, owners who wish to
prevent such uses would be faced with the considerable difficulty of
identifying and locating the potential users in order to purchase their
rights. 56 William Landes and Richard Posner similarly justify, as necessary
to reduce transaction costs, vesting in each author the exclusive right to make
any and all derivative works based on her underlying works.'2 7 Concentrating
exploitation rights in a single person facilitates market formation, they claim,
because in that event potential derivative authors avoid having to deal with
multiple holders of different rights. 5 '
c. Exclusivity
Neoclassicists generally favor property rules, defined as the absolute right
to exclude nonpurchasers from using a resource, over so-called "liability" rules,
which allow nonpurchasers to use the resource by paying the entitlement
holder an amount set by an organ of the state rather than the parties
themselves.'59 For neoclassicists, private entitlements can best promote
allocative efficiency when would-be users must pay the price agreed upon by
the entitlement holder in a voluntary exchange." Accordingly, they argue,
the law should impose liability rules only when transaction costs are so
intractable and so great that voluntary exchange is highly impractical.'
Moreover, in determining whether a nonpurchaser has infringed the owner's
property rights, courts should not generally take into account whether the
owner suffered any harm from the unauthorized use or whether the use resulted
in socially beneficial effects. Rather, the owner should be entitled to monetary
as well as injunctive relief simply upon a showing of unauthorized use. 62
Otherwise, neoclassicists contend, the court will be usurping the owner's
proprietary entitlement to determine the terms upon which use rights may be
purchased. 163
156. See Gordon, supra note 155, at 472-73.
157. See Landes & Posner, supra note 144, at 355.
158. That idyllic situation persists, of course, only until the onginal owner transfers certain dcn'atic
uses or other exclusive rights to others. But for Landes and Posner. the posstbilit) of subsequent divided
ownership is akin to Kitch's patent holder's efficient coordinatton of product deelopmcnt It enables the
original owner to license others who would be more efficient at exploiting partcular uses than %ould the
original owner herself. See id. at 355-56.
159. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 123. at 1106-10
160. See id.
161. See. e.g., Krier & Schwab. supra note 123, at 464 (maintaining that judtcial refusal to interenc
by way of damages when market negotiations fail would encourage panics to learn ho% to reduce
transaction costs).
162. See POSNER, supra note 32, at 70 (stating that absent high transaction costs, strct habilit) trespass
rule is preferred over nuisance rule because "It]he former, by refusing to consider the value of the invader's
activity, channels the transaction into the market, where it belongs").
163. See Calabresi & Melamed. supra note 123. at 1118-24; Gordon. Fair Use. supra note 8. at
1609-10; see also POSNER, supra note 32, at 64 (noting congenital ''nsk of error" shenescr -court
undertakes to determine market values").
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Neoclassicists apply these same principles to copyright. They favor a
proprietary copyright regime in which, absent incurable market failure, owners
have the absolute right, backed by the ready availability of injunctive relief and
punitive damages, to prevent unauthorized uses and to set licensing prices
through ex ante negotiations' 64 In corollary, they generally oppose
compulsory licenses and would sharply restrict the availability of fair use.65
Neoclassicists argue further that a copyright owner should not have to show
that it has been harmed in order to obtain injunctive or monetary relief for
infringement. 166
Significantly, neoclassicists favor this marketplace norm even where high
transaction costs would block market transactions, so long as it appears that a
property rule might lead to the development of institutions for overcoming
such barriers. 167 They maintain that strong property rules in copyright are a
necessary predicate to the establishment of mechanisms, such as collective
licensing and computerized tracking systems, that reduce transaction costs.
68
In this view, then, even the presence of transaction costs leading to market
failure is not sufficient to justify limitations on copyright owners' exclusive
164. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 2655 (1994) (arguing, generally, that proponents of liability rules in intellectual property carry heavy
burden).
165. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 18, § 1.14.2.3(a), at 1:51-54 (suggesting that circumscribed
compulsory licenses are appropriate only in face of insurmountable transaction cost barriers to market
transactions); Merges, supra note 164, at 2668-73 (discussing cost of compulsory licenses). Similarly,
Wendy Gordon asserts that compulsory licensing schemes are justifiable only when necessary to correct
market distortions and that "the broad brush of this regulatory solution is too sweeping for most cases."
Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 8, at 1613. The Copyright Act currently provides for various forms of
compulsory licenses (including negotiated licenses subject to binding arbitration) in a number of areas,
including certain secondary transmissions by cable systems, see 17 U.S.C. § 11 (c) (1994), the public
performance of sound recordings in certain digital audio transmissions, see id. § 114(d)(2), cover recordings
of nondramatic musical works, see id. § 115, public performances of nondramatic musical works in
jukeboxes, see id. § 116, the use of published nondramatic musical works and published pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works in noncommercial broadcasting, see id. § 118, and secondary transmissions by satellite
carriers for private home viewing, see id. § 119. In addition, the fair use doctrine (codified at id. § 107),
can be seen, in essence, as a compulsory license at a license fee of zero.
166. Gordon justifies copyright's strict liability rule with the argument that judges should not be
involved in balancing interests, but rather should assume, in the ordinary copyright case, "that the defendant
could have, and therefore should have, proceeded through the market." Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 8,
at 1613; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 18, § 1.14.2(c), at 1:55 & n.39 (maintaining that harm has no
place in determining copyright infringement just as it is irrelevant to real property trespass).
167. See Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrine, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory Licensing:
Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1118-34 (1977); Merges, supra note 164, at
2662--64.
168. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 144, at 358 (arguing that "fair use, if too broadly
interpreted, might sap the incentive to develop market mechanisms that reduce transaction costs and make
economic exchanges between copyright holders and users feasible"); Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into
Liability Rules: Institutions Supporting Transactions in Intellectual Property Rights, 84 CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming Oct. 1996); Merges, supra note 164, at 2662-64. Merges has also argued that clearly defined
property rules in copyright lessen negotiating costs by obviating the need of would-be licensees and
licensors to recreate through contract their mutual rights and obligations, and determine the enforceability
of their contract, each time they deal with one another. See Merges, supra note 22, at 1574.
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rights. 69 Rather, copyright is to serve as an instrument for overcoming
market failure. Only if market failure is seen to be endemic and insuperable
might fair use or compulsory license be justified. 170
d. Transferability
Although this attribute has little independent impact on the copyright
expansion issues that are the focus of this Article, it bears mentioning that, for
neoclassicists, property rights must be fully transferable so that they can be
readily moved to the most highly valued uses. Accordingly, any restriction on
entitlement alienability is generally viewed as an undesirable anomaly. 7'
Neoclassicists tend to view restrictions on the alienability of copyright with
similar disfavor. For them, provisions that favor authors at the expense of
subsequent transferees, such as provisions allowing authors to terminate
copyright grants after a certain period or according authors so-called "moral
rights" to prevent publishers and others from distorting their work, are an
unwelcome barrier to free marketability.72
2. The Marginality of Law
Although it may appear at first glance to be contradictory, legal
marginalism is a close adjunct to the neoclassicist belief in broad property
rights and a broad copyright alike. In the Coasean universe of zero transaction
costs, "the choice of legal rules ... becomes a matter of supreme
indifference."' 73 Whatever entitlements or distributions the law creates are
destined to be swept away in a whirlwind of bargaining as private parties
engaged in an infinite array of frictionless transactions move resources to their
highest valued use. 74 Legal institutions are necessary in our fallen, positive
169. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21. at 218 (maintaining that "the very decision to extend copyright
into comers where transaction costs appear to be insuperably high may galvanize market forces needed to
reduce transaction costs"); Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 8. at 1620-21 (arguing that fair use should not
general apply in situations of high transaction cost market failure when property rule might induce
development of mechanisms for lessening transaction costs sufficiently to enable markets to function),
Merges, supra note 164, at 2662.
170. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 8, at 1614-16, 1618-22. 1624-26 (discussing fair usc)
171. For a cogent critique of this view, see RADIN. supra note 23.
172. For a discussion of restrictions on copyright alienability in United States and Continental doctmne.
see Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonom) in United Staes and
Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. I (1994); Neil Netanel. Copyright AlenabdtnV
Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy: A Normative Evaluanon. 24 RL-TGER.S LJ 347
(1993) [hereinafter Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions).
173. Epstein, supra note 150, at 555. But see Robert C. Elickson, A Critique of Economic and
Sociological Theories of Social Control, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 81-83 (1987) (cnttaing Coase and some
law and economics scholars for giving insufficient attention to possibility of private party. as opposed to
state, delimitation of rights).
174. See BARZEL. supra note 127, at 55 n.13 (stating that under conditions of costless transacting.
parties will clearly define property rights).
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transaction cost world, but for neoclassicists, even here they are subservient to
the market. 75 Their primary purpose is not to implement collective goals or
social commitments. Law instead provides a mechanism for overcoming
transaction cost barriers to ideal Coasean exchange and, where this is
impractical, to stimulate or mimic the market by producing the perceived
outcome of such exchange.
176
The principle of legal marginalism colors the neoclassicist approach to
copyright in four basic ways. First, to the extent that legal intervention is
required to facilitate a market in original expression, legal marginalism is
another reason why neoclassicists favor a property regime, rather than one that
involves the state in subsequent allocation decisions. 177 In addition to
enabling copyright owners to set their own licensing price through ex ante
negotiations, a property regime would avoid regulatory or judicial involvement
in the valuation or allocation of rights to use expressive works.'78 Once a
broad, proprietary copyright has been created, such a regime would leave
resource allocation to private ordering, rather than prospective government
policy making or ex ante judicial fiat.
175. For a salient, in-depth analysis of how the drive to economize transaction costs has shaped legal
and economic institutions, see WILLIAMSON, supra note 119. Williamson offers an internal critique of the
neoclassical faith in pricing to bring about optimal resource allocation, arguing that far more attention needs
to be paid to institutional dynamics, bounded rationality and other factors that hinder utility maximization.
176. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 32, at 14-15 (arguing that where transaction costs prevent markets
from securing efficient results, entitlements should be assigned to stimulate or mimic market by producing
outcomes market would have produced); Epstein, supra note 150, at 555 (stating that "the central theme
of all legal institutions [is] the effort to control transactions costs that impede voluntary exchange"). See
generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 135-97 (1970) (analyzing determination of
entitlements in accident law, given transaction costs).
For neoclassicists, the market not only provides the justification for law, it also shapes legal rules by
directing judicial and legislative decisionmaking. According to neoclassicists, judge-made law, including
common law and much of statutory interpretation, is the accumulated product of litigants' tendencies to
challenge inefficient rules and judges' intuitive predisposition to find efficient solutions to legal disputes.
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 41, at 251-66; George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection
of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). For a biting critique of this position, see Bruce A. Ackerman, Law, Economics,
and the Problem of Legal Culture, 1986 DUKE LJ. 929, 934-36. Legislation, neoclassicists claim, is the
outcome of interest group bargaining and legislators' rational pursuit of their own self-interest. This is, of
course, a central tenet of public choice theory. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991). Lawmaking, in sum, is simply one more arena where market forces
promote allocative efficiency. While market actors may choose to avail themselves of public institutions
in certain instances, there is no normative reason why public institutions should be preferred over private
contract for the definition and distribution of entitlements. In fact, given the costs involved in government
regulation, it is often more efficient (and thus better) for private actors to arrange their affairs in the same
manner as Coase's proverbial rancher and farmer, through market exchange.
177. See Merges, supra note 164, at 2664-65 (favoring property over liability rule in intellectual
property cases).
178. Gordon, for example, asserts that compulsory licensing schemes are justifiable only when
necessary to correct market distortions and that "the broad brush of this regulatory solution is too sweeping
for most cases." Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 8, at 1613. Similarly, she notes, regarding copyright's strict
liability rule, that judges do not balance interests, but rather assume, in the ordinary copyright case, "that
the defendant could have, and therefore should have, proceeded through the market." Id.; see also
Goldstein, supra note 167, at 1128 (asserting that "[l]ike other systems of private property, copyright law
is founded on the notion that privately bargained prices are preferable to publicly administered rates").
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Second, legal marginalism supports the subordination of copyright to
contract. 79 It favors contractual arrangements, such as those that might be put
into effect by online content providers, that systematically abrogate the
limitations that copyright law imposes on owners' exclusive rights.'" For
neoclassicists, such arrangements simply reflect the establishment of property
rights through private ordering.' As such, they are inherently more efficient
than state efforts to define and delimit property rights since, by definition, the
parties would not have agreed to such arrangements if they were inefficient.
Third, legal marginalism sharply limits the use of the copyright statute to
achieve goals that neoclassicists describe as distributional. "2 If one starts
from the neoclassicist assumption that copyright owners are entitled to capture
the economic value of existing works, then, absent insurmountable market
failure, any copyright rule that enables selected groups or the public at large
to use existing works without paying the full market price effects a distribution
of wealth from owner to user.'8 3 Seen this way, the support of public
education and the free exchange of ideas through fair use news reporting,
criticism, scholarship, and parody become an unwarranted extension of law
into the realm of private ordering.'" Since broad property rights in original
expression are deemed necessary to enable copyright owners to capture the
economic value of existing works, a legal regime that establishes those rights
comports with the neoclassicist preference for private ordering. But the use of
179. For an argument that a broad copyright-like protection '%ould have ansen c'en u.Ithout federal
intervention through a combination of contract and state tort la%% protection against interference sIth
prospective contractual relations, see Edmund W. Kitch. Commentary Intellectual Prperr amid the
Common Law, 78 VA. L. REv. 293 (1992).
180. See supra text accompanying note 87; see also Robert L Dunne. Deterring Unauthorized At ces
to Computers: Controlling Behavior in Cyberspace 77Trough a Contract Lai% Paradigm, 35 JLRItMETRICS
J. 1 (1994) (favoring regime of private contract for determining scope and nature of content prosidcr
control); I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regimefor "Ciberspace". 55 U PIr L RE% 993. 1029-31
(1994) (citing Coase for proposition that decentralized contract should generally be fasored oser ccntralized
statute to address various cyberspace problems, including those coterminous. sith cop) right), Merges. supra
note 168 (lauding examples of quasi-copyright through contract)
181. See. e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg. 86 F.3d 1447. 1455 (7th Cir 1996) trendenng opinion.
authored by noted neoclassicist, Judge Frank Easterbrook, upholding enforceabtlity of shnnk%, rap licenses
as "private ordering" that is "essential to the efficient functioning of markets")
182. See, e.g., Nil WHITE PAPER. supra note 6. at 84 (asserting that cop) right one&" rights should
not be limited to redress inequalities between information haves and have-nots). Gordon. Fair Use. supra
note 8, at 1615, 1632 (maintaining that fair use doctrine should neither be used for purpose of "'dcpning
copyright owners of their ... property precisely when they encounter those users v ho could afford to pay
for it," nor to "tax copyright owners to subsidize impecunious but meritorious users"-)
183. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 224-25 (refemng to statutory exemptions to copyright
liability for uses such as classroom performances of copyrighted works in nonprofit educational institutions
as "distributional aspects of [Congress's) copyright agenda"); Gordon. supra note 105, at 1449 targuing
that, except in isolated instances of "extremely strong public need." copyright holder's entitlement to
prohibit nonconsensual uses is correct baseline for evaluating distributional effects of cop) right doctrine)
But see Merges, supra note 164, at 2661 (describing tendency of intellectual property la% to favor creators
rather than infringers as "built-in distributional bias").
184. Cf Goldstein, supra note 167, at 1136-37 (contending that "Iblecause cop)right is founded on
the primacy of private decisions, any proposal to introduce compulsory licensing bears the heasy burden
of showing that the benefits to be derived from compulsory licensing outweigh the costs")
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law to support transformative and educative uses of existing works causes
market distortions and is akin to state-sponsored theft. Hence Posner argues
that, whatever the benefits of social, political, and aesthetic criticism to our
system of free expression, fair use should never be available for satiric uses of
existing works because such uses present no problem of congenital market
failure: "But, as we do not suppose that writers should be allowed to steal
paper and pencils in order to reduce the cost of satire, neither is there a
compelling reason to subsidize social criticism by allowing writers to use
copyrighted materials without compensating the copyright holder." 85
Finally and most generally, legal marginalism reinforces the principle that
the purpose of copyright, like that of all law, is simply to facilitate an efficient
allocation of resources through private ordering. As such it undermines, if not
radically opposes, the traditional idea that copyright serves to further the public
interest in expressive diversity and public education. Neoclassicists may well
believe that an untrammeled market in broad, proprietary rights to use authors'
works will in fact promote public education and expressive diversity, perhaps
even at a more optimal level than would a copyright statute designed to
balance incentive and access.8 6 But even if such a belief were well-
founded-and I shall argue that it is not-this would ultimately be no more
than a fortunate byproduct of a regime that treats expression like any other
vendible commodity. If nothing else, the notion that the social value of
expression may be measured in terms of market price encourages the
subversion of copyright's constitutive goals and its conversion into a general
misappropriation statute.8 7
C. The Neoclassical Market Paradigm Versus Copyright's Democracy-
Enhancing Goals
To their credit, leading intellectual property scholars who have advanced
the neoclassicist approach generally seek to place the market paradigm within
185. Richard A. Posner, When is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 73 (1992). In contrast,
according to Posner, parodic uses, which target the parodied work itself, may be subject to market failure
since "it may be in the private interest of the copyright owner, but not in the social interest, to suppress
criticism of the [copyright owner's] work." Id. Posner also argues that according fair use treatment to
certain uses might promote an "excessive allocation of resources" to those uses and a resultant
underutilization of works that are not subject to fair use, "as potential buyers of this intellectual property
switch to its free competitor." Id. at 72.
186. Posner has argued, for example, that a reading of the fair use doctrine that effectively puts some
forms of intellectual property into the public domain, "where [they] can be used without being paid for,
may cause the priced forms to be even more underutilized from a social standpoint." Id.; see also
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 236 (maintaining that extending copyright "into every corner where
consumers derive value from literary and artistic works" would promote "political as well as cultural
diversity").
187. Cf. RADIN, supra note 23, at 166-72 (describing manner in which conceptualization of expression
as market rhetoric context may undermine our cultural commitments to active citizenship, collective self-
government, and individual human flourishing).
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a framework that affirms copyright's fundamental democracy-enhancing goals.
They recognize that copyright serves to promote important public interests,
including the First Amendment values of robust debate, citizen education, and
expressive diversity, that are not reflected in many consensual licensing
transactions. Neoclassicists address this inconsistency between public interest
and an untrammeled market in a number of different ways. At times they
attempt to incorporate public interests within the market paradigm by defining
as a "transaction cost" the parties' congenital failure to account for them.'
In other instances, they fall back on the dichotomy between unprotected idea
and protectible expression, contending that even if copyright assumes
proprietary proportions, the dichotomy continues to set a tenable limit on
private censorship.' 89 In still other instances, neoclassicists simply concede
that the market paradigm perhaps should not apply in certain discrete cases
involving paramount nonmonetizable interests."9 Finally, neoclassicists
sometimes assert that even if a broad proprietary copyright might appear in
some cases to trammel expressive diversity, it ultimately promotes diversity by
enabling publishers better to tailor their investments to meet consumer
choice. t
In this Section, I will contend that such efforts to account for First
Amendment values and other democracy-enhancing goals within or alongside
the neoclassicist approach are only minimally successful at best. I will first
consider two examples, an essay by Robert Merges on parody," : and Wendy
Gordon's seminal article on fair use. 93 I will maintain in each case that the
neoclassical market paradigm leads the writer to favor an exceedingly broad
scope of copyright protection, despite the writer's purported attempt to place
limits on the paradigm's effect. I will then critically examine Paul Goldstein's
argument that a broad copyright is compatible with democratic values because
extending "rights into every comer where consumers derive value" will
promote expressive diversity)9
Professor Merges's essay applies what he terms the ""market-centered'
view of copyright" to the parody fair use defense, focusing on the case of
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell.'9 In Campbell, the popular music group
"2 Live Crew" had released a rap version of Roy Orbison's soft rock ballad
188. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 105, at 309-10.
189. See infra note 252.
190. See, e.g., Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 8, at 1632 (describing "not ilegitimate'" judicial concern
that in some cases "'criterion of economic 'value' is itself flawed")
191. See. e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 236.
192. See Merges, supra note 105.
193. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 8.
194. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 236. None of these eminent commentators. I vih to cmphatzc
again, has adhered consistently to a neoclassicist approach. Strkingly. how, ever. to the extent that thcy have
followed that approach, the expansionist neoclassicist model has appeared to trump v,.hate' er concerns the)
have elsewhere expressed about treating copyright as a broad property right,
195. 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992).
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"Oh, Pretty Woman." Orbison's music publisher, Acuff-Rose, sued the group
for copyright infringement, and the defendants asserted that their version of the
song constituted a parody of the Orbison original, which, the defendants
contended in line with longstanding precedent, counted strongly in favor of a
finding of fair use under the Copyright Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed the
district court's finding of fair use, questioning whether 2 Live Crew's version
was really a parody of the Orbison song as opposed to a more general social
satire and holding that the commercial nature of the rap group's copying raised
a presumption against fair use that the defendants had failed to overcome. 96
When Professor Merges wrote his essay, the Supreme Court had just
granted certiorari to hear the case. 19 7 Subsequently, in a potentially far-
reaching decision, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and remanded the
matter for further findings. 98 The Court emphasized that because all authors
necessarily borrow from the work of their predecessors, fair use for
transformative uses is an integral part of copyright, serving the same
constitutive purpose of promoting individual creativity and public education as
does the grant of exclusive rights to authors and their assigns. 99 The Court
then rejected the notion that the commercial nature of the petitioner's use
creates a presumption against fair use, holding that "the more transformative
the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.'2 It also
rejected the Sixth Circuit's rigid distinction between parody and broader social
commentary, holding that a work will be treated as a parody so long as its
parodic character may "reasonably be perceived,"20' and that, in any event,
fair use may be readily applicable to nonparodic transformative uses, no less
than to parodies, whenever "there is little or no risk of market
substitution."202 Finally, the Court suggested that given copyright's
paramount goal of stimulating "'the creation and publication of edifying
matter,' ' '203 in cases of colorable but failed claims of fair use for
transformative secondary works, courts should award damages rather than grant
196. See id. The Sixth Circuit grudgingly assumed for purposes of its argument that the 2 Live Crew
version was parodic in character, see id. at 1435, but its doubts on that score seem to have affected its
analysis nonetheless.
197. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993) (granting certiorari).
198. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994). The Court remanded the case
for a determination of whether 2 Live Crew's repeated use of the original song's opening bass riff was
excessive for the group's parodic purpose and whether the rap parody would usurp the market for
nonparody rap versions of the original. See id. at 1176-77, 1179.
199. See id. at 1171. Stating that copyright's goal of promoting science and the arts is "generally
furthered by the creation of transformative works," the Court emphasized that such works "lie at the heart
of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright." Id. At the same
time, the Court rejected the petitioner's suggestion that parodies should be presumptively fair use. See id.
at 1172-73.
200. Id. at 1171.
201. Id. at 1173.
202. Id. at 1172 n.14.
203. Id. (quoting Leval, supra note 19, at 1134).
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injunctive relief, in effect issuing a compulsory license to further the -strong
public interest in the publication of the secondary work."' 0" In sum, the
Court affirmed in Campbell that uses incorporating significant defendant
contributions may well qualify for fair use or judicial compulsory license even
if the defendant could have paid the ex ante market price for the use.20,
Professor Merges purports to set forth a market-based, value-neutral
analysis of fair use that would make considerable room for parodic works. -206
His essay not only criticizes the Sixth Circuit's ruling, but also contends that
a fair use defense might be available to 2 Live Crew "only if one takes the
economic view of copyright quite seriously."20' 7 At closer examination,
however, Merges's neoclassicist approach leads him to a position that is quite
at odds with the conclusions he purports to draw. His adherence to the market
paradigm supports an exceedingly limited parodic fair use exception to the
copyright holder's proprietary right, and one that is far more circumscribed
than that which the Supreme Court later enunciated in Campbell.
Professor Merges begins his analysis of parody fair use with the basic
proposition that copyright is based on a norm of "'consensual market
transfers '20 ' and that "[d]eviations from this norm must be pleaded with
special facts, and convincingly."2 9 He allows that "'social welfare
considerations have a place in intellectual property law."2 0 But he defines
social welfare in market terms, maintaining that social welfare is best furthered
by market transactions and that legal intervention is justified only when the
private parties' failure to contract arises from the absence of a viable market
in a particular context.211 Merges then suggests that parody may often
represent an instance of such market failure since the copyright owner of the
parodied work may refuse to grant a license for the parody because of a
"noneconomic" motive, the desire to squelch the parody rather than an absence
of agreement on a licensing price.1 2 For Merges, such insurmountable
market failure, resulting in this case from the congenitally high "transaction
costs" of overcoming the owner's "'noneconomic" resistance to granting a
license, may justify the "coerced exchanges" inherent in findings of fair
use.
213
Merges, however, is not content to follow the traditional presumption,
subsequently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Campbell, that copyright
204. Id. at 1171 n.10 (quoting Leval, supra note 19. at 1132)
205. See rd. at 1171 n.10, 1172 n.14. 1177-78.
206. See Merges, supra note 105, at 312.
207. Id. at 307.
208. Id. at 306.




213. See id. at 309-10.
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owners will generally refuse to license parodies of their works. 2 4 He insists
that the parodist must prove a clear failure in the market in each case.2" 5 The
parodist could establish either "(1) that a consensus of licensing experts agrees
that the parody will not appreciably injure the market for the original work;
or (2) that, prior to the release of the parody, the parodist made an offer to pay
a royalty that would generously compensate the copyright holder."'216 With
regard to the first possibility, Merges neither defines "appreciable injury" nor
states whether the relevant market includes the market for licensing parodies.
Given Merges's assumption that a parody licensing market is possible, it would
appear that any unlicensed parody would cause some appreciable injury to that
market. In any event, Merges's focus is on the second alternative, the
requirement that the parodist actually offer to compensate generously the
copyright holder. That requirement, he asserts, would determine whether or not
the copyright holder's refusal to deal was based on economically rational
motives.
The generous compensation alternative contains a number of crucial
concepts that Merges fails to clarify. Aside from the obvious indefiniteness of
the term "generously," he does not set forth what is to be the basis for
compensating the copyright holder, that is, whether the copyright holder is
entitled to be paid for any degree or type of injury to any possible market or
just for some injuries to some markets. This ambiguity is exacerbated by his
failure to distinguish convincingly between impermissible noneconomic
motives and permissible economic ones. On the one hand, Merges states that
the holder's refusal to license a parody that the holder simply finds distasteful
is not economically rational and thus would support judicial intervention. 2 7
On the other hand, he suggests that, even if the prospective parodist is willing
to pay the standard license fee, the holder's desire to prevent a parody from
harming the holder's reputation may be a legitimate economic concern and that
the techniques used in defamation cases for valuing such harm can similarly
be employed in calculating the compensation that a prospective licensee must
offer the holder.2t
214. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1178 (1994); see also Fisher v. Decs,
794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The parody defense to copyright infringement exists precisely to make
possible a use that generally cannot be bought.").
215. See Merges, supra note 105, at 307. Paul Goldstein also suggests that this should be the case.
While granting that copyright owners will generally refuse to license parodists, he insists that the parodic
nature of the defendant's use should not necessarily count in favor of fair use, in part because "the
copyright owner may be sufficiently thick-skinned to be willing to license defendant's use for a fee or,
indeed, to enter the market for the 'parody' himself." GOLDSTEIN, supra note 18, § 10.2.1, at 10:24.
216. Merges, supra note 105, at 307 (emphasis added).
217. See id. at 308-10. As Merges concedes in a footnote, many economists would argue that any
subjective preference regarding the relative private utility of alternative possibilities is an "economic" value.
See id. at 310 n.24.
218. See id. at 310 n.26.
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Significantly, Merges fails to discuss what most courts and commentators
assume is the most common reason that copyright holders refuse to license
parodies. As seems to have been the case in Campbell, the holder's refusal
generally stems from a real and understandable concern that a biting lampoon
will suppress or even destroy demand for the holder's work. 2'9 Given this
concern, a holder's refusal to license for any price less than what would
compensate it for such loss reflects perfect economic rationality-and Merges's
generous compensation standard would have to reflect that calculation.
Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Campbell, the commercially
harmful effects of criticism cannot be taken into account in determining fair
use, no matter how severe their impact or how economically rational the
holder's desire to avoid them.Y The reason is that the nonmonetary social
benefit of such criticism outweighs any constraint on the holder's market
prerogatives, except potentially when the secondary work acts as a market
substitute for the original or its derivatives.YI
Towards the end of his essay, Merges notes that his transactional account
of the parody defense is very different from a "First Amendment view," in
which "the parody is either privileged free expression or it is not" and "Ithe
ability or willingness of the parodist to pay is irrelevant. ' 7m He then
concedes momentarily that perhaps his theory shortchanges First Amendment
values. 223 But in closing, Merges returns to what appears to be the root of
much of the allure of the neoclassicist approach, its seeming value-neutral
precision in contrast to the policy-laden openness of balancing private and
public interests. He contends that by looking at the existence of and reasons
for a real bargaining breakdown, rather than the nature of the defendant's
transformative use, courts will attain a more manageable "market
neutrality." 224
As is evident, however, from Merges's vague standards for determining
whether a cognizable bargaining breakdown has occurred, the neoclassicist
approach is itself far from determinate.7 At the same time, his neoclassicist
insistence that "consensual transfers are so much the norm in copyright law
that coerced exchanges must be convincingly justified" inevitably tilts the scale
in the direction of broad, absolutist protection, upending copyright's traditional,
219. See Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1178.
220. See id.; see also 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT. supra note 56. § 13.05[A). at 13-187 to 13-188 (-[AI
court need not take into account an adverse impact on the potential market for plaintiff's work by reason
of a disparaging or otherwise unfavorable reference in defendant's work to plaintiff's work.").
221. See Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1178 (distinguishing between "potentially remediable displacement"
and "unremediable disparagement").
222. Merges, supra note 105, at 312.
223. See id.
224. See U
225. For a critique of the indeterminacies and inaccuracies in neoclassical economic theory generally.
see supra note 113 and infra text accompanying notes 241-48.
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delicate balance between robust incentive and public access. 226 Perhaps most
tellingly, Merges concedes in a footnote that the facts as presented in Campbell
would not meet his standard for fair use because 2 Live Crew offered to pay
Acuff-Rose merely the statutory compulsory license fee for a "cover" recording
and not the full (i.e., generous) market price.227
In her early and influential article on fair use, Professor Gordon similarly
sought to employ a "market approach" at least in part to counter judicial
restriction of fair use, in this instance the Ninth Circuit's holding that fair use
is unavailable for nontransformative uses.228 But like Professor Merges,
Professor Gordon's adherence to neoclassicist economics in that article leads
her to treat fair use as an anomalous deviation from copyright's marketplace
norm, available only in occasional cases of incurable market failure.
29
Gordon purports to emphasize that certain uses may yield "external" social
benefits that will not be reflected in the price the prospective user would be
willing to pay or may significantly further "nonmonetizable values," such as
"public knowledge, political debate, or human health."23 But given her
neoclassicist orientation, she carefully cabins these cases, asserting that fair use
should apply "[o]nly when the public interest to be served is great, and the
damage to the owner small."23t To that end, Gordon would impose on the
defendant the burden of proving insurmountable market failure and
demonstrating that his use serves an identifiable public interest that would
outweigh any harm caused to the copyright holder by granting fair use.232 In
226. Merges, supra note 105, at 310.
227. See id. at 310 n.26.
228. In the so-called "Betamax" case, the Ninth Circuit held that home videotaping of television
programs did not constitute a fair use. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963 (9th
Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court subsequently reversed, holding that noncommercial home videotaping for
the purpose of viewing a program at a later time, as opposed to keeping a copy for repeated viewing, posed
no market harm to plaintiffs and thus constitutes a fair use. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984). Professor Gordon's article was cited in Justice Blackmun's dissent in Sony, see id.
at 478 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and, the following year, in the majority opinion in Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559, 566 n.9 (1985). The Sony dissent and Harper & Row
majority each supported a highly restrictive interpretation of the applicability and scope of fair use.
229. Professor Gordon's article on fair use was her first published foray into the field of intellectual
property. Since then she has come to place far greater emphasis on nonmonetary values relating to the
creation and use of creative expression and has come unequivocally to oppose the idea that all social value
should be propertized. See, e.g., Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 8.
230. Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 8, at 1631.
231. Id. at 1632.
232. See id. at 1624-25. When Gordon wrote her article, the question of how the burden of proof was
to be allocated in fair use litigation was a matter of substantial disagreement among courts and
commentators. See id. at 1624 n.135. The rule that has emerged since then, while still uncertain, appears
to be that the burden of proof is generally on the party asserting fair use, except when the use is of a type
that generally counts in favor of fair use, including noncommercial and educational uses. Compare
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1177 (1994) (citing Harper & Row. 471 U.S. at 561)
(holding, in case involving commercial parody, that fair use is affirmative defense, elements of which must
thus be proven by defendant), with Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 451 (holding that burden of proving market
harm falls on defendant when commercial use and on plaintiff when noncommercial). See also Princeton
Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Serv., Inc., 74 F.3d 1512 (6th Cir.), vacated pending reh'g en banc,
74 F.3d 1528 (6th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing Campbell from Sony on basis of nature of defendant's use and
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addition, in order to correct for possible errors in judicial valuation and to
make certain that "the market can be safely bypassed," Gordon would deny
fair use, even when market failure and important social benefit have been
demonstrated, whenever it would "leave the plaintiff copyright owner facing
substantial injury to his incentives. 233 Therefore, despite her expression of
concern for nonmonetizable social benefits, Professor Gordon's adherence to
neoclassicist precepts leads her to a sharply circumscribed view of fair use.
In his recent account of copyright's digital future,2 Professor Goldstein
expresses even greater reluctance than Professors Merges and Gordon to
countenance exceptions to the neoclassical marketplace norm. He asserts that
fair use should be invoked only in cases of bilateral market failure, which, he
contends, in the coming age of nearly costless collective and digital licensing,
would rarely, if ever, occur.235 He would limit copyright's breathing space
for socially valuable ends to narrow statutory exemptions for specifically
identified uses (like classroom performances in nonprofit educational
institutions) or, possibly, cash subsidies that specified users could apply
towards paying the full market price for a license. " 6 At the same time-and
this appears to be central to his strident adherence to the market
paradigm-Professor Goldstein contends that the neoclassicist approach is fully
compatible with copyright's democracy-enhancing objectives. He gives special
emphasis to the neoclassicist faith in the capacity of the pricing system to
signal consumer preferences, and he equates consumer purchasing decisions
with expressive diversity.237 Professor Goldstein asserts that copyright serves
essentially as a mechanism for authors and publishers to identify and meet
consumer preferences, and that the more consumer uses are included within the
ambit of copyright holders' exclusive rights, the more holders will tailor their
investment in the creation and development of creative works to reflect the full
array of consumer market segments. 238 Professor Goldstein thus maintains
that "to extend rights into every corner where consumers derive value from
literary and artistic works," a broad proprietary copyright would in fact
"promote political as well as cultural diversity. '2 39
imposing on plaintiffs burden of proving meaningful likelihood of future harm to potential market for
copyrighted works).
233. Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 8. at 1619.
234. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 197-236.
235. See id. at 224.
236. See id. at 224-25.
237. Professor Goldstein is not alone among neoclassicist copyright scholars in touting price signaling
as a supposed benefit of copyright. See supra notes 8. 228-33 (discussmg Professor Gordon's position)
238. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 35, 179. 228-29. Professor Goldstein views a copyright
holder's ability to engage in price discrimination among various consumer groups as an integral part of
copyright's consumer signaling system. See id. at 8. Along these lines, he looks fasorably on the possible
development of licensing technologies that will enable copyright holders to engage in ever more precise
price discrimination. See id. at 224.
239. Id. at 236. Although he does not expressly say so. it would appear that Professor Goldstein
intends to apply this reasoning to transformative, as well as consumptive. uses given his vtew that the
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I am in substantial agreement with Professor Goldstein, particularly vis-A-
vis some of the sharpest critics of copyright expansion, that at least a relatively
strong copyright is a prerequisite of expressive diversity. But the democratic
paradigm that I advance diverges from Professor Goldstein's approach in two
important respects. First, it supports a relatively strong copyright only as a
blunt instrument for insuring a vital, independent sector for the creation and
dissemination of original expression. The democratic paradigm eschews the
neoclassicist pricing model and questions whether market pricing can serve
with any reasonable degree of precision as a mechanism for producer direction
of investment toward diverse audiences. 240 Second, the paradigm places a
greater emphasis on the costs of an overly broad copyright monopoly.
Although a full discussion of the inadequacies of the pricing model, both
generally and with respect to copyright, is beyond the scope of this Article, I
will briefly mention a few problems. To begin with, the substantial literature
on the bounded rationality of both consumers and producers belies any
mechanical application of the neoclassicist pricing equation. On the consumer
side, studies show that consumer tastes and purchasing decisions are highly
malleable and heavily influenced by taste addiction, status quo biases, herd
exclusive right to make derivative works serves, like the remaining panoply of copyright owner
prerogatives, to direct owner investment in accordance with consumer preferences. See GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 18, § 5.3, at 5:79. Elsewhere, he has insisted that copyright law "must not impose too severe a
prohibition against authors' borrowing from others." Goldstein, supra note 22, at 80. But his willingness
to curtail copyright owner control over transformative uses to accomplish this purpose seems limited, at
best, to (1) cases of intractable market failure (including some, but not all, parodies), see GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 18, § 10.2.1.2, at 10:23; (2) his (to my mind, meager) suggestion that infringing derivative works
should themselves be entitled to copyright protection, see supra note 155; and (3) the traditional, but ill-
defined, notion that whatever constraints copyright may impose on transformative uses of "expression,"
"ideas" should be free for all to use, see infra note 252. Professor Goldstein has also questioned whether
infringing derivative works that require a large-scale investment of time and money (such as motion
pictures, television series, and advertising campaigns) and derive only to a minor extent from an underlying
work, should be subject to injunctive relief. See Goldstein, supra note 70, at 238. He cautions, however,
that, "like compulsory licenses generally," withholding injunctive relief "may improperly reduce investment
incentives by proportioning the copyright proprietor's returns to terms that an official tribunal believes are
just rather than to terms privately struck in the marketplace." Id. at 239 n.94.
240. The paradigm also lends far greater emphasis than does Professor Goldstein's market model to
an important aspect of expressive diversity in a democratic society: that of the reformulation of prevailing
cultural icons in order to challenge mainstream values and assumptions. See infra text accompanying notes
361-62. This subversive reformulation aspect of expressive diversity demands limits on copyright owner
control over transformative uses. Professor Goldstein's primary focus, in contrast, seems to be on expressive
diversity in the sense of product differentiation. See Goldstein, supra note 167, at 1135 (opposing
compulsory licenses in part because they would impose artificial ceiling on market revenues and thus "will
reduce the range of differentiation among works produced"). According to his market model, that aspect
of diversity would be best served by broad, proprietary rights, so that copyright proprietors would have
incentives to meet varied consumer demand. See id. at 1135, 1140. It might also be argued that broad
proprietary rights would encourage subsequent authors to come up with novel, nonderivative expressive
works. Cf id. at 1135-36 (noting that copyright law might encourage greater product differentiation if it
required higher threshold of originality as condition of protection and proscribed subsequent author
borrowing of ideas as well as expression). The equation of expressive diversity with product differentiation
overlooks the extent to which highly derivative transformative uses, such as parody, may be valuable or
necessary to challenging the ideas and sensitivities embodied in preexisting expression.
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behavior, and other preference shaping distortions.23 As a result, consumer
purchases do not reflect the full array of potential audience receptivity. On the
producer side, especially given the dynamics of bureaucratic organization,
managers are unlikely to respond to consumer pricing signals in accordance
with the neoclassical model of economic rationality.242  In particular,
according to several theoretic models, book publishers, film studios, and other
media organizations show an inherent bias against minority tastes and in favor
of expression that is likely to appeal to large audiences. "3 This is especially
the case in those sectors characterized by firm concentration, which, given the
unabated growth of multimedia conglomerates in recent years, are now
absorbing a greater and greater share of the copyright marketplace.: "
Moreover, there is little evidence to support the traditional neoclassical
notion, which is also a linchpin of the pricing model, that an unhindered
market inexorably leads to the evolution of efficient institutions. As Mark Roe
has recently asserted, economic institutions are shaped largely by arbitrary
conditions, local evolution, and path dependence, not simply or even
predominantly by producer capacity to respond to consumer demand.2' To
241. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect. Loss Av'erion. and Status
Quo Bias, J. ECON. PERSP., Vinter 1991, at 193 (presenting evidence supponing endowment effects and
status quo biases and discussing their relation to loss aversion): George Loewenstemn & Samuel tssacharoff.
Source Dependence in the Valuation of Objects. 7 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 157 (1994) (finding that
means by which people obtain objects impacts their valuation of them); James G March. Bounded
Rationality Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice. in RATIONAL CHOICE 142 (Jon Elster ed. 1986)
(discussing studies on role of taste in rational choice): Robert J. Shiller. Conversatin. Information. and
Herd Behavior, 85 AM. ECON. REv. PAPERS & PROC. 181. 181 (1995) (discussing systematic "hcrd
externality,' of imitating others and thereby concealing one's own information"). Cass R Sunstein. Legal
Interference with Private Preferences. 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1129. 1145-66 (1986) (can%ass ng consumer
preference scholarship), David Throsby. The Production and Consumption of the Arts A Viet of Cultural
Economics, 32 J. ECON. LrT. I. 3 (1994) (discussing role of acquired taste and taste addiction in
individuals' consumption of arts).
242. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, supra note 119. at 45; see also Herbert A Simon. Ratronali in
Psychology and Economics, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEE,N ECoNOwICs A.oND
PSYCHOLOGY 25, 33-40 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds. 1987) (surseying evidence that
neoclassical economic theories of substantive rationality and utility maximization fail to explain firms'
decisions).
243. See BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN. VIDEO ECONOMICS 101-50 (1992) (surveying
their own models and those of others).
244. See DIANA CRANE, THE PRODUCTION OF CULTURE: MEDIA AND TIE URBAN ARTS 55-75 (1992)
(canvassing studies that link production of mainstream, prosaic expression with increased concentration of
media ownership); Paul DiMaggio, Market Structure. the Creative Process. and Popular Culture Totward
an Organizational Reinterpretation of Mass-Culture Theory. I I J. POPULAR CULTURE 436. 440 (1977)
(noting that larger, established media organizations have poorer record than do smaller, independent firms
in providing innovative products). For a general, and somewhat polemic. discussion of concentration in the
media, see BEN BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 3-26 (1992). For a chart showing significant
entertainment company interrelationships as of 1990 in the areas of film. broadcasting and cable. see
HAROLD L. VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY ECONOMICS: A GUIDE FOR FINANCIAL ANALYSTS 55
(1990). For discussions of the concentration of ownership among book publishers in the hands of
multimedia conglomerates, see Michael J. Robinson & Ray Olszewski. Books in the Marketplace of Ideas.
30 J. COMM. 81, 84-85 (1980); Jason Epstein, The Decline and Rise of Publishing. N Y REV BOOKS. Mar
1, 1990, at 8, 9-11.
245. See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics. 109 HARv L REV 641 (1996)
For an insightful and more detailed discussion of path dependence in the development of institutions. see
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take a pertinent example, the film industry is notorious for its relentless
overinvestment in big event and big star pictures, driven far more by its
peculiar corporate culture and capital structure than by any economically
rational response to market pricing signals. 46
Finally, in addition to these consumer and producer rationality distortions,
recent game theoretic studies of strategic bargaining seek to demonstrate that
limited entitlement regimes, including liability rule and divided ownership
systems, may, in some circumstances, actually provide greater inducements for
efficient consensual transfers than full, neoclassical property rules. 247 To the
extent that these studies are applicable to copyright-and it appears that they
would apply to many transactions, particularly those concerning transformative
uses of existing works-they suggest that an expansive proprietary copyright
might not be the best vehicle for channeling producer investment to meet
audience tastes, even assuming that market pricing affords a fairly accurate
indication of those tastes.248 In short, while the copyright system as a whole
NORTH, supra note 119, at 95-104.
246. For a detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see JOHN IZOD, HOLLYWOOD AND THE BOX OFFICE
1895-1986, at 141-87 (1988). Cf John Pick, The Compulsion Towards Inefficiency, in ECONOMICS OF
CULTURAL DECISIONS 110 (William S. Hendon & James L. Shanahan eds., 1983) (maintaining that cultural
and artistic expectations, ritualized techniques, group mythologies, and embedded commercial practices
have driven London West End theaters regularly to put on lavish, unprofitable productions).
247. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement To Facilitate
Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995) [hereinafter Ayres & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining]. Ayres
and Talley maintain, in essence, that when two parties have private information about how much they value
an entitlement, giving each party a partial claim to the entitlement (either by imposing a liability rule or
by dividing ownership) in a manner that creates ambiguity or uncertainty about who is the buyer and who
is the seller can reduce the parties' incentive to withhold valuation information during bargaining, thus
facilitating efficient trade. See id. at 1029-30. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have challenged this thesis
in part, arguing that although bargaining occurs under liability rules when transaction costs are low, liability
rules are not especially conducive to bargaining (although they may induce efficient nonconsensual takings
and need not be less conducive to bargaining than are property rules). See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221, 224-32 (1995)
[hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Reply]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability
Rules, 109 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1996) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Property Rules]. Kaplow and Shavell
do, however, agree with Ayres and Talley that divided ownership may better facilitate efficient trade than
would full, neoclassical property rights. See Kaplow & Shavell, Reply, supra, at 222 n.5; see also Ian Ayres
& Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between Consensual and Nonconsensual Advantages of Liability Rules, 105
YALE L.J. 235 (1995) (responding to Kaplow & Shavell critique); Jason S. Johnston, Bargaining Under
Rules Versus Standards, II J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256 (1995) (maintaining that bargaining under standards
may be more efficient than bargaining under rules).
248. See Ayres & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining, supra note 247, at 1039-42 & n.48 (labelling
copyright compulsory licenses for musical recordings, songs played on jukeboxes, certain cable television
transmissions, and certain uses of copyrighted works by public television as classic untailored liability rules
that favor information disclosure, thus encouraging consensual transfers). Robert Merges argues that Ayres's
and Talley's model is applicable only in cases of bilateral monopoly and not, as in the case of copyright,
where an entitlement holder would have to buy out multiple potential takers, some of whom might even
threaten infringement entirely to extort a payment. See Merges, supra note 168, manuscript at 18. For a
further discussion of this multiple taker problem, see infra notes 425-26 and accompanying text, Merges
is only partly correct, and even here he misses the point. The multiple taker problem would arise only
where the liability rule takes the form of a compulsory license in which a license fee is specified in
advance and is set at an amount that prospective licensees would generally be prepared to pay. In that
event, as Merges notes, the copyright holder will be unable to buy out unwanted uses and may have to
accept less than the prescribed fee for prospective uses that she does want to transpire. But this multiple
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undergirds author self-reliance and expressive diversity, especially as compared
with the alternative of no copyright.2 49 There is little evidence, if any, that
a finely tuned pricing system, built upon a broad proprietary copyright, would
direct investment to diverse audiences any more effectively than a more
balanced copyright regime.
As noted above, the second respect in which the democratic paradigm
diverges from Professor Goldstein's approach is that the democratic paradigm
takes far more seriously the costs of a broad copyright monopoly. As a result,
it supports a copyright that, while still relatively strong, is considerably less
monolithic than his model. Put in economic terms, the democratic paradigm
entails the transfer to copyright holders of sufficient consumer surplus to
accord authors and publishers, not only a bare incentive for the production of
creative expression, but also substantial room for risk taking and independence
taker problem would not generally be present where the liability rule takes the form of an cx post
determination of the required license fee, whether on an individualized basis, as in a court's or arbitrator's
damage award, or an industry-wide basis, as where government rate setting tribunals are authorized to
prescribe across-the-board compulsory license fees after copyright holder and user groups cannot agree
among themselves. In those cases, uncertainty regarding the fee amount and the prospect of considerable
negotiation and adjudication costs would discourage frivolous claimants and encourage efficient bargaining
See Ayres & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining, supra note 247. at 1074-75 (contending that. like liability rules
and split entitlements, uncertainty as to judicial outcome may induce private information disclosure and thus
lead to efficient bargaining). This would especially be the case with respect to industry-wide compulsory
license fees, where the possibilities for tailored liability based on the private information of an) individual
party are minimal. Accordingly, contrary to Merges's claim that property rules are most conduci'vc to the
establishment of collective licensing institutions that make bargaining possible in the face of high
transaction costs, it would appear that the most fruitful regimes in that regard are those. such as that long
in effect in Germany, that require industry-wide bargaining under the threat of administratte determination
of binding "reasonable" license fees if no voluntary agreement is reached. See Adolf Dictz. Germany, in
I INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRAcncE, GER-66 to GER-67 (Paul Edward Geller ed, 1995)
(describing provisions of German law regarding formation of such "general'" agreements) This basic model
of providing for voluntary negotiations under the shadow of binding arbitration has now.. been adopted in
the United States with regard to the public performance of sound recordings in certain digital audio
transmissions, the public performance of nondramatic musical works in jukeboxes, the use of published
nondramatic musical works and published pictorial. graphic, and sculptural works in noncommercial
broadcasting, and secondary transmissions by satellite carners for private home viewing See 17 U S C §§
114(0, 116, 118, 119(c)(2)-(3) (1994).
Merges misses the point by failing to see that the primary purpose of certain compulsory licenses
might not be to overcome transaction costs, but rather to deprive the copyright owner of the possibility of
preventing transformative uses. Armed with a right to exclude, copyright owners may refuse to license
unwanted transformative uses or demand supracompetitive license fees that have the same effect See supra
notes 33-42 and accompanying text. Such a proprietary regime frustrates copyright's fundamental goal of
promoting expressive diversity (in the sense of subversive reformulation as well as product differentiation)
Copyright's democratic purposes will often be better served by a system, such as the cover recording
compulsory license, in which copyright owners are allocated more than adequate user surplus (as evidenced
in part by their consistent willingness to license for less than the statutory ceiling), but are unable to prevent
the transformative uses that are subject to the compulsory license. See infra notes 427-31 and
accompanying text. (Of course, such a system will have democracy-enhancing advantages o'cr a formal
property rule only if. as in the case of the cover recordings, the compulsory license fee is not set so high
as effectively to preclude nonconsensual transformative uses.) Seen in that light. and contrar) to Merges's
claim, it is hardly evidence of the failure of compulsory licenses that negotiated cover recording license
fees will typically be less than the statutory rate. See Merges. supra note 168. manuscript at 33-35
(describing cover recording compulsory license as undesirable, "suboptimal liability rule" because copyright
holders bargaining under its shadow typically receive less than statutory rate).
249. See infra Subsections IV.C.I-2.
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from government and private patronage. But the democratic paradigm stops far
short of Professor Goldstein's position that copyright holders should be able
to appropriate as much consumer surplus as possible, especially as applied to
prospective users who wish to draw upon existing expression to create new
cultural works. 50 It posits that, given the deadweight loss and dangers of
private censorship that are intrinsic to the copyright monopoly, the social costs
of enacting that sweeping protection would be simply too high to permit such
a step, especially when Professor Goldstein's proffered justification for such
additional protection is a pricing system of questionable efficacy.
Professor Goldstein is not unmindful of the social costs of a broad
copyright monopoly, particularly as far as the burden on transformative uses
is concerned t5' But he relies too heavily on the idea/expression dichotomy
as a mechanism for ensuring that, no matter how broad copyright's protection
of expression, at the end of the day, subsequent authors will be able to borrow
sufficiently from existing works to create their own.52 Copyright's dramatic
expansion into areas that were once thought to be unprotectable ideas, a
phenomenon supported by neoclassicism, greatly undercuts the force of this
constraint. 5 3 Professor Goldstein's attempt to characterize neoclassicism as
democracy-enhancing thus ultimately depends on an attempt to place limits on
the neoclassical market paradigm that turns out to be untenable. Copyright's
democracy-enhancing objectives would be better served by an approach that
unequivocally places them in the foreground, relying on marketplace
economics as a means of important, but of limited utility, in achieving that
end.
III. THE MINIMALIST CRITICS OF COPYRIGHT EXPANSION
In the face of the failure to obtain judicial recognition of a First
Amendment defense to copyright infringement, critics of copyright's expansion
have sought to constrain copyright from within. While this attempt has its
250. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 18, § 1.13.2, at 1:39 (maintaining that U.S. copyright law reflects
implicit principle that "a copyright owner is entitled to capture the full value that consumers attach to its
works, and not just the minimum sum that it would require to support its investment"). Professor Goldstein
appears to apply this principle to transformative as well as nontransformative uses. See supra note 239.
251. See, e.g., id. § 1.14, at 1:40 (noting that "(i]f copyright law is to promote the national culture and
learning, it must allow subsequent creators to draw on copyrighted works for their inspiration and
education").
252. Compare id. § 1.14.2.2, at 1:47 (asserting that "[c]opyright law withholds protection from ideas
on the principle that the national culture would languish if creators had to pay tribute each time they
employed on these basic building blocks"), with id. § 5.3, at 5:79 (contending that copyright owners'
exclusive right to make derivative works, which "sometimes contain only the faintest trace of the
underlying work," serves to direct owner investment in accordance with consumer preferences). See also
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 19-21 (contending that while copyright "optimists," such as himself,
recognize need for idea/expression dichotomy, it is copyright "pessimists." who have succeeded in installing
compulsory licenses and fair use "safety valves" into copyright law). For further discussion of Professor
Goldstein's treatment of derivative uses, see supra note 239.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 68-76.
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merits, in the absence of a robust theory of why and how copyright itself
reflects First Amendment values, critics have generally failed to account for
the ways in which a properly tailored copyright would support expressive
autonomy and diversity. As a result, opposition to expansion has had little
force. In addition, many critics have fallen back on approaches to copyright
that are overly minimalist 5 4
The minimalist critique has taken several forms. Perhaps most intriguingly,
some critics have, in effect, set neoclassicist expansionism on its head by
considering copyright economics in the context of the marketplace for all
social resources. Like the neoclassicist expansionists, they view copyright as
a mechanism for using the market pricing system to move resources to the uses
for which consumers are most willing to pay. But in contrast to the
expansionists, neoclassical minimalists insist that the market for copyrightable
works is only a small part of the allocative efficiency matrix. In this view,
while a broad proprietary copyright may lead to the mix of expression desired
by those consumers who wish to buy expression, it will draw resources away
from nonexpressive productive activity, resulting in an inefficient allocation of
social resources overall. 5 5 Indeed, for neoclassical minimalists, even a far
more limited copyright, designed to achieve expressive diversity through a
balance of incentive and access, may fail the test of allocative efficiency. As
Glynn Lunney has recently stated:
More variety in works of authorship must mean less of something
else. Because the production of additional works of authorship is not
inherently more valuable than any other potential use of society's
resources, justifying copyright requires some determination that
society will benefit more from devoting additional resources to
creating works of authorship than from the alternative investments to
which the resources would otherwise have been devoted.
As a result, argues Professor Lunney, copyright should provide only that
degree of protection that would lead individuals to expect roughly the same
price for their talent and resources whether invested in expressive or
nonexpressive products that are equally sought by consumers.2"
Other critics adopt a minimalist interpretation of the traditional copyright
incentive rationale in order to question the necessity for copyright. They would
254. Some critics have also misdirected their attack on copyright expansion b) laying the blame for
expansion on natural rights theory and Romanticism. See supra note 97
255. See ARNOLD PLANT, Economic Aspects of Copyrght in Books. in SEECTED ECOOtic ESSAYS
AND ADDRESSES 57, 72 (1974); Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman. 7he Economic Ratonale of
Copyright, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 421,425. 430 (1966); Lunney. supra note 30: see also KAPLAN. supra note
68, at 75 (asserting that overprotection "may conceivably run the risk of attracting too much of the nation's
energy into the copyright-protected sectors of the economy")
256. Lunney, supra note 30, at 655.
257. See id. at 600, 656.
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scrutinize separately each type of original expression and would withhold
copyright protection for that expression absent convincing proof that protection
is required to induce its production and dissemination.5 8 Moreover, even if
protection is to be accorded, these minimalist critics favor a copyright that
provides just enough incentive for production and, possibly, dissemination, but
no more.259 As Stewart Sterk puts it: "[F]rom an efficiency standpoint,
copyright is justifiable only to the extent that copyright protection is necessary
to induce additional creative activity. ''260 Accordingly, unless authors of a
specific category "need copyright protection to induce them to create," no
protection should be accorded.26' On this theory, Sterk argues that copyright
should be unavailable for persons, such as commercial photographers, who are
commissioned to produce their work, or even for anyone who would create a
work without consulting with an attorney regarding formal requisites to obtain
262protection.
As applied to the controversy over the proper scope of copyright in the
digital network environment, the minimalist position has led some critics to a
utopian vision of a world without copyright, where we all would be free to
engage in collaborative, creative play. These critics believe that little or no
copyright incentive is required to encourage creative activity and interaction
on the Internet and, therefore, that copyright as we know it is not needed in
the digital world.263 David Lange presents that view in a recent essay that
hails digital technology as our Messiah, liberating us not only from copyright,
but also from the constraining figures of societal authority, linear thought, and
verbal language.2 4 In the digital world, muses Lange, our notion of
intellectual "property" and our bourgeois "obsession" with "[p]lagiarism,
attribution, distortion, truncation, mutilation, and the like,, 265 will give way
to an ethic of mutual gift-giving. 266 "Perhaps," Lange concedes, "there will
be room for encouragement of productivity and for appropriation of
investment ... ."267 Such a scheme would have to operate, however, under
258. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REv. 281, 322-23 (1970) (concluding that "the basic
case for copyright protection for books is weak" and arguing that this "suggests that a heavy burden of
persuasion should be placed upon those who would extend such protection," including extending protection
against photocopying and to computer programs); Sterk, supra note 30, at 1205, 1209, 1213-15 (arguing
that copyright incentive should be limited to inducing creative activity).
259. See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 30, at 1205, 1209, 1213-15 (suggesting that copyright incentive
should be limited to inducing creative activity).
260. Id. at 1213.
261. Id.
262. See id. at 1214 (opposing protection for commercial photographers); id. at 1224-25 (opposing
elimination of copyright notice requirement).
263. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
264. See Lange, supra note 9, at 148, 150.
265. Id. at 144.
266. See id. at 148, 151.
267. Id. at 151.
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the overriding principle "that anyone who wishes will be free to play in the
fields of the word. 268
Somewhat more moderately, other critics would make room for some form
of copyright in cyberspace, but would insist on maintaining in the digital
network environment the same "free use zones" that have arisen in the hard
copy world.2 69 These critics would insist that copyright not extend to
personal and various noncommercial uses. They argue that remote digital
reading, listening, viewing, and even electronic transmission of copies for
personal use, should not infringe copyright. -70
The critics' various minimum positions suffer from a number of
fundamental flaws that would lead to an overly truncated copyright. To the
extent that minimalists view copyright entirely through the lens of allocative
efficiency, they ignore copyright's constitutive role in underwriting the
conditions for a democratic society, a social benefit that can neither be
measured nor reflected in terms of consumer purchasing decisions. '
Copyright serves to support a system of self-reliant authorship, expressive
diversity, and the dissemination of information that, given its vital importance
for democratic governance, is and should be subsidized, at least to some
extent, at the expense of nonexpressive production.
In this regard, many of the minimalist critics, it seems, have overlooked
copyright's structural function. As I will discuss in the next Part, copyright
does not serve merely to induce a greater quantity of creative production. It
also is designed to secure the qualitative conditions for creative autonomy and
expressive diversity. Copyright supports a sector of creative and
communicative activity that is relatively free from reliance on state subsidy,
elite patronage, and cultural hierarchy. As such, copyright must aim to enable
authors and publishers to appropriate a somewhat larger share of consumer
surplus than that which would merely support a minimally adequate quantity
of creative production. To fulfill its structural function, copyright must accord
authors and publishers some additional wiggle room, in effect creating a public
268. Id.
269. See, e.g.. Elkin-Koren. supra note 40. at 277 (asserting that users of epr~esston dissmnnatcd over
digital networks must be allowed "to do the same things the) are able to do in a non-digititzcd
environment"); Hamilton, supra note 12. at 631 (favonng construction of "free use zone in the on-line era"
that will make "'explicit what is already accepted practice in a hard copy uniserse-that cop)right ovncrs
do not have rights to prohibit individuals from browsing and borro%%ing their %ork",. Litman. supra note
3, at 41-43 (opposing copyright protection for digital browsing): Zimmerman. supra note 3. at 405 inoting
public interest "in maintaining some approximation of our current cheap and simple access to cop) righted
works for research, scholarship and pleasure").
270. See infra text accompanying notes 399-401
271. My point that the metric of consumer purchasing decisions is inadequate to measure cop)nght"N
social benefit may be supported either by: (I) an economics-based argument that. gi'.en market failure
arising from the public good characteristics of copynght's social benefit. indi idual purchasing decisions
do not reflect its true value; or (2) the idea that copyright's social benefit is an "irducblN social good"
whose value derives from fundamental collective interests, rather than an aggregation of individual
preferences. See supra note 44.
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subsidy to ensure author independence from patronage and to make possible
a greater degree of risk taking, while still encouraging productive uses of
existing works. Put in economic terms, the condition of self-reliant authorship
is itself a public good that must be factored into the copyright equation.
Some critics also exhibit an impoverished view of copyright's production
function. Those who call for a copyright-free cyberspace rely heavily on the
indisputable fact that Internet discussion groups, featuring a wide open
exchange of ideas on a broad spectrum of topics, have proliferated with little
apparent reliance on copyright protection or financial incentive. But there is no
reason to assume that the creators of "sustained works of authorship"-books,
articles, films, songs, and paintings, as opposed to simply conversations and
bits of information-will generally make their work available over the Internet,
or will create new cyberspace variations of such works, without some
reasonable possibility of remuneration.272
Still other critics give insufficient weight to copyright's role in
encouraging the dissemination of creative works, as opposed simply to creative
production.273 Some authors may in fact create works without a monetary
incentive. For example, university professors and others who look to writing
scholarly articles as a means to communicate their ideas and enhance their
prestige, more than as a direct source of financial remuneration, are generally
pleased to have as wide a readership for such articles as possible. At first
glance, such authors might even welcome a regime in which their work was
freely copyable. But authors must generally depend on publishers to
disseminate their work, and publishers generally require, at the very least, the
possibility of recovering their costs in selecting, editing, marketing, and
distributing creative works.2 7 4 Publishers need copyright protection to publish
scholarly works, even if scholars might not need such protection to write
them.275
Finally, many critics take insufficient account of the changes in copyright
economics that will be brought about by digital technology. As I discuss in
272. See Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 1498-99.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 258-62.
274. Digital network technology will enable authors to bypass publishers to some extent. A novelist,
for example, might reach her prospective audience directly by making her work available on her own Web
site. But for the most part, authors and audiences will still likely be dependent on intermediaries to select
which works are most likely to appeal to certain audiences and to make those works known to those
audiences. Without such digital publishers to fulfill these gatekeeping and marketing functions, audiences
will be lost in the ever-expanding sea of material available over the World Wide Web and other digital
networks.
275. The Second Circuit recently recognized this principle:
Ultimately, the monopoly privileges conferred by copyright protection and the potential financial
rewards therefrom are not directly serving to motivate authors to write individual articles; rather.
they serve to motivate publishers to produce journals, which provide the conventional and often
exclusive means for disseminating these individual articles. It is the prospect of such
dissemination that contributes to the motivation of these authors.
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881, 895 (2d Cir. 1994).
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Part V, hard copy world "free use zones" cannot be applied to the digital
world without radically undermining copyright incentives.
IV. THE DEMOCRATIC PARADIGM
Copyright plays a central role in promoting public education and
expressive diversity. But both the neoclassicist approach, with its treatment of
creative expression as a "vendible commodity," and the minimalist critics'
approach, with its vitiation of the copyright incentive, threaten to diminish that
role. This Part lays the foundations for an alternative approach, one that better
comports with copyright's appellation as an "engine of free expression." 76
It offers a theoretical framework that seeks to articulate more precisely and
more directly than have other commentators the ways in which copyright
supports a democratic civil society.277 The democratic paradigm is hostile
neither to economic analysis nor to neoclassicist insights regarding the
operation of copyright markets. But the democratic paradigm makes clear that
while copyright may operate in the market, copyright's fundamental goals are
not of the market. In providing a theoretical framework for a strong, but
limited copyright, the democratic paradigm aims to reinvigorate copyright's
role in the "preservation of a free Constitution.2 7 5
I begin this Part with an examination of democratic theory underlying the
paradigm. I then explain how copyright helps to foster a vibrant and
participatory civil society, thus underwriting opportunities for collective self-
rule in a representative democracy. Part V will describe and contrast the
paradigm's possible doctrinal outcomes with those of neoclassicism and the
minimalist critics.
A. Democratic Governance and Civil Society
The emergence of democratic institutions in Eastern Europe, coupled with
our acute uncertainty regarding the continued vitality and viability of our own,
276. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.. 471 U S. 539. 558 (1985)
277. For another recent, and welcome, attempt, see Elkin-Koren. supra note 40 See also David Ladd.
The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright. J. COPYRIGHT SOc'Y 421. 427-28 (1983) (refernng briefly
to importance for democratic governance of author and publisher independence from state largess) Paul
Goldstein has also underscored the relation between copyright and democratic governance See GoulTtit%.
supra note 18, § 2.2.1, at 2:10. His blueprint for copyright. however, reflects less an effort to determine
how the particular needs of democratic governance might shape copyright docmne than his '.tes, of
copyright as a vehicle for directing investment and his underlying premise that a broad. neoclassicist
copyright fosters expressive diversity, a premise I dispute. See supra notes 237-44 and accompanying text
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Lyman Patterson and Stanley Lindberg have argued that copyright
should be narrowly tailored to the needs of a democratic citizenry for access to information See LY,iA%
RAY PATrERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG. THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT A LAw OF USERS" RIGHTS
123-33 (1991). In so doing, they neglect copyright's role in underwriting an independent sector of authors
and publishers, a function that is critical to a democratic civil society See mnfra Subsection IV C 2 a
278. See supra note 17.
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has brought renewed attention to the centuries old concept of "civil
society., 279 Civil society is the sphere of voluntary, nongovernmental
association in which individuals determine their shared purposes and norms.
It may include unions, churches, political and social movements, civic and
neighborhood associations, schools of thought, educational institutions, and
certain forms of economic organization. 21 It incorporates formal and
informal organizations, group identities and the shared purposes, histories, and
discursive norms that hold groups together.28' As such, civil society also
comprises the realm of public communication and discourse.282 This realm,
which encompasses numerous forms of cultural expression, the mass media,
and, increasingly, the proliferating welter of Internet user groups, bulletin
boards, and Web sites, serves both as a fount of organizational life and as an
independent manifestation of civic association, the space in which political,
social, and aesthetic norms are debated and determined.
Contemporary theorists see a robust, pluralist civil society as a necessary,
proactive foundation for democratic governance in a complex modern
state.2 83 Civil society bolsters representative democracy in a number of ways.
279. See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 276-88 (1995); JEAN L. COHEN &
ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY (1994); ERNEST GELLNER, CONDITIONS Or
LIBERTY: CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS RIVALS (1992); DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 281-87 (1987);
JOHN KEANE, DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY (1988); ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY
(1992); Daniel Bell, "American Exceptionalism" Revisited: The Role of Civil Society, PUB. INTEREST,
Spring 1989, at 38; Charles Taylor, Modes of Civil Society, 3 PUB. CULTURE 95 (1990); Alain Tourainc,
Triumph or Downfall of Civil Society, in I HUMAN. IN REV. 218 (David Rieff et al. cds., 1982); Michael
Walzer, A Better Vision: The Idea of Civil Society: A Path to Social Reconstruction, DISSENT, Spring 1996,
at 293; Guyora Binder, Post-Totalitarian Politics. 91 MICH. L. REV. 1491 (1993) (reviewing COHEN &
ARATO, supra, and FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992)).
280. The precise definition and contours of civil society have long been a matter of some uncertainty
and dispute. See JOHN B. THOMPSON, THE MEDIA AND MODERNITY: A SOCIAL THEORY OF THE MEDIA
121 (1995). Hegel and other early theorists saw civil society as the realm of all social relations outside the
state, including commercial and personal relations. See id. Many contemporary theorists, on the other hand,
define civil society, to one degree or another, in opposition to the state, the market, and the family. See,
e.g., BARBER, supra note 279, at 285 (labelling civil society as "mediating domain between private markets
and big government"); COHEN & ARATO, supra note 279, at ix-x (describing civil society as sphere of
democratic association and unconstrained discussion that lies separate from, but intertwined with,
institutions of state power and economic production); HELD, supra note 279, at 282-87 (maintaining that
democratic civil society is incompatible with unrestricted private ownership and private firm determination
of political agenda); Walzer, supra note 279, at 300 (arguing that civil society may encompass institutions,
like consumer cooperatives and worker communes, that function in market, but, as distinguished from
capitalist firms, have their origins outside market).
281. See Binder, supra note 279, at 1521.
282. For an extensive study of the role of the communications sector in civil society, see generally
JOHN KEANE, THE MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY (1991).
283. See, e.g., BARBER, supra note 279, at 276-88 (calling for reinvigoration of civil society as
prerequisite for building global democracy); GELLNER, supra note 279, at 188-89 (arguing that pluralist
civil society is necessary precondition to democratic government); HELD, supra note 279, at 281-89
(asserting that democratic, participatory civil society is necessary for viable democratic governance);
KEANE, supra note 279, at 1-30 (seeing democratic civil society working in tandem with democratic state
institutions as preferable alternative to state-administered socialism and neoconservative laissez faire
economics); see also JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE:
AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 248 (Thomas Burger trans., 1989) (1962) (positing
that public participation in process of formal communication conducted through civic associations may lead
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First, a robust, participatory, and pluralist civil society is the wellspring of
what Robert Dahl, building on Alexis de Tocqueville's observations of
antebellum America, has called a "democratic culture," a belief in and
understanding of the democratic process that becomes embedded in the minds,
habits, and character of a people.28 A democratic order depends upon a
domain in which citizens develop the independent spirit, self-direction, social
responsibility, discursive skill, political awareness, and mutual recognition. A
state whose citizenry has not internalized these skills and values will rule
through fiat and obedience, without any sense, so vital to our understanding
of democracy, that its laws and social norms originate in the commitments of
a self-governing polity.28
5
More concretely, a democratic civil society also fosters the citizenship
skills and opportunities required for the explicit assertion of popular
sovereignty over the apparatus of the representative democratic state. Popular
sovereignty depends upon a citizenry imbued not only with the right, but also
with the sufficient capacity and political competency, to pass judgment on
decisionmakers, petition government officials, and influence political
agendas. 28 6 By participating in intermediate associational and communicative
to more deliberative and broad-based generation of public opinion and to greater public control ocr state
institutions).
284. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIc DEMOCRACY 30. 48-49 (1985)
285. Indeed, freed from any real constraint of popular accountability, such a state uill inevitably
trample even whatever abstract political rights it purports to accord its citizens. According to Michacl
Walzer, even a totalitarian state cannot survive without some measure of willing cooperation on behalf of
its citizens:
No state can survive for long if it is wholly alienated from civil society. It cannot outlast its
own coercive machinery; it is lost. literally, without its firepoer The production and
reproduction of loyalty, civility, political competence, and trust in authonty are never the ssork
of the state alone, and the effort to go it alone-one meaning of totalitanansm-i s doomed to
failure.
valzer, supra note 279, at 301.
286. Our system of representative democracy requires at once that state officials be entrusted % ith near
exclusive authority to make formal law and that popular sovereignty be the ultimatc source of that
authority. See Marci A. Hamilton, Power Responstbthri; and Republican Democracs. 93 MICit L Rv
1539, 1539-40 (1995); Frank I. Michelman, Laws Republic. 97 YALE LJ 1493. 1500-03 (1988) The ci'vil
society model insists that in order for popular sovereignty to serve as a source of authonty for formal law.
citizens must possess a certain capacity and will to influence politics. It emphasizes as acll that much
democratic self-rule takes place outside the ambit of state institutions and formal law The ci'.il society
model vision of an active, politically competent citizenry within the frameaork of a represcntatisc
democracy stands in contrast to the models of competitive elitism, direct democracy, and anarcho-
syndicalism. The model of competitive elitism, associated with Max Weber and Joseph Schumpcter. posits
a highly truncated view of popular sovereignty, in which, for all intents and purposes, the function of
citizens in a modem representative democracy is limited to endorsing as their rulers one subset of the
political elite rather than another. See HELD. supra note 279. at 143-85; JOSE t A SCHLIPETER.
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEiOCRACY 235-83 (1942). The direct democracy model. ahich has its
roots in the theory and practice of the ancient Greek pois. requires active citizen participation in formal
governmental decisionmaking. See HELD, supra note 279. at 13-28: PAUL A RAIIE. REPUBLICS AC1E.N'T
AND MODERN: CLASSICAL REPUBLICANISM AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 28-54 (1992) It also tends
to place a far greater emphasis on achieving consensus and on the subordination of private interest to the
common good than does the civil society model. See Walzer. supra note 279. at 299. 303 (maintaining that
democratic civil society requires men and women who are actively engaged. but only "intermittently
The Yale Law Journal
networks, citizens discover, refine, and articulate their interests, enabling them
to vote with deliberative judgment and petition government officials with
greater effectiveness.21 7 They also acquire organizational skill and see the
possibility of accomplishing through common undertaking what they could not
on their own, encouraging their participation in political association. 288
Finally, civil society provides opportunities for collective self-rule outside
formal institutions of government. It encompasses sites for associational
activity in which citizens may determine their preferences and commitments
and assert control over resources, without state direction. It is also the forum
where policy and social norms are debated and determined, where preferences
are aggregated, and where much of the political agenda is set. The norms and
understandings that are contested and shaped in the associational and
communicative contexts of civil society have a profound influence on the tenor
of our individual and collective lives, often exceeding that of government
action or policy. They not only percolate to public officials, but also pervade
the myriad of nongovernmental settings in which we live our daily lives. As
such, they govern us no less than formal law. 289 Citizen deliberation
regarding these norms and understandings, whether it takes places on shop
floors, in Internet user groups, or through the mass media, is thus an intrinsic
element of self-governance.29
B. Civil Society, the State, and the Market
Despite its largely self-constituted character, civil society is only partly
autonomous from the legal and political institutions of government. Civil
society requires from government massive material and institutional
virtuous," and who learn to articulate their own interests, rather than setting them aside in interest of
consensus); see also JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 5-6, 10-1 I
(1991) (distinguishing between "active" or"good" citizenship and fully devoted "ideal" citizen of classical
antiquity). The anarcho-syndicalist model contemplates delegating formal lawmaking power to voluntary
associations. See, e.g., PAUL HIRST, ASSOCIATIVE DEMOCRACY: NEW FORMS OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
GOVERNANCE (1994) (calling for substantial devolution of power from state and market institutions to
voluntary, self-governing associations which would then "become the primary means of democratic
governance of economic and social affairs").
287. See DENNIS F. THOMPSON, THE DEMOCRATIC CITIZEN 60-62 (1970); see also Guyora Binder,
What's Left, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1985, 2019-21 (1991) (discussing possibility for radical redefinition of
personal identity and commitments and for enhanced political confidence and competence through
participation in collective enterprise).
288. See 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 115-16 (Phillips Bradley, ed., Henry
Reeve, trans., 1945) (1840).
289. See Michelman, supra note 286, at 1531.
290. That is not to imply, moreover, that the civil society model requires rational deliberation or
orderly progression towards consensus. In many ways, the opposite is the case. The civil society model
allows, and indeed celebrates, a plurality of outlooks, identities, and lifestyles. The discursive element of
civil society reflects this fundamental pluralism. It is more raucous cacophony than reasoned syllogism. It
operates as much through the emotion, symbolism, and subliminal influences of art and mass culture as
through a methodical presentation of issues. See infra Section IV.B.
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support. 29' State intervention is required not only to sustain civil institutions,
but also to ensure that they provide, rather than diminish, opportunities for
democratic governance. While civil society generally nourishes democratic
culture, it may also generate radically unequal power relationships.-
Intermediate associations and communicative structures need not be entirely
egalitarian and democratic to fulfill civil society's constitutive potential."
But an abundance of authoritarian social relations, whether in the employment,
familial, interracial, religious, or educational contexts, may foster deference and
servility rather than the culture of assertive autonomy upon which democracy
rests. Workers with no job security or say in management, students and
congregants who are trained to follow teachings without question, and persons
who lack the means or opportunity to discern and articulate their interests can
neither fully participate in democratic self-rule nor gain the political
competency required for effective democratic citizenship.
Accordingly, an important role of law in a democratic state is to
underwrite a robust, democracy-enhancing civil society through a combination
of state involvement and private initiative. The state must provide educational
and material resources for an active and politically competent citizenry. " It
must facilitate the democratization of associational and communicative
frameworks to provide greater opportunities for citizen engagement and self-
government. Concomitantly, it must work to modify or eliminate social
arrangements that undermine democratic citizenship while still leaving
considerable room for "bottom-up" community organizing, education, and
direction.
291. Michael Walzer provides several examples:
Families with working parents need state help in the form of publicl) funded day care and
effective public schools. National minorities need help in organizing and sustaining their own
educational programs. Worker-owned companies and consumer cooperatives need state loans
or loan guarantees; so do (even more often) capitalist entrepreneurs and firms Philanthropy and
mutual aid, churches and private universities, depend upon tax exemptions. Labor unions need
legal recognition and guarantees against "unfair labor practices.'" Professional associations need
state support for their licensing procedures.
Walzer, supra note 279, at 302.
292. See id.; see also COHEN & ARATO. supra note 279. at 255-98 (concluding that although
"Foucault is right in arguing that modem civil society is not equi'alcnt to its principles of freedom.
equality, democracy, justice, rights, autonomy, and solidanty." neither is it '*equivalent to its strategies of
domination and control").
293. See Walzer, supra note 279. at 302-03
294. As Louis Brandeis said:
Under universal suffrage ... every voter is a part ruler of the state Unless the rulers ha%c. in
the main, education and character, and are free men. our great experiment in democracy must
fail. It devolves upon the state, therefore, to fit its rulers for their task. It must pros idc not onl)
facilities for development but the opportunity of using them It must not only provide
opportunity, it must stimulate the desire to avail of it.
Louis D. BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON DE.mOCRACY 25. 27 (Philippa Strum cd. 1995).
see also JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRFSE.N-ATVE GOVERNiE.-" 25 (Cumn V Shields
ed., Liberal Arts Press, Inc. 1958) (1861) ("[Tlhe most important point of excellence wshich any form of
government can possess is to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themse',es.")
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The market presents both a threat and a promise to the democratic
character of civil society. An unfettered market can give rise to gross
disparities of power, resources, and associational capability, according the
wealthy disproportionate opportunities to participate in civil life and to set
political and social agendas.295 Significant state involvement may be required
to prevent such market-based hierarchy. At the same time, however, the market
underwrites opportunities for democratic citizenship that would not be available
even in a benignly statist regime. In addition to promoting material well-being,
market institutions support a degree of individual choice and possibilities for
political autonomy and associational diversity that could not subsist within an
all-encompassing bureaucratic state.296 Far from dispensing with market
institutions, therefore, a democratic state should use them to enhance the
independent, democratic character of civil society. The state may accordingly
lend support to commercial activity and private accumulations of wealth in part
to foster nonstate centers of power and associational activity. At the same time,
it may define and allocate proprietary entitlements in a manner that diversifies
private power structures, lessens dependency on state largess, and augments
citizens' capacity for independent-minded participation in public discourse.297
295. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUsTIcE 225-27 (1971) (noting that political liberties and
democratic institutions "lose much of their value whenever those who have greater private means are
permitted to use their advantages to control the course of public debate"). In the public communications
sector, for example, those who have the capital to acquire or own a television station, newspaper, or movie
studio, those who control advertising budgets, and those who have the wherewithal and propensity to
respond to advertising have a far greater voice in determining the nature and content of disseminated
expression than those who do not. See generally C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC
PRESS (1994) (arguing that "advertising seriously distorts and diminishes the mass media's contribution to
a free and democratic society"); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 787-88 (1987)
(describing constraints of public communications market). In the view of many commentators, unregulated
capitalism may also threaten the democratic character of civil society by depriving workers of the material
security, autonomy, and practice in governance required for effective democratic citizenship. See, e.g., 4
JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 775-941 (J.M. Robson ed., 1965) (1848)
(decrying capitalism's stultifying impact on wage eamer dignity and independence of thought and
advocating syndicalist system of worker ownership and election of management); CAROLE PATEMAN,
PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970) (advocating participatory democracy within industry in
order to enhance civic concern and political competence); William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property,
38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1339-40 (1991) (noting that republican and market socialist doctrine hold that
market structure subverts democracy, in part, by forcing workers into "experiences of dependency (to use
the republican term) and alienation (to use the socialist term) that preclude personal and political
autonomy," and by reducing social actors to mere mass of consumers, undercutting the possibilities of
association and democratic action). See also BARBER, supra note 279, at 242-45; Robin West, Taking
Freedom Seriously, I04 HARV. L. REV. 43, 63-79 (1990) (discussing Vdclav Havel's critique of impersonal
authority and subversion of individual responsibility in both capitalist consumer culture and totalitarian
state).
296. See COHEN & ARATO, supra note 279, at 547 (maintaining that traditional welfare entitlements
tend to create isolated clients of intrusive state bureaucracy, thus undermining personal autonomy and
communicative and associational infrastructure of civil society); KEANE, supra note 279, at 4 (noting
tendency of state-administered socialism "to encourage the passive consumption of state provision and
seriously to undermine citizens' confidence in their ability to direct their own lives"); see also RAWLS,
supra note 295, at 272-73 (noting that market system provides citizens with "free choice of careers and
occupation," but emphasizing that market system is not necessarily synonymous with capitalism).
297. Control over certain material resources may enhance citizens' political autonomy by freeing them
from the corrosive influence of "pressing material need or beholdenness to patrons." Frank Michelman,
Copyright and Democracy
C. Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society
Copyright is a limited proprietary entitlement through which the state
deliberately and selectively employs market institutions to support a democratic
civil society. Copyright law provides this support in two fundamental ways.
First, through its production function, copyright encourages creative expression
on a wide array of political, social, and aesthetic issues. The activity of
creating and communicating such expression and the expression itself
constitute vital components of a democratic civil society. Second, through its
structural function, copyright serves to further the democratic character of
public discourse. By according authors and their assigns a proprietary
entitlement, copyright fosters the development of an independent sector for the
creation and dissemination of original expression, a sector composed of
creators and publishers who earn financial support for their activities by
reaching paying audiences rather than by depending on state or elite largess.
No less importantly, by limiting the scope of that proprietary entitlement,
copyright constrains owner control over expression, seeking to preserve rich
possibilities for critical exchange and diverse reformulation of existing works.
1. Copyright's Production Function
Copyright law is designed to foster the creation and public communication
of original expression. Copyright protects "original works of authorship" that
are "fixed in any tangible medium of expression .. . from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated. 29 Although such works
Tutelary Jurisprudence and Constitutional Property, in LIBERTY. PROPERTY. AD TI E FL-t." RE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 127, 158 n.16 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds. 1990)
(describing civic republican view of property but noting that it also has libertanan analogue), see also
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 49-52 (1994) (discussing democratic ,alucs inherent
in antitrust enforcement); Akhil Reed Amar, Forr. Acres and a Maule" A Republican Theor of .limmal
Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 37 (1990) (arguing that 'a mintmal entitlement to property is
so important, so constitutive, and so essential for both individual and collective self-gosemancc" that state
is entitled and, indeed, constitutionally obligated to provide each cttizen with that entitlement, if necessary
by redistributing property held by other citizens). Entitlements that assure decent housing, a secure job that
offers a modicum of discretionary income, and access to informattonal and communtcati'.e netorks support
citizen ability and willingness to resist hegemomc extensions of state and pn%ate po%%er See Robert H
Anderson et al., Universal Access to E-mail: FeasibilitY and Societal implicattons (19951 (last vsited Oct
19, 1996) <http://www.rand.org/publications/iMRMR650> (maintaining that umersal accessN, to e-mail is
prerequisite to full participation in democratic society): Michelman. supra. at 130; see also Richard Krousc
& Michael McPherson, Capitalism. "Property-Owning Democracs; " and the Welfare State. in DF-%IOCRACY
AND THE WELFARE STATE 79 (Amy Gutmann ed.. 1988) (listing possible di:,Inbutlc measures)
298. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). The requirement of orginality means little more than that the ,,otk
cannot be a copy. Expression that exhibits a modicum of creativity and more than a triial ,anation from
existing public domain works from which expression is borrossed will qualify. See Feist Publications V
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts Inc. 191 F2d 99. 102
(2d Cir. 1951). The fixation requirement rules out unrecorded conversation and extemporaneous speech.
even if they are broadcast throughout the nation, unless they are fixed simultaneously with their broadcast
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "fixed"). Conversely, copyright may subsist, from the moment of fixation.
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need no longer be made available to the public as a condition of federal
copyright protection, the Copyright Act continues to maintain a system of
incentives designed to encourage public communication.299 The stuff of
copyright-fixed original expression and its public communication-lies at the
heart of a democratic civil society.
30°
In fostering the production and dissemination of fixed original expression
concerning a broad range of political, social, cultural, and aesthetic matters,
copyright may promote the democratic character of civil society in two
fundamental ways. First, the dissemination of such expression, no less than
face-to-face dialogue, plays an auxiliary role: It is a fundamental building
block of democratic association. Associations depend, for both their formation
and operation, upon the exchange of information and ideas. Participants need
to learn of and express their common interests, gain information about the
association's founding principles and activities, and exchange their ideas about
the strategies and issues that confront them. In all but the smallest, most
geographically concentrated associations, this communication must generally
take place among people who, because of distance, time constraints, and the
number and anonymity of potential participants, cannot converse face-to-face.
For that reason, Toqueville's observation that "hardly any democratic
association can do without newspapers ''30t is equally applicable to modern-
day mass media, both electronic and print, and increasingly to digital network
communication. The millions of fixed works of authorship that are regularly
broadcast, distributed, and transmitted every day across such communicative
systems are the lifeblood of civic association. The extent to which copyright
promotes or inhibits their creation, dissemination, and reformulation is of
fundamental importance to the democratic, participatory character of civil
society.
A related aspect of copyright's auxiliary role is education. Democratic civil
society and citizenship rely heavily on the widespread distribution of
knowledge. For citizens to articulate their interests, participate in civic
in letters, books, sound recordings, recorded broadcasts, visual art, and works that are embodied, digital
media.
299. See Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 UCLA L.
REv. 1, 2 (1995).
300. To be certain, the sphere of copyrightable subject matter is not coextensive with our system of
free expression. Much public debate consists of speech that does not qualify for copyright protection, either
because it is not original or not fixed in a tangible means of expression or because the Copyright Act
withholds protection from works created by federal employees within the scope of their employment. See
17 U.S.C. § 101 ("work of the United States Government"); id. §§ 102(a), 105 (1994). But copyright does
extend to a myriad of commentary that may have a direct or indirect impact on matters of democratic
governance.
301. 2 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 288, at 112. For an account of the central role of newspapers in
the proliferation of grassroots political organizations soon after the founding of the Republic, see JOYCE
APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER; THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 1790s, at 55-56,
77-78 (1984); see also THOMPSON, supra note 280, at 82-85, 114-18 (detailing ways in which
communications media greatly enhances dispersed individuals' ability to act in concert).
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association, and engage in reasoned deliberation on public issues, they must
"have access to the rich store of the accumulated wealth of mankind in
knowledge, ideas and purposes."3"2 Since effective, democratic education
encourages independent thinking through active learning, the access to existing
knowledge must involve an opportunity to reformulate ideas and transform
expressive works, as well as simply to contemplate them. Copyright supplies
a vital incentive for authors and publishers to contribute to the store of
knowledge. But if drawn too broadly, it can also inhibit access and unduly
burden transformative uses of existing works, thereby impeding public
education.
In addition to its auxiliary role, public communication, much of which is
underwritten by copyright, serves as an independent, critical component of civil
society. Deliberation and robust debate are the essence of democratic culture.
Indeed, democracy might be defined as a moral system in which those who are
best able to convince their contemporaries through rhetorical skill, rather than
win them over by bribes or brute force, are entitled to the greatest share of
political power.30 3 In our age of mass media and electronic communication,
much democratic citizenship consists not in face-to-face dialogue or
community organization, but rather in exchanging ideas about political, social,
and cultural issues through television, radio, films, newspapers, books, music,
art, and now multi-media CD-ROMs and the Internet."' While such fora
lack the intersubjective intimacy of face-to-face interaction, they are no less a
locus of deliberative discourse.0 5 Indeed, they make up the primary space
in our society where public opinion is forged and social norms are contested
and elaborated.
302. JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION 52 (1963) without saying so explicitly. Dew ey
was sharply critical of intellectual property regimes that reallocate exclusive rights to ideas and exprcssion
He advocated the diffusion of learning based on the model of the scientific community, in w.hich icentitic
inquirers share their knowledge with their colleagues. See altso JOIHN DE\% Y. %DI\ IDt At-ISI OtD \%D
NEW 154-55 (1930). In one biting passage. Dewey appears to lay upon intellectual propr) much of the
blame for the failings of democracy:
Back of the appropriation by the few of the material resources of society lies the appropnation
by the few in behalf of their own ends of the cultural, the spintual. resources that are the
product not of the individuals who have taken possession but of the cooperati'.e work of
humanity. It is useless to talk about the failure of democracy until the source of It% failure has,
been grasped and steps are taken to bnng about that type of social organization that wtll
encourage the socialized extension of intelligence
DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION. supra. at 53.
303. As Michael Valzer notes: "Citizens come into the forum with nothing but their arguments All
nonpolitical goods have to be deposited outside: weapons and wallets. titles and degrees M %IICHAEL
WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALrTY 304 (19831
304. For an insightful discussion of the role of the mass media in public deliberatlon. see BEI tIAt
I. PAGE, WHO DELIBERATES?: MASS MEDIA IN MODERN DEMOCRACY (1996)
305. In fact, the act of fixing one's thoughts in a tangible medium of expression and the act of reading.
viewing, or listening to fixed expression may often involve greater thought and contemplation than off-the-
cuff conversation. As John Thompson has noted, such "mediated quasi-interaction can stimulate deliberation
just as much as, if not more than, face-to-face interaction in a shared locale - TuOMPsON. istpro note 280.
at 256.
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It bears emphasizing that the constitutive role of copyrightable creative
expression in a democratic civil society is limited neither to works of
authorship that explicitly address matters of political or social importance nor
to those that present ideas in a rationally apprehensible manner. Many creative
works have broad political and social implications even if they do not appear
or even seek to convey an explicit ideological message. Literature and art may
be subtle, but powerful, vehicles for attitude change or reinforcement. Even
what may seem to be abstract, "pure" artistic expression may challenge
accepted modes of thought and belie the efforts of governments or cultural
majorities to standardize individual sensitivities and perceptions. 306 For that
reason totalitarian regimes have prohibited styles of art and music that might
be seen as politically innocuous in other contexts-and for that reason a
democratic polity committed to the dialogic interchange of independent-minded
individuals must protect them from official or private censorship. 31
The same is true with regard to works of popular culture. Our public
discourse comprises a rambunctious, effervescent brew of spectacle, prurient
appeal, social commentary, and political punditry. It is part entertainment, but
as it entertains, it often reveals contested issues and deep fissures within our
society, just as it may reinforce widely held beliefs and values.308 To be
understood by their audiences, films, songs, and television programs must deal
in the currency of prevailing practices, ideologies, and stereotypes, and in so
doing must either reinforce or challenge them."l Even seemingly innocuous
cartoon characters, like Bart Simpson and Mickey Mouse, may be used to
subvert (or reinforce) prevailing cultural values and assumptions-and with
306. See Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 86-95 (1996) (maintaining that art
is crucial to representative democracy because it challenges existing social relations, requiring fresh
interpretation or reoriented reaffirmation of status quo). For an intriguing account of the sociopolitical
influences, statements, and ramifications of successive schools of architecture, see Jilrgen Habcrmas,
Modern and Postmodern Architecture, in CRITICAL THEORY AND PUBLIC LIFE 317 (John Forester ed.,
1985). Even instruction in basic science may venture into politically contested territory. Consider Galileo's
trial for heresy, the ongoing debate between evolutionists and creationists, and the claim by some that
Western mechanical science and mathematics is implicated in cultural imperialism and environmental
destruction. See 7 WILL DURANT & ARIEL DURANT, THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION: THE AGE OF REASON
BEGINS 606-11 (1961) (describing Galileo's trial and conviction for espousing "heretical" idea that Earth
revolves around Sun); Boyle, supra note 9, at 1531 (critiquing Western science); Williamson B.C. Chang,
The "Wasteland" in the Western Exploitation of "Race" and the Environment, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 849
(1992) (arguing that "eurocentric" patterns of thought, involving separation and conquest, are at root of
environmental degradation and racial oppression); Peter Applebome, 70 Years After Scopes Trial, Creation
Debate Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Mar, 10, 1996, at Al (chronicling current efforts in several states to prevent
teaching of evolution as fact rather than controversial theory).
307. See ALAN BULLOCK, HITLER AND STALIN: PARALLEL LIVES 426-27 (1991) (describing
totalitarian repression of certain forms of artistic expression); Hamilton, supra note 306, at 96-101
(presenting historical examples where art that was not overtly political threatened entrenched power
structures).
308. The media treatment of the O.J. Simpson trial is a prime example of this mix of entertainment
and elucidation.
309. See generally CHANNELS OF DISCOURSE, REASSEMBLED (Robert C. Allen ed., 1992) (discussing,
from various theoretical perspectives, manner in which audiences understand and interpret television).
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greater social impact than the most carefully considered Habermasian
dialogue.3 1° The words, images, and sounds of commercial entertainment
have a profound influence on our social mores and collective sense of
reality.31' As such, the realm of popular culture serves, to a considerable
extent, as both a resource and a playing field for the exercise of democratic
culture and civic association.
In addition, the autonomous creation, critical interpretation, and
transformation even of works of pure aesthetics or entertainment helps to
support a participatory culture. Citizens who engage in these activities gain a
measure of expressive vitality and independence of thought that may carry over
into matters of more unequivocal public import as well. So long as the sources
for pure aesthetics and entertainment are varied, such works may also foster
an appreciation for diversity and a sense that elite cultural and social values
may be confronted and contested. When taken as a whole, therefore, expressive
works created for symbolic impact or broad audience appeal must, no less than
copyright-supported political analysis, be seen as a vital part of democratic
self-govemance
3 t 2
310. As Jack Balkin has described The Simpsons, "Nothing like good, cynical humor that undermines
everything honorable about American life." J.M. Balkin. Popuhsm and Pmogrrssivusm as Consttutional
Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 1935, 1937 (1995) (reviewing CASS R SLNSTEiN. DL.tO(CRACY AD rte
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993)). In that article Professor Balkin critiques (or. more accurately. ridicules)
the notion that Habermasian rational deliberation on matters of unequivocal political import can serse as
the guiding ideal for democratic culture. See id. at 1936-42. 1958-63. Although I share in the substance
of that critique, I disagree with his assessment that popular culture is itself the epitome of democratic
culture and thus should be valued for its own sake. see id. at 1948 (arguing that popular culture "is not a
sideshow or distraction from democratic culture, but the main eent") My point is that popular culture is
worthy of legal support because, on the whole, it has instrumental value to democratic culture
311. See generally STUART EwEN & EuzABEni EwEN. CHANNELS OF DESIRE MASS IMAGES A5.D
THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN CONSCIOUSNESS (1982). This is not to say that audiences are mere passise
receptors of mass media entertainment. Communications and cultural studies theorists have forcefully
argued that audiences are active interpreters and rearrangers of mass culture See John Ftske, Britsh
Cultural Studies and Television, in CHANNELS OF DISCOURSE. REASSEMBLED. supra note 309. at 284.
292-321 (surveying British cultural studies examinations of "negotiated" and "oppositional" readings of
television programs and mass culture icons). Nevertheless. the mass media certainly play a major role in
agenda setting, in presenting the material to which audiences react.
312. As the Fifth Circuit has cogently pointed out in rejecting the claim that obscene expression should
be ineligible for copyright protection, Congress fulfills its Copyright Clause mandate "Itlo promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts" so long as it "generally promotes [that) constitutional goal -
Congress has not, need not, and should not require that "each copyrighted work be shown to promote the
useful arts." Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater. 604 F.2d 852. 860 (5th Cir 1979)
First Amendment scholars have engaged in considerable debate over shcther "political speech."
meaning speech that deals (preferably in a rationally apprehensible manner) with issues touching upon
matters of government should be given greater weight than "artistic speech." meaning speech that deals
with social, personal, or aesthetic issues, often in a symbolic manner. Compare ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOIN.
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948) (arguing that since purpose of free speech
is to educate voters, only political speech falls within ambit of First Amendment). and CASS R StAsTEi.
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 121-65 (1993) (favoring two-tier First Amendment that
recognizes primacy of political speech), with C. EDWIN BAKER. HUMAN LiBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
31 (1989) (contending that "nonpolitical" speech should receive same level of protection as -political"
speech). Scholars have also argued about whether giving political speech greater %%eight in the First
Amendment context should mean that government should be more or less invoked in seeking to promote
a wealth and diversity of such expression. Compare SUNSTEIN. supra. at 48-51 (favoring government
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2. Copyright's Structural Function
In addition to encouraging the production and dissemination of much of
the expressive underpinning of civil society, copyright promotes the democratic
character of public discourse. Copyright serves this end in two basic ways: It
undergirds a sector of expressive activity that is independent from state and
elite patronage and it sets limits on private control of creative expression.
33
a. An Independent Expressive Sector
The public communication of fixed original expression will support a
democratic civil society only if such expression is autonomous and diverse. A
regime in which government administrators exert broad control over the
content and dissemination of tangible expression will be unlikely to maintain
viable civil institutions. A civil society in which private elites exert such
control will be characterized by hierarchical domination, not democratic
participation.
Copyright is vital to maintaining the democratic character of public
discourse in civil society. By supporting a market-based sector of authors and
publishers, copyright achieves considerable independence from government
involvement to "produce attention to public issues, and exposure to diverse views"), with Balkin, supra note
310, at 1964 (maintaining that Sunstein's two-tier system should require greater judicial scrutiny of
government involvement in political speech). Often scholars who view the First Amendment as a protection
against government incursion into individuals' possibilities for self-realization disfavor the distinction
between political and artistic speech. See, e.g., BAKER, supra, at 31. In contrast, those who see the First
Amendment as an instrument for promoting democratic governance generally favor lending greater weight
to political speech, but seek, with considerable difficulty, to incorporate within the parameters of political
speech at least that "artistic speech" that concerns social issues of fundamental importance. See, e.g.,
SUNSTEIN, supra, at 152 (including within the ambit of political speech, "all art and literature that have the
characteristics of social commentary").
My argument might suggest that even those who see the First Amendment primarily as a vehicle for
enhancing citizen capacity for democratic self-rule need not distinguish between political and artistic
speech. Cf Hamilton, supra note 306, at 86-95 (maintaining that art's challenge of status quo
understandings is crucial to representative democracy and thus that art deserves same level of First
Amendment protection as overtly political speech). Nevertheless, my thesis that copyright law serves
primarily to promote democratic governance, and that it does so by encouraging the dissemination of artistic
as well as political expression, does not necessarily support the equal treatment of political and artistic
speech in the First Amendment context. While artistic speech does make a certain contribution to
democratic governance, it may be that political speech (whether broadly or narrowly defined) has a greater
and more direct importance for democratic governance and thus should be treated differently in the First
Amendment context.
313. Copyright may also promote the democratic character of public discourse by highlighting the
value of individual creativity. Modem copyright arose from and continues to give legal expression to an
Enlightenment understanding of individual agency, rationality, and transformative potency. See Netanel,
supra note 97, manuscript at 40-42, By according protection to creators of original works of authorship,
rather than simply to publishers who reprint long-existing works, copyright underscores the value of fresh
ideas and of individual contributions to our cultural heritage. As such, it tends to undermine cultural as well
as political hierarchies, thus contributing to the democratization of civil society. See Hamilton, supra note
12, at 617-18 (arguing that pressure, backed by threat of trade sanctions, on nondemocratic regimes to
enforce copyright protection for U.S. works is, in effect, aimed at forcing greater democratization in such
countries).
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administrators and private patrons who would otherwise meddle in expressive
content. Though not dispositive, it will be helpful, first, to anchor this claim
in the early historical development of modem copyright. In so doing, I hope
to underscore both the print market's instrumental role in the development of
a sphere of democratic public discourse and the Framers' understanding of that
role in providing for federal copyright protection. I then discuss copyright's
continuing part in promoting expressive plurality in the dawn of digitization,
including the problem of market-generated hierarchical domination of public
discourse.
Prior to the first modern copyright statutes in the eighteenth century,
writers and artists were heavily dependent on royal, feudal, and church
patronage for their livelihoods." 4 This dependency undermined expressive
autonomy and thwarted the development of a vital, freethinking
intelligentsia 5 As Voltaire described it: '[E]very philosopher at court
becomes as much a slave as the first official of the crown."'
31 6
The patronage system also served to embed public discourse firmly within
the hierarchical order of medieval and early modem Europe. During the
Middle Ages, literature and art were commonly commissioned and controlled
for purposes of public mystification. 3'7 They were designed to impress upon
their audience the dominant status of the patron, whether it be king, noble, or
church. Later, within the framework of late Renaissance neoclassicism, the
patronage system fostered a view of the arts as a "gentleman's calling,"
tailored to aristocratic tastes and far removed from common social experience
and creative sensibility.
3 1
It was not until the eighteenth century that there emerged a comprehensive
sphere of public communication that was both independent of monarchy,
aristocracy, and church, and capable of challenging their political and social
314. See PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN IN'TERPRETATIo,-THE SCIEsc't OF FREEDOM 57-65
(1969); Herman Finkelstein. The Copyright Law-A Reappraisal. 104 U PA L R-.\ 1025. 1033-35
(1956).
315. See GARY D. STARK, ENTREPRENEURS OF IDEOLOGY NEOCONSERVATIVI: PLHLISIIERS 1%
GERMANY, 1890-1933, at 3 (1981) (asserting that delayed transition from patronage to proprietary cop) right
system in Germany helps account for relatively late emergence of German intelligentsia)
316. GAY, supra note 314, at 63 (quoting Voltaire).
317. See James Curran. Communications, Power and Social Order, In C. L'L RE. SoCEl"n AND THtE
MEDIA 201, 203-10 (Michael Gurevitch et al. eds., 1982) (describing medtesal Catholic Church's use of
architecture, sculpture, paintings, stained glass windows, and books to uphold its po%.er)
318. See HAROLD J. LASKI, THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 394 (1948) Laski maintains that this
Renaissance view of the arts persisted, to some degree, among the founding elite of the United States. even
though it did not actually reflect the creative temper of nascent American culture See id at 395-400. see
also MICHAEL WARNER, THE LETTERS OF THE REPUBLIC. PUBLICATION AND TIE .eBLIC SPHERE I%
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 132-38 (1990) (describing tension betwen republican teiw of pnnt and
aristocratic concept of "'polite" or "fine" art). Prior to the neoclassical period, popular and elite culture %ere
intermingled to a greater extent. See PETER BURKE, POPULAR CULTURE IN EARLY MODERN EL ROPE 277
(1978) (noting that Shakespeare had played to noblemen and apprenttces alike) It was not until the spread
of print and the "rediscovery" of popular culture among late eighteenth- and earl) nineteenth-century
Romantics, that the neoclassical disjunction between elite and popular culture was. to some degree.
attenuated. See id. at 3-22.
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dominance.3 9 That sphere was largely made up of printed materials-
newspapers, pamphlets, and books-that received their primary financial
support not from official patronage, but from readers and audiences.320 Freed
from capricious and overbearing patrons, writers enjoyed a new, broad latitude
to choose their own subject matter and find their own voice. 321 The rapidly
expanding reading public gradually shook off the influence of those who had
used their control of art and literature to reinforce their positions of power.322
As it moved from patronage to market support, this sphere of communicative
exchange generated, for the first time, a sense of "public opinion," the set of
beliefs and norms elaborated in debate and discussion that citizens recognize
as something they hold in common.323
The notion of public opinion, mediated by printed materials and emerging
from autonomous citizen interaction outside of official, hierarchical organs,
was central to early understandings of democratic civil society.324 It emerged
with particular force in early eighteenth-century America, where this print-
mediated public space, outside any established political structure, defined the
goals of the people and called government officials to account for deviating
from them. In so doing, it centered the ultimate power of democratic rule in
the autonomous institutions of civil society, which would direct and maintain
a vigilant watch on elected representatives. Within democratic theory, it shifted
the locus of citizen deliberation from the sovereign assembly of classical
republicanism to the rough and tumble of the pen and the press.
Modern copyright arose with and contributed to the emergence of this
democratic, print-mediated public square.325 Prior to the enactment of the
319. This is not to say that prior to the eighteenth-century elite control of literature and art was
absolute and universal. Indeed, a largely oral popular culture coexisted alongside that of the political elite.
But this oral popular culture lacked the widespread political potency of print. See BURKE, supra note 318,
at 259-67 (describing print's emerging political influence in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe).
320. For discussion of the economic conditions of authorship in England prior to and during the
eighteenth century, see VICTOR BONHOM-CARTER, AUTHORS BY PROFESSION 5-32 (1978); see also John
Feather, From Rights in Copies to Copyright: The Recognition of Authors' Rights in English Law and
Practice in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 455 (1992).
321. See GAY, supra note 314, at 58-65.
322. See DAVIDSON, supra note 55, at 42-45 (describing how growth, in late eighteenth- and early
nineteenth-century America, of proto-mass audience for books, especially those, such as novels, that did
not require official exegesis, eroded pulpit model of authority and led to "democratization of mind"); see
also THOMPSON, supra note 280, at 56-62 (discussing role of early print capitalism and nascent reading
public in eroding power of Catholic Church and contributing to emergence of modem state in sixteenth-
and seventeenth-century Europe).
323. My discussion of this sphere of print-mediated public opinion draws heavily upon Taylor, supra
note 279, at 108-11; see also APPLEBY, supra note 301, at 76-78 (noting centrality of print in grassroots
politics in early United States); HABERMAS, supra note 283, at 29-43 (chronicling emergence of literary
public sphere in England, France, and Germany); LARZER ZIFF, WRITING IN THE NEW NATION: PROSE,
PRINT, AND POLITICS IN THE EARLY UNITED STATES 91 (1991) (discussing generally how "the
democratization of print both promoted and was promoted by the democratization of society").
324. See Taylor, supra note 279, at 108-09; see also WARNER, supra note 318 (discussing preeminent
role of contemporary understandings of print in republican ideology of eighteenth-century America).
325. This is not imply that this print-mediated public sphere was wholly dependent on copyright. For
one, the first copyright statutes in Great Britain and the United States contained registration and deposit
[Vol. 106: 283
1996] Copyright and Democracy
Statute of Anne of 1710,326 the printing privileges that the Crown granted to
members of the London Stationers Company had served as an instrument of
centralized control and censorship. 3 7 With the expiration of the notorious
Licensing Act and the advent of modern copyright, however, authors gained
a limited exclusive right to print copies of their works, with the express
purpose of encouraging learning through the widespread dissemination of
original expression.328 For the first time, authors could hope to earn their
bread from the sale of their work to the public, and to do so through
independent publishers who stood apart from the censorial arm of the state and
the intermeddling of aristocratic and ecclesiastic patrons."' As Oliver
Goldsmith declared in 1760: "[Writers] have now no other patrons but the
public, and the public collectively considered, is a good and a generous
master.
' 330
requirements that, for all practical purposes. excluded from protection the newspapers, magazines.
broadsides, and pamphlets that comprised a significant part of print culture. See Clayton v Stone. 5 F Cas
999, 1003 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872) (denying copyright protection to newspaper financial reports
in part on grounds that daily newspapers' incompatibility %,ith copynght deposit and registration
requirements indicated that Congress did not intend to include them within scope of copyrightable "'book5")
In addition, while the first British copynght statute was enacted in 1710. copynght %%as not secured by
statute in colonial America. See LYMAN RAY PATTERSON. COPYRIGiHT IN HISTORICAL PERsPtcnvE 183
(1968). It was not until 1783, largely in response to a resolution of the Continental Congress. that the states
began to enact copyright statutes, and the first federal copyright statute wvas enacted onl) in 1790 See id
at 183-84. On the other hand, however, the common law recognized a nght to prcscnt unauthonzed
publication of unpublished manuscripts. See Wheaton v. Peters. 33 U S. (8 Pet ) 591. 657 t1834) ("That
an author, at common law, has a property in his manuscnpt, and may obtain redress against any one sho
deprives him of it, or by improperly obtaining a copy endeavors to realize a profit from its publication.
cannot be doubted."). Less certainly, the common law may have also been seen to pro% ide protection
against unauthorized copying of published works. Compare Millar v Taylor. 98 Eng Rep 201 iK B 1769)
(holding that perpetual copyright existed at common law). with Ho% ard Abrams. 7e Historic Foiundation
of American Copyright: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copiright. 29 WAYNE L RE%, 1119. 1156-71
(1983) (interpreting House of Lord's 1774 decision in Donaldson v Becket to stand for proposition that
no copyright existed at common law). A measure of protection against ruinous copying %%as also pro,,idcd
by custom and agreement among colonial printers. See JOHN TEBBEL. I A HISTORY OF BOOK P1 Bi iHIii%G
IN THE UNITED STATES: THE CREATION OF AN INDUSTRY 1630-1865. at 46 (1972) In addition.
technological and economic conditions gave the first to publish a %%ork a far greater advantage ocr
latecomer copiers than would be the case following the development of the telegraph and mechanized
printing in the mid-nineteenth century and, even more dramatically, the possibility of instantaneous digital
reproduction and distribution today. See. e.g.. Richard B. Kielbowicz. The Press, Post Office, and Flow of
News in the Early Republic, 3 J. EARLY REPUBLiC 255. 259 (1983) (noting that. because of significant time
involved in distribution and printing, people living on frontier of eary Republic could get newspaper from
Philadelphia or New York as quickly as their local paper could obtain and prini same information) Despite
these protections, however, early American authors. printers, and political leaders recognized that s. ithout
a federal copyright statute, the print market would not realize its potential for the diffusion of literature and
information. See TEBBEL. supra, at 138-41 (noting lobbying efforts of Noah Webster. Thomas Paine. and
others).
326. 8 Anne 19 (1710) (Eng.).
327. See PATTERSON, supra note 325, at 28-41; Feather. supra note 320. at 472-73
328. The Statute of Anne, enacted by Parliament in 1710. was entitled "An Act for the Encouragement
of Learning, by vesting the Copies of printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies. dunng
the Times herein mentioned." 8 Anne 19 (1710) (Eng.); see also PATrERSO",. supra note 325. at 134-50
(chronicling expiration of Licensing Act and enactment of Statute of Anne)
329. See Feather, supra note 320. at 472-73.
330. Letter LXXXIV, The Citizen of the World. in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF OuVER GoLD T 341,
344 (1966).
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The emergence of a broad market in printed expression encouraged authors
to challenge civic and religious authority, in part because rebelliousness and
irreverence attracted paying readers.33' It also greatly enhanced print's
democratic character and democratizing influence. The noncommercial
literature of letters and political pamphlets in colonial America was ordinarily
addressed to a small, educated elite and was composed in a florid style
punctuated with classical references that had meaning only for a few. 3 32 But
the establishment of markets for literary works encouraged authors to write for
a broader audience. 333 Thus, the unprecedented best-seller success of Thomas
Paine's pamphlet Common Sense in 1776 was due, in Paine's own estimation,
in large part to his calculated effort to reach the common republican reader by
using "'language as plain as the alphabet' and by replacing classical
references with Biblical references. 334 This "'descent' of literature "'from
the closets of philosophers, and the shelves of polite scholars"' to the
community at large, while a source of despair for some, was generally viewed
as a necessary predicate for representative democracy, the health of which was
seen to depend on an educated and informed citizenry.335
When the Framers drafted the Copyright Clause and the Copyright Act of
1790, they took as self-evident that the diffusion of knowledge and exchange
of view through a market for printed matter was a pillar of public liberty.336
33 1. See LANCE BERTELSEN, THE NONSENSE CLUB: LITERATURE AND POPULAR CULTURE 1749-1764,
at 260-61 (1986); Curran, supra note 317, at 222.
332. See Michael Schudson, Was There Ever a Public Sphere? If So, When? Reflections on the
American Case, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 143, 151 (Craig Calhoun cd., 1992).
333. By the end of the eighteenth century, the audience for print appears to have comprised the
majority of U.S. citizens. See WARNER, stupra note 318, at 14. The question of the size of the early print
public has preoccupied numerous historians and remains a matter of some controversy. See DAVIDSON,
supra note 55, at 55--61; THOMPSON, supra note 280, at 59; WARNER, supra note 318, at 14. Although
some such studies are based on evidence of book ownership or writing skills, other historians point out that
many persons in the eighteenth century could read, but not write, and that many who could not read,
regularly listened as printed materials were read out loud in family, church, and social gatherings. See
THOMPSON, supra note 280, at 60; see also KEANE, supra note 282, at 28 n.23 (depicting collective reading
groups as "seedbed of revolutionary ideas and democratic forms of life" in eighteenth-century Germany
and France). While most persons could not afford to purchase more than a book or two until well into the
nineteenth century, libraries were a common and heavily used means of book circulation in the early years
of the American republic. See DAVIDSON, supra note 55, at 27-28. Moreover, most eighteenth-century
white Americans had ready access to newspapers, broadsides, and other print material. Not surprisingly,
the reading public in late eighteenth-century America generally excluded black slaves (for whom it was
illegal to read or write) and Native Americans. See id. at 56; WARNER, supra note 318, at II.
334. Schudson, supra note 332, at 151 (quoting Thomas Paine, quoted in ERIC FONER, TOM PAINE
AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 83 (1976)). Not surprisingly, Paine was an outspoken advocate for
according statutory copyright protection to authors. See TEBBEL, supra note 325, at 138.
335. ZIFF, supra note 323, at 52 (quoting SAMUEL MILLER, A BRIEF RETROSPECT OF THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY (New York, T. & J. Swords 1803)); see also JAMES RALPH, THE CASE OF AUTHORS BY
PROFESSION OR TRADE (facsimile 1966) (1758) (defending professional authors against charges of venality,
but conceding that much commercial literature is of low quality).
336. See WARNER, supra note 318, at 124-25. Typical of this widely held view was the paean to the
power of print in the inaugural issue of the New-York Magazine, published in 1790, the same year that
Congress enacted the first federal copyright statute:
Those institutions are the most effectual guards to public liberty which diffuse the rudiments
of literature among a people .... A few incautious expressions in our constitution, or a few
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They were fully immersed in a culture that identified print with republican
government and resistance to tyranny.337 The Framers believed that a
copyright-supported national market for authors' writings was vital to
maintaining public vigilance against government encroachment, as well asfostering a democratic culture. 33' As President Washington declaimed in his
address to Congress in support of the first federal copyright statute, the
promotion of science and literature would help to secure a
free constitution ... [b]y convincing those who are entrusted with
public administration that every valuable end of government is best
answered by the enlightened confidence of the public; and by teaching
the people themselves to know and value their own rights; to discern
and provide against invasions of them; to distinguish between
oppression and the necessary exercise of lawful authority.'
Part and parcel of this vision was an understanding that democratic
governance requires not simply the diffusion of knowledge per se, but also an
autonomous sphere of print-mediated citizen deliberation and public education.
The Framers well understood the dangers of patronage. They had seen first
hand the transformation of the American print industry as it emerged, in the
mid-eighteenth century, from its servile dependency on colonial government
and church largess to become, with the support of a broad-based readership,
a powerful and highly combative force in public affairs.i It was only by
salaries of office too great for the contracted feelings of those sho do not kno%% the sorth of
merit and integrity, can never injure the United States, while literature is gencrall, diffused, and
the plain citizen and planter reads and judges for himself
WARNER, supra note 318, at 125 (quoting On the Means of Presering Public Libern. \%' -YoR MNG.
Jan. 1790). The view of print, literacy, and the diffusion of knowledge as a pillar of democratic gocmance
was shared by federalist and antifederalist, political elite and artisan. alike See id a[ 122-32
337. See WARNER, supra note 318. at 71. 122-32.
338. Copyright was not the only mechanism by which the Framers sought to achiese a national nmarket
for authors' writings. The new federal government also heavily subsidized nespapct deh.crtc, b,
imposing preferential postal rates, levying postal charges on subscribers rather than printers. interinttentls
collecting subscribers' postal charges, providing free newspaper dehery among printers, and maintaining
postal roads for both post office and printers' private use. See Kielbo icz. supra note 325. at 257-59. 266.
275. The importance of transportation networks for the diffusion of kno% ledge tas shell. of course, lot other
national political and economic objectives) also received expression in the Cop) right Act ot 1790. shhich
accorded protection not only to books, but also to maps and navigational charts See Act of Ma) 31. 1790.
ch. 15, § 1, I Stat. 124, 124.
339. UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT IN CONGRESS 1789-1904. COPNRiGIrr Oi-ii(1
BULLETIN No. 8, 115-16 (T. Solverg ed., 1905) (quoting U.S. Senate Journal. Ist Cong 102-041
340. See DAVIDSON. supra note 55, at 16-30 (describing emerging, but unesen market economy ot
book publishing in early national period): LUCAS A. POWE. JR. THE FOtinI EsT1AThE A\ , i,,i
CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OFTHE PRESS IN AMERICA 28-29(1991) (depicting transformation of eighteenth-
century press); WARNER, supra note 318, at 67-70 (discussing manner in shich prnter's. %%hose economic
viability was threatened by Stamp Tax. successfully galvanized public opinion against Ta1 b% emphaizing
that it was affront to liberty of press). Government contract did not cease to become a major ,ource ot
business for early national printers. But it represented only a portion of that business, and the struggling
new government was just as reliant on printers for the printing of money. las, tracts, and olficial
proclamations as were printers on government revenues. See DAVIDSON. supra note 55. at 21. Pov, L. supra.
at 28-29.
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maintaining their fiscal independence that authors and publishers could
continue to guard public liberty. For the Framers, therefore, copyright's
importance lay in its structural, as well as production, function. By
underwriting a flourishing national market in authors' writings, copyright
would help to secure authors' and printers' freedom from the corruptive
influence of state, church, and aristocratic patronage.
The Framers' basic premises remain at the heart of copyright today.
Without legal protection against ruinous copying, authors and publishers would
be unduly dependent on state or private beneficence, with its attendant vitiation
of critical autonomy and expressive diversity. While circumscribed government
subsidies for the creation and dissemination of creative expression may be a
valuable, democracy-enhancing measure of a modem democratic state, the
widespread, systematic reliance of authors and publishers on such subsidies
would ultimately bring the sphere of public communication within the web of
state bureaucracy, stifling free expression.34 Alternatively, in a world with
neither copyright nor massive state subsidy, authors would likely rely heavily
on private patronage, forcing them to cater to the tastes, interests, and political
agenda of the wealthy, rather than seeking a broader, more varied consumer
audience. Copyright thus serves to support a robust, pluralist, and independent
sector devoted to the creation and dissemination of works of authorship. As
such, copyright constitutes an integral part of a system of collective self-rule
in which the norms that permeate our social relations and undergird state
policy are determined in the space of broad-based citizen debate, rather than
by government or private fiat.
This is not to say that the Framers' understandings are directly applicable
to late twentieth-century political, cultural, and economic conditions. Our
public discourse is far more dissonant and eclectic than that envisioned by the
Framers. The political elite of the early Republic abhorred expressions of
ideological faction and generally disdained fiction and "light"
entertainment. 2 Such works, however, form a major part of our copyright-
supported discursive universe. From our perspective, the Framers' watchdog
view of literature and the press also seems somewhat simplistic. Today's media
conglomerates have attained an agenda-setting power that rivals that of state
officials and, in the view of some commentators, undermines the democratic
character of public discourse by skewing it towards those with the financial
wherewithal to obtain access or buy advertised products. 3
But this certain disjunction between Framers' suppositions and current
conditions in no way contradicts my basic premise that copyright, at its core,
continues to underwrite an independent expressive sector that is critical to
341. See infra note 346.
342. See DAVIDSON, supra note 55, at 40-42 (describing Framers' censure of fiction); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 20-24 (1993) (discussing Framers' efforts to contain factions).
343. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 295; Fiss, supra note 295, at 787-88.
[Vol. 106: 283
Copyright and Democracy
democratic governance. With regard to the nature and content of public
discourse, as the civil society model attests, our conception of democratic
governance has come to accept, and indeed celebrate, a diversity of outlook
and interest that comports fully with the cacophonous outpouring of expression
that makes up our symbolic realm. As discussed above, we have also come to
appreciate the sociopolitical valency of much expression that is designed
largely for audience enjoyment and appeal. It must be remembered, moreover,
that even during what some contemporary commentators regard as the apex of
eighteenth-century republican deliberation, editors routinely pledged to make
their newspapers "entertaining" as well as "useful." ' " Although we must
recognize the vital importance of considered deliberation on issues of public
policy, many copyright-protected works of so-called "pure" art, fiction, and
entertainment also make a substantial contribution to the "democratic culture"
that is central to a viable system of representative democracy. Accordingly,
while our copyright market may encompass a wealth and diversity of
expression not contemplated by the Framers, the basic principle is the same:
To systematically subject authors' expression to the stifling grip of patronage
would be inimical to a "free Constitution."
The problems of media concentration and market-based hierarchy are more
troublesome, but these, too, do not belie the importance of copyright's
structural function for a democratic civil society. My claim is not that
copyright, by itself, constitutes a sufficient condition for expressive pluralism
and diversity. Indeed, the democratic character of public discourse may well
depend upon some measure of state subsidy and regulation to disseminate
information and give a voice to persons and views that might otherwise receive
insufficient attention in an unregulated media market." But even to the
extent that other forms of state involvement may be necessary and desirable,
copyright remains a vital component of our system of free expression. Most
basically, whatever the limitations of the market for cultivating expressive
diversity, an all-encompassing state-supported regime would ultimately be far
worse. Even in a representative democracy, massive state involvement would
undoubtedly present a serious impediment to expressive autonomy and freedom
344. JEFFREY A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOm TitE IDEOLOG' 01. EARtI A'itkilC(A%
JOURNALISM 50 (1988).
345. Democratic governments regularly provide direct and indirect subsidies for %anous tormnn of
cultural expression, ranging from individual grants to the funding of public broadcasting See ThrosbK.
supra note 241, at 20-22. They also commonly impose selective resiclions on cultural industr) structure
and expressive content, including limitations on ownership concentration and requirements for a minimum
amount of public affairs programming and domestic production See generalh ERIC B'RE DOT,
BROADCASTING LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1993) (surveying broadcast regulation in Great Britain.
France. Germany, Italy, and United States). On the benefits for a democratic socict) of goemrncnt
subsidization of speech, see Martin H. Redish & Daryl 1. Kessler. Goternment Subsidies and Free
Expression, 80 MINN. L. REV. 543, 560-62 (1996); see also SUNSTEI,'. supro note 312. at 17-51 (calling
for "New Deal for Speech," involving selective regulation and subsidy. to promote greater media co,.erage
of public issues and greater public exposure to diverse views)
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of information. Indeed, even limited state intervention may be used to further
government officials' narrowly conceived political agenda and institutional
goals-and given the ubiquity of government in modem life, the dangers of
government indoctrination, favoritism, and suppression are certainly no less
today than at copyright's birth.46 Accordingly, even if some state
intervention is a necessary counterweight to market-based hierarchy, a strong,
self-reliant expressive sector whose roots are outside the state still constitutes
an indispensable ingredient of representative democracy.3 7 It is that
expressive sector-both a watchdog and an independent, nongovernmental site
for collective self-rule-that copyright serves to support.
A copyright-supported market would also enhance expressive pluralism
and diversity to a greater extent than an expressive sector that relied heavily
on corporate patronage. Like their aristocratic and ecclesiastic antecedents,
corporate patrons are notorious for supporting expression that furthers their
own objectives at the expense of artistic autonomy and diversity. As numerous
studies have concluded, corporations regularly eschew avant-garde or
controversial expression, tending rather to support cultural production that
reflects mainstream interests and tastes, as befits a vehicle of public
relations 48 Indeed, given their inherent conservatism, corporate patrons
prefer to support art that has already been evaluated and approved for funding
by the federal government, thus augmenting the danger of an official,
government-established art that leaves little room for nonconforming
views.4 9
To be certain, a copyright market dominated by media conglomerates may
also exhibit a certain centripetal force. As noted above, given market dictates
and institutional risk-averseness, media conglomerates share, at least to some
extent, corporate patrons' proclivities toward prosaic and safe products.350
But the copyright market also contains room for highly innovative and
provocative expression, as well as that targeted for specialized or minority
audiences.3  Significantly, copyright's fundamental capacity to support
346. See Redish & Kessler, supra note 345, at 562-63; see also LUCAS A. POWE, AMERICAN
BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 108-61 (1987) (detailing repeated political favoritism in FCC
regulation of broadcast media).
347. For an intriguing "public service model" of communications, centered in the development of
pluralist, nonstate, but not fully market-based communications systems, see KEANE, supra note 282, at
150-62.
348. See, e.g., CRANE, supra note 244, at 151-52 (canvassing studies); ROSANNE MARTORELLA,
CORPORATE ART 67-91, 98-102, 179-83 (1990); Victoria D. Alexander, Pictures at at Exhibition:
Conflicting Pressures in Museums and the Display of Art, 101 AM. J. SOC. 797, 801-02, 822 (1996)
(discussing conflicting pressures placed on museums to display various kinds of art by different social
groups).
349. See Hamilton, supra note 306, at 115.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 243-44.
351. See CRANE, supra note 244, at 57, 59-60 (discussing continued contribution of independent
recording and film companies in face of increased concentration and domination of major studios);




expressive diversity will likely grow dramatically in the digital age. The ease
and low cost of digital production and dissemination has the potential of
enabling authors, for the first time, to communicate directly with audiences
throughout the world. As a result, many authors will be able to bypass media
conglomerates, creating a copyright market characterized by an even greater
multiplicity of view.35
2
This newfound freedom will not be realized without copyright protection,
however. As several commentators have noted, in the absence of copyright,
authors who seek remuneration for their work will be heavily dependent on
vendors who, in effect, distribute creative expression for free in order to sell
services, advertising, and ongoing customer relationships." Such a scenario
could have dire consequences for expressive autonomy and diversity. For one,
such value-added vendors are likely to be large firms with established delivery
networks and the capacity to deliver ongoing services, thus leading back to the
problems associated with media concentration. In addition, vendors who
provide content simply as an adjunct to advertising and services will select
(and alter) content on the basis of what will best sell advertising and services,
not on the basis of what they think audiences will want to receive. This may
seem to amount to the same thing, as the more people that want to see the
content, the better it can be used to sell the related products. But often the
content deemed best suited to selling the related products is not what audiences
would otherwise pay to receive. As has been convincingly demonstrated with
respect to television advertising, broadcast content tends to be weighted toward
specific advertiser needs, such as putting audiences in a buying mood and
offering attractive lead-ins to commercials, " and targeted towards audience
segments that are likely to buy advertiser products."' Expressive content
broadcast over the air is consequently less diverse and creator autonomy far
more constrained than in sectors where consumers buy creative works
directly.356 In short, the "patronage" of advertisers and bundled service
providers would be no less constraining than that of contemporary corporate
352. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 256-58: Volokh. supra note 21. at 1836-38
353. See, e.g., Barlow, supra note 21. at 128-29; Dyson. supra note 21. at 137-38 For what. to my
mind, is an overly sanguine view of this possible development, see Jessica Litman. Rev isng Cops right Law
for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REv. 19, 29 (1996) (questioning necessity of copyright incentise given
content provider ability to find different ways of charging for value. including advertising and
complementary services); Tom Palmer, Intellectual Properrv. A Non-Posnernan Law and Economics
Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REv. 261, 289-91 (1989) (same)
354. For examples and discussion, see BAKER. supra note 295. at 62-69. MICtHAEL SCIiLDSO%.
ADVERTISING. THE UNEASY PERSUASION 209-18 (1984); Les Brown. Sponsors and Documentaries. in TIE
COMMERCIAL CONNECTION: ADVERTISING AND THE AMERICAN MASS MEDIA 265 (1979)
355. See TODD GITLIN. INSIDE PRIME TIME 208 (1983) (noting that advertising agencies began
focussing on audience composition in early 1970s): OWEN & WILDMAN. supra note 243. at 3-4 (discussing
creation of target audiences by broadcasters).
356. See OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 243, at 10 1-50 (noting that content providers" congenital bias
against minority tastes and in favor of large audiences' tastes is exacerbated in media characterized by firm
concentration and in media supported by advertising).
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givers and seventeenth-century aristocrats.? Without some copyright
protection, much of the Internet's potential for promoting a democratic civil
society will not be realized.
b. Imposition of Limits
A copyright constructed in accordance with the democratic paradigm
would enhance expressive pluralism and diversity, not only by supporting an
independent expressive sector, but also by imposing limits on the proprietary
control over cultural works. That imposition of limits must be seen as a vital
and integral part of copyright's structural function. No less than substituting
paying audiences for patrons and service vendors, it is an important means by
which the state may diversify communicative power structures without undue
involvement in expressive content.
At present, much media conglomerate power derives from the ability to
select, market, and distribute newly created expressive works. As a result of
copyright expansion, however, such power also constitutes an unprecedented
ability to control the deployment of existing expression.358 Media entities
typically exercise that control to prevent any controversial use that might run
contrary to their corporate image or threaten the salability of their expressive
products.359 In addition, in many instances prospective authors are unable or
unwilling to bear licensing fees for creative, transformative uses of media-
controlled expression.360 As such, expansive copyright owner control over
existing expression may exacerbate the problem of market-based hierarchy.
Given authors' needs to draw on the existing images, sounds, and texts that
make up our cultural milieu, conglomerate control over existing expression
would continue to subvert the democratization of public discourse even in a
digital age in which many authors no longer rely on conglomerates to market
and distribute new works.
As I will outline in the next Part, a democratic copyright would limit
copyright owner control over transformative uses, thus serving, at least to some
extent, to loosen media conglomerates' hold on public discourse. In so doing,
it would accord subsequent authors greater latitude to adapt media images,
357. Cf Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & COM. 509, 521-22 (1996)
(labelling as "dystopic commodified vision" replacement of copyright with digital fusion of content and
advertising).
358. See supra Section I.A.
359. See, e.g., Doreen Carvajal, What Is a Book Publisher to Do When a Parody Hits Home?, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 12, 1996, at DI (reporting that Crown Publishers cancelled contract to publish book that
spoofed works of another, more popular author, also published by Crown); see also Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994) (confronting action by music publisher to enjoin rap parody of
song in its repertoire after refusing to license parody); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th
Cir. 1978) (confronting action brought by Disney to enjoin parody of Disney characters in counterculture
comic book).
360. See supra note 42.
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sounds, and texts in ways that may challenge mainstream assumptions-like
the counterculture parody of Mickey Mouse or the bootleg sale in American
inner cities of "Black Bart Simpson" T-shirts.36 ' In allowing for such highly
derivative but subversive reformulations of existing expression, copyright
would further the goal of expressive diversity no less than when it encourages
product differentiation among the original underlying works. 6 2 It would
provide greater opportunities for mass expression to individuals and groups that
are marginal to the centers of cultural production, while still supporting a
strong expressive sector that is outside the state.
Importantly, under the democratic paradigm this diversification aspect of
copyright's structural function implements the view that the public domain is
no less vital to a democratic civil society than is copyright's protection of
original expression.363 The limits that copyright law imposes on copyright
owner prerogatives are thus not simply a neutral ending point where copyright
protection ends and some other proprietary right may begin. Rather, they are
an affirmative manifestation of copyright's democracy-enhancing principles.
They are a statement that, where necessary to further those principles, ideas
and expression should be free for all to use.
Under the democratic paradigm, therefore, the limits to copyright's
duration and scope represent the outer bounds not only of copyright protection,
but also of other forms of private control over publicly disseminated
expression. Copyright should serve to circumscribe the propertization of
publicly disseminated expression, even as it grants a limited monopoly over the
use of expression. As I will discuss further,"6 the democratic paradigm
would therefore bar digital content provider efforts to circumvent copyright's
limitations through contract and appropriate the public domain.
3. Summary
Copyright, in sum, is a state measure that uses market institutions to
enhance the democratic character of civil society. Copyright law accords a
limited proprietary entitlement that underwrites democratic culture and
citizenship in three ways. First, it promotes the creation and distribution of
information and educational resources. In supporting a market for creative
expression, copyright aims to increase and make widely available the store of
knowledge required for effective citizenship and civic association. Second, it
enhances civil society's participatory character. Through economic incentives
361. See Walt Disney, 581 F.2d 751; Rosemary J. Coombe. Objects of Property and Subjects of
Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue. 69 TEX. L REv 1853. 1865 (1991)
(discussing Black Bart Simpson phenomenon).
362. See supra note 240.
363. On the importance of maintaining a vibrant public domain. see generally Litman. supra note 9
364. See infra Section V.D.
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and a careful balance between exclusivity and access, copyright seeks to foster
widespread citizen participation in public deliberation. Third, it supports the
plurality, independence, and vitality of civil society's communicative sphere.
By according authors a carefully tailored proprietary entitlement, copyright
frees them from reliance on patronage and cultural hierarchy, while opposing
market-based hierarchy and encouraging transformative uses of existing works.
In that way copyright law hopes to generate diverse and autonomous
contributions to our common discourse.
Significantly, the neoclassicist economic view of creative expression as a
commodity and of copyright as a mechanism to further allocative efficiency,
fails to account for copyright's role in democratic governance. The activities
and transactions that copyright encourages are in, but not of, the market.
Copyright's fundamental purpose is to underwrite political competency, with
allocative efficiency a secondary consideration. Copyright employs a quasi-
proprietary regime to achieve its constitutive goals, but the exclusive rights that
copyright law accords are meant to be defined and delimited as required to
further copyright's democratic purpose. Too thin a copyright would diminish
the incentive for autonomous creative contribution, but a copyright of bloated
scope, and one that would treat creative expression as simply another
commodity, would stifle expressive diversity and undermine copyright's
potential for furthering citizen participation in democratic self-rule.
V. DOCTRINAL OUTCOMES IN THE DIGITAL PUBLIC SQUARE
With the advent of digital communications, copyright's role in a
democratic civil society has become at once more prominent and more
problematic. All indications are that, within the next couple of years, a vastly
increasing percentage and number of expressive works will be created and
disseminated via digital communication networks like the Internet. Such
networks create possibilities for collaborative authorship, transformative uses
of existing works, and easy, inexpensive, and instantaneous access to creative
works that exceed exponentially the possibilities that are available with current
matrices of hard copy and broadcast distribution. 365 As noted above, the
Internet also promises a far more diverse, decentralized system of distribution.
It offers an arena in which authors and audiences can communicate directly
and interactively on a global scale, with far less involvement of government
and media conglomerates in the provision and control of content than exists
today.366 Given these possibilities, many commentators see the Internet as a
365. See Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 1466-69 (discussing potential uses of digital networks and need
for new understanding of copyright); Volokh, supra note 21, at 1808-31 (discussing changes in various
media resulting from digital technology).
366. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 401-04 (noting that digital networks may weaken or transform
intermediaries who previously controlled information).
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new site for a revitalized democratic civil society.37 The Internet will
increasingly constitute a space where ad hoc coalitions, many of which will
transcend national borders, will join forces outside the centralized institutions
of state and market that currently control much dissemination of
information. 368 Through the Internet the realm of public communication will
become more democratic. It will become less a unidirectional flow of
information from agenda-setting elite to common citizen and more a digital
public square in which citizens engage in unstructured, untempered discourse,
free from the hierarchies imposed by government bureaucracy and capitalist
organization.369
Some commentators see copyright as an obstacle to this digital
democratization of public discourse. They argue that the propertization of
expression will inhibit the free exchange of ideas over the Internet and enable
media conglomerates to maintain their hold over expressive content, access,
and cultural and political agendas. 370 These concerns are understandable. An
overly expansive copyright may indeed have a chilling effect on democratic
discourse. But copyright remains, by and large, the best means of remunerating
authors while still fostering a large measure of creative autonomy. The solution
to the critics' concerns, then, is not to do away with copyright. Rather,
copyright must be defined and delimited in accordance with its constitutive
purpose. It must be designed to underwrite a vital and independent expressive
sector without unduly hampering access and the free exchange of ideas.
With these parameters in mind, this Part will briefly compare the
neoclassicist, minimalist, and democratic approaches to the most troublesome
areas of copyright and copyright-related expansion, with particular emphasis
on their implications for the digital network environment. This Article
previously surveyed four areas in which the expansion of copyright holder's
exclusive rights have been particularly dramatic and controversial."' These
367. See, e.g., id.; Howard Frederick, Computer Nenvorks and tMe Emergence of Global C ii Soctett.
in GLOBAL NETWORKS: COMPUTERS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION 283. 283-95 (Linda M
Harasim ed., 1993) (discussing growth of nongovernmental organizations. peace movements, human nghts
groups, and environmental preservation societies resulting from computer netsorking)
368. See Frederick, supra note 367, at 294 (stating that purpose of news allied computer netsorks is
to circumvent information monopolies).
369. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 40. at 236-67 (discussing ways in %hich digital net,%orks may
decentralize meaning-making process and enhance ability of inditiduals to participate effecti'.ely in social
dialogue). See generally Volokh, supra note 21 (predicting that digital distribution %%ill usher in era of
"cheap speech," which will liberate authors and audiences from mass media content selection and. largely
as consequence, will undermine arguments for government regulation of speech)
370. See, e.g., Barlow, supra note 21. at 85-86. 89-90 (arguing that copyright lay% %%as deelopcd to
convey forms and methods of expression entirely different from digitized medium and fa% oring system that
puts fewer constraints on circulation and modification of expression in digital netsork environments).
Lange, supra note 9, at 140-47 (discussing role of premoder origins of copyright in restricting dissent and
new technological challenges to copyright and ideas of authorship); see also Elkin-Korcn. supra note 40.
at 268 (arguing that employing copyright in its present form may diminish Internet's capacity to
decentralize social dialogue).
371. See supra Part I.
1996]
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 106: 283
include: (1) the lengthening of the duration of copyright protection; (2) the
extension of copyright to personal uses; (3) the subjugation of transformative
uses; and (4) the displacement of copyright by contract. I will now suggest, for
each area of expansion, some likely differences in direction that the three
approaches would support.
A. Copyright's Duration
As previously noted,372 Congress has lengthened the duration of
copyright protection from its initial bifurcated period of 28 years under the
1790 Act (with a more common 14-year term since relatively few copyrighted
works were renewed for a second term),373 to a bifurcated period of 56 years
under the 1909 Act (with a more common 28-year term, given the relative
rarity of renewal), 374 to the author's life plus 50 years (with works made for
hire enjoying a term of the shorter of 75 years from publication or 100 years
from creation) under the 1976 Act.3 75 Under the Copyright Term Extension
Act, now pending in Congress and likely to be enacted, copyright protection
will be once again extended, to the author's life plus 70 years (with 20 years
added to the term for works made for hire as well).376
The lengthening of the copyright term appears to be less attributable to
neoclassicism than are other areas of copyright expansion. Much of the force
behind the durational expansion lies in the realpolitik of international copyright
relations 377 -and, historically, continental European natural rights approaches
372. See supra Section I.A.
373. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § I, I Stat. 124, 124.
374. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080-81. A Copyright Office study of the
copyright renewal, completed in 1960, found that only about 15% of subsisting copyrights were being
renewed. See Barbara A. Ringer, Renewal of Copyright, in I COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES,
STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 503, 617 (Fisher Mem. ed. 1963).
375. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994). Different terms apply to works created but
not published or copyrighted before January I, 1978, the effective date of the 1976 Act, and to works in
which copyright already subsisted on that date. Id. §§ 303-04. In addition, in 1992 Congress effectively
lengthened the copyright term for many works created before 1978 by making copyright renewal automatic.
The Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, tit. I, § 102(a), (d), 106 Stat. 264, 266 (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 304(a), (c) (1994)).
376. See H.R. 989, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 483, 104th Cong. (1995).
377. The 1976 copyright revision was designed in part to pave the way for accession to the Berne
Convention, which provides for a general term of protection of the life of the author plus 50 years. See
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act, 1971), Art. 7(l) [hereinafter
Berne Convention]. The Berne term was nonmandatory until the Brussels Revision of the Berne Convention
in 1948. See Sam Ricketson, The Copyright Term, 23 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 753, 778,
783 (1992). More recently, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, TRIPs,
supra note 63, finalized in 1994 as part of the agreement amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GAIT), requires all members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to comply with the minimum
terms of protection set out in the Berne Convention, whether or not such countries are signatories of Berne.
See id. art. 9, at 415. In addition, under the so-called "Rule of the Shorter Term," in effect in many
countries and encouraged by Article 7(8) of the Berne Convention, copyright protection is extended to
foreign works only for the shorter of the term accorded in the country of origin or the term accorded to
domestic works in the country applying the Rule. Under the Rule, American works enjoyed protection in
most European countries for only 56 years, while domestic works were protected for the life of the author,
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to authors' rights have motivated the long terms, based on the author's life,
that have increasingly become the international standard."' On the other
hand, Congress has used the concern for maintaining the United States's
copyright industry trade advantage to lengthen the duration of our copyright
protection even beyond that which would be required for the United States
simply to comply with international standards and requirements. In particular,
the United States provides longer terms than required by the Berne
Convention, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPs), or the European Union for photographers, creators of applied
art, broadcasters, sound recording and film producers, and corporate
authors. 379 Even more strikingly, a recent amendment to the Copyright Act,
ostensibly enacted to comply with TRIPs, provides for a seemingly perpetual
right for performers and their assigns to prevent the distribution of bootleg
recordings of live music performances, even though TRIPs requires only a
term of fifty years from the performance. s°
Neoclassicism lends unreserved support to the lengthened copyright term.
Under traditional economic incentive theory, copyright's optimal term would
be no longer (and no shorter) than that required to provide a sufficient
plus 50 years, or, in the case of Germany, beginning in 1965. for the life of the author, plus 70 )ears More
recently, in order to achieve greater harmony among the copyright regimes of its member states. the
European Union has directed its member states to enact copynght terms equivalent to that of Germany. the
life of the author plus 70 years, and to apply the Rule of the Shorter Term to non-Union works See
Council Directive 93/98, arts. I. 7. 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9. reprnted in SWEET & MAXWELL'S EC
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MATERIALS 29-34 (Anna Booy & Audrey Horton eds. 1994) The directive has.
in turn, sparked moves in Congress to increase the length of protection in the United States as well See
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 989 Before the Suboinim on Courts and
Intellectual Property, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead)
378. See SAM RICKETSON. THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR TilE PROTECn''O. oF LITERARI AD
ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 323 (1987).
379. The European authors' rights tradition distinguishes between those works that emanate from
individual creativity and those that are seen as less creative or more corporate endeavors. with the latter
often being protected under noncopyright "neighboring right" regimes. Reflecting this distinction, the Berne
Convention and the Rome Convention (which governs certain neighboring rights) set the minimum terms
of protection for photographers, film producers, creators of applied an. television broadcasters. sound
recording producers, and performers at periods ranging from 20 to 50 years from publication, creation or
fixation, as the case may be. See Berne Convention. supra note 377. art. 7- International Convention for
the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms. and Broadcasting Organizations at Rome. Italy.
Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43, art. 14 [hereinafter Rome Convention). The EU Directive similarly
provides for a 50-year term for performers, sound recording producers, film producer, and broadcasters
and confers a 70-year term upon collective and corporate works These periods art all shorter than the life-
plus-50 and 75-from-publication or 100-from-creation terms conferred under the U S Copyright Act. as
are the periods of protection for such works required under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), which came into force in 1994 See TRIPs. supra note 63. art 99
(incorporating minimum terms of Berne Convention with respect to most works of individual authors). id
art. 12, at 415-16 (providing for minimum 50-year term for works of authorship. other than photographs
or applied art, term of which is calculated other than by reference to life of natural person). id art 14(5).
at 415 (providing for 50-year minimum term of protection for performers and sound recording producers
and 20-year minimum term of protection for broadcasters) Moreover. the proposed Copyright Term
Extension Act, with its 95-year term for works made for hire. would heighten this dispa ity
380. Section 1101 was added to the Copyright Act on December 8. 1994. pursuant to the requirement
set forth in Article 14(1) of TRIPs that performers be accorded exclusive rights of fixation. reproduction
and transmission of their performances. See TRIPs. supra note 63. art, 14(l)
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possibility of return to induce the creation and dissemination of new works.
Neoclassicism, in contrast, focuses more on the market for existing works than
on the creation of new works. It holds that broad, fully transferable property
rights are the best mechanism for putting existing works of authorship to their
most socially valued uses. Neoclassicism, therefore, has no reason to
extinguish the owner's copyright after a term of years.38' So long as a work
is socially valued, that value will be reflected in the price for using the work
and the work will be licensed and developed accordingly, thus achieving an
efficient allocation of resources. To withdraw protection from a work that is
still socially valued would defeat this objective. Continuing protection for
works that have no remaining social value causes no harm since, by definition,
no one wants to use such works anyway.382 Similarly, if anyone does want
to use the work, the work still has a social value measured by the price the
user would be willing to pay, and thus protection should continue to facilitate
the system of pricing and allocation.
The only plausible neoclassicist limitation on copyright's term might come
at the point of anticipated market failure. Copyright protection, the
neoclassicist might say, should end at the approximate time when most works
still have some social value, but when that social value has decreased to such
an extent that transaction costs would likely exceed the price that would be
paid for using most works.383 But with collective licensing and computerized
tracking mechanisms that sharply decrease transaction costs, that time would
be far off, if it would ever come at all.3&
The democratic approach, in contrast, would build on traditional incentive
theory to support a richer vision of the public domain. It would hold that
381. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 144, at 361-62 (suggesting that, aside from positive
tracing costs, which need not pose any serious problem, there is no reason in principle to limit copyright
term); cf Easterbrook, supra note 8, at II n.7 (justifying copyright's long term on principle that
intellectual property should be treated just like physical property absent strategic bargaining and tracing
problems that might arise from exclusive right to ideas); Meiners & Staaf, supra note 117, at 924
(suggesting, on basis of neoclassicist property theory, that duration of patent rights should be perpetual like
duration of title to land).
382. Accordingly, a neoclassicist would see no more reason to withdraw protection from such works
than to require that the property right in a dime store pen be automatically extinguished when the pen has
run out of ink.
383. See Landes & Posner, supra note 144, at 361-62 (citing positive tracing costs as possible
justification for limiting copyright term).
384. Computerized systems are already in place in some contexts. For example, the Copyright Office
has initiated a project to enhance its online database of copyright registrations to include information about
obtaining licenses and to provide for an online clearance procedure that would make it possible for users
to ascertain the status and ownership of a work, to obtain permission to use the work, and to pay for the
use. See U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Office Electronic Registration, Recordation & Deposit System
(visited Aug. 31, 1996) <gopher://marvel.loc.gov/l I/copyright>. Likewise, the Copyright Clearance Center
and a number of technology companies, digital content providers, and computer network service providers
have formed the "Electronic Rights Management Group" with the intent to promote widescale electronic
clearance, per-use billing, encryption, and tracking for content that is available over digital networks. See
Copyright Clearance Ctr., Inc., Press Release, Information Industry Leaders Form Electronic Rights
Management Group to Foster Commerce on the Internet, Oct. 31, 1995 (on file with author).
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works should at some point become a part of our common cultural heritage
because they have considerable social value, not simply because of market
failure. It would emphasize that copyright is a limited grant designed to foster
the expressive diversity and citizen autonomy required for democratic
govemance, and that copyright's term of protection should be determined with
that objective in mind. Copyright must be sufficiently robust to support a
vibrant, diverse, and innovative sector for the creation and distribution of
original expression. At same time, once copyright has given sufficient support
to creative autonomy, copyright's constitutive objectives are better served by
placing works in the public domain than by continuing to transfer consumer
surplus to copyright owners. At that point, so long as public domain works are
adequately available to the public, continued protection would place an undue
burden on authors, all of whom borrow from existing works in creating new
ones, and an undue cost on those who simply wish to read, see, or hear such
works. Or, put in economic terms, once copyright's democratic goals have
been substantially funded, consumer surplus is better allocated to subsidizing
both transformative and nontransformative uses of existing works for a broad
array of educational and cultural purposes.
To state the principle, of course, is not to say that it is susceptible to exact
application. Especially given the variegation and fluidity of copyright markets,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine with any degree of precision the
term of copyright that would lead to optimum support for creative autonomy,
while still allowing for sufficient user access. By all accounts, however, it
seems clear that the current term provides more than sufficient support for an
independent and diverse sector of authors and publishers, 3S and that, from
the perspective of democratic governance, any further lengthening of the
duration of protection would be undesirable and unwarranted.3' At the very
least, the democratic approach would require that policymakers put copyright's
constitutive goals at the forefront in seeking to determine an optimal copyright
term. And it would seem, in this regard, that the relatively negligible and,
possibly, fleeting trade benefits of lengthening the term would be outweighed
by the resulting impairment of public access and expressive diversity.
That said, however, even once the initial democratic benefits of copyright
have been obtained, a longer term, or at least some form of protection, may be
warranted as an incentive to publishers to keep public domain works in
circulation.387 To fulfill the democratizing potential of the Internet, large
385. See Nimmer, supra note 47, at 1416: Ricketson. supra note 377. at 783-84
386. While it might be desirable, in theory, to amend the Copynght Act to shorten the basic copyright
term, such a step would be exceedingly difficult to achieve in practice. since. in addition to hamg to
overcome domestic copyright industry opposition, it would run afoul of the current term of protection
requirements of TRIPs and the Berne Convention. See supra note 379
387. The United Kingdom accords publishers of new editions a 25-year right to preent unauthorized
facsimile copies of the typographical arrangement of said editions. See Copyright. Designs and Patents Act
1988, §§ 1(c), 15, 17(5) (Eng.).
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numbers of public domain texts, music, art, and films should be translated into
digital format and made available to online users. As we move from a system
based on the dissemination of hard copies to one of online access to virtual
libraries, book and record stores, video rental outlets, and jukeboxes, it will be
in one sense more difficult, but in another much easier, to meet this objective
of public domain availability. At present it requires a material amount of time,
effort, and money to produce and store a digital version of a hard copy
work.3"8 But once the digital version has been produced and stored on a
computer server, it costs much less to make it available for ready online access
to anyone with an Internet connection anywhere in the world than it would
cost to publish and distribute a hard copy edition.389
Our challenge, then, must be to encourage the initial production and
storage of digital versions of public domain works. Given the costs of such
tasks and the ease with which digitized works may be further copied and
transmitted by others, we can expect relatively few such digital "editions"
without some protection against unauthorized copying, transmission, and
display. Absent such protection, our efforts to make public domain works
widely available in digital format will likely be stymied by the same public
good and free rider problems that, if not for copyright, would plague creators
and publishers of new works. Accordingly, despite likely objections from some
minimalist critics,39 the democratic approach might well support the
extension of limited copyright-like protection for those who "publish" public
domain works in digital format.
As with democratic copyright, such protection would be circumscribed,
both in scope and duration, as necessary to meet its objectives. It might accord,
for a limited time, a person who makes a digital version of a public domain
work the exclusive right to copy that digital version and to transmit and
display the underlying public domain work over a public computer network.
The right would extend only to literal or near-literal appropriations of at least
a substantial portion of the work. In order to promote (and, in effect, cross-
388. Given the considerable expense of converting hard copy works to digital format, it is unlikely,
at least in the near term, that more than a small percentage of hard copy collections will be so converted.
See CRAWFORD & GORMAN, supra note 21, at 90-96 (discussing high cost of digital conversion and
dispelling notion that all or substantial portion of hard copy collections will be converted to "virtual
library"). Nevertheless, the Library of Congress recently initiated a five-year program to digitize five
million items from its collection, at a projected cost of $60 million, or an average of $12 per item. See
Terry Pristin, Selling History, Reel to Reel, to Today's Media, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 9, 1995, at DI.
389. See CRAWFORD & GORMAN, supra note 21, at 29-30 (noting cost savings from electronic
distribution of up to 30% for a hardbound book, but questioning whether that represents sufficient portion
of hard copy publishing and distribution costs to represent "major savings").
390. To the extent they recognize the need for copyright at all, minimalists tend to favor a short term
of protection. James Boyle, for example, proposes that copyright should last for only 20 years. See BOYLE,
supra note 97, at 172. On the other hand, Professor Boyle expresses support for sui generis intellectual
property regimes for information products. See id. at 170-72. This might lead him to consider favorably
my proposal for a short-term digital publisher's right.
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subsidize) creative exchange, it would not prevent sampling or transformative
reformulations. Nor would it prevent hard copy editions of the public domain
work, so long as such editions were created independently and not by
downloading the protected digital version. The right's duration would roughly
approximate the period that is necessary to provide a reasonable incentive for
such digital "publication," probably ten years at most. Thereafter, any online
provider would be free to include the work in its catalogue, and the Library of
Congress, which would receive a digital deposit of the protected work, would
make the work available online to the public at large.
B. Personal Uses
Copyright has traditionally been designed to protect copyright owners
against competitors who illicitly appropriate a share of the owner's mass
market, either by distributing infringing copies to the public or by conducting
infringing public performances of the copyrighted work, whether live or over
the air. Copyright has not generally required owner authorization for an
individual's personal uses of protected works, whether such uses entail reading,
listening, private performances, or even home copying. Such personal uses
have either fallen outside the scope of copyright's exclusive rights or have
generally been deemed to be a noninfringing de minimis or fair use.39' But
with the advent of online dissemination of authors' works, the distinction
between mass market infringement and personal use appears to be breaking
down. The NIl White Paper maintains, with some case law support,3 " that
even the temporary fixation of a protected work on a computer's random
access memory, such as is required to view a work resident on another
computer, constitutes an actionable reproduction of the work, absent
authorization or fair use.393 It also contends that fair use for otherwise
infringing personal uses should no longer be available, given the development
of collective licensing and computerized tracking systems that greatly reduce
negotiating costs.394 As a result, under the legal regime anticipated and
favored by the White Paper, individuals would require a copyright license to
view or listen to protected works or to give or lend a "book" to a friend via
391. The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). accords copyright owners with a specificd bundle
of exclusive rights, including the rights to reproduce the work, to prepare derivaive works, to distribute
copies or phonorecords to the public, to perform the work publicly, and to display the work publicly Uses
like reading a book, listening to the radio, or singing a song in the shower, that do not fall within the scope
of any of these rights, are not infringements. Other uses. like hand copying portions of a copyrighted article
or loudly playing a portable cassette player in the park, do run afoul of the owner's rights but are generally
deemed to constitute de minimis or fair use. See 2 NiMiER ON COPYRIGHT. supra note 56. § 8.01(G). at
8-25.
392. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer. Inc.. 991 F.2d 511. 519 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
loading of computer software into RAM creates "a copy").
393. See Nil WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 64-66.
394. See supra note 65.
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the Internet. A library that made its collection of texts available for online
perusal would also likely infringe upon the owners' copyrights by virtue of
Congress's extension of the exclusive right of public display to remote serial
access.
395
The neoclassicist approach embraces the propertization of personal uses
and appears to have significantly influenced the authors of the White Paper.
Neoclassicists assert that, as new collective licensing institutions and
computerized tracking systems sharply reduce negotiating costs and as digital
technology makes possible ever more exact price discrimination, a regime of
property rules and market transactions should be the cyberspace norm.396
They argue that copyright holders should capture the social value of reading
or borrowing a book online, just as broad property rights should encompass the
value of physical resources.397 For neoclassicists, the extension of copyright
to such private uses would enable the market pricing system to achieve
efficient resource allocation more fully. It would give copyright holders the
capacity "to channel their investments more precisely to meet ... newly
articulated patterns of demand. 398
Minimalist critics, on the other hand, insist that the "free use zone" of the
hard copy world, including such uses as reading, viewing, or listening to an
authorized copy of a work, browsing in a bookstore or newsstand, lending a
book or sound recording to a friend, and borrowing from a public library, must
be maintained in cyberspace.399 They argue that the extension of copyright
395. See supra note 64. Similarly, making a copyrighted film or song available for serial online
viewing or listening would likely fall within the copyright owner's exclusive right of public performance.
See Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that video store
operator infringed public performance right when he rented motion picture tapes to customers and provided
semi-private rooms where tapes could be viewed); On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that hotel movie viewing system that allowed guests to view
movies in their rooms by selecting tapes to be played on remote-controlled console in hotel basement
infringed public performance right).
396. See, e.g., Hardy, supra note 3, manuscript at 27-35. Hardy would allow fair use only for uses
that are "either trivial, or undertaken for unusually worthy purposes." Id. manuscript at 33.
397. Applying this approach, the Nil White Paper suggests that universities and libraries should have
to pay full market price for expressive material, just as they must pay for tangible supplies. See Nil WHITE
PAPER, supra note 6, at 84 n.266, 88; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 202 (asserting that "as new
technological uses of copyrighted works emerge, lawmakers should be quick to extend copyright to
encompass them, even if the uses are construed as private"); Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 110-11 (favoring
like treatment of intellectual property to physical property and arguing that "quasi-rents . . . are common
in every industry with specialized assets").
398. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 200.
399. See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 273, 277 (opposing extension of copyright to digital
"borrowing" and asserting that users of expression disseminated over digital networks must be allowed "to
do the same things they are able to do in a non-digitized environment"); Hamilton. supra note 12, at 623
(coining the term "free use zone"); id. at 632 (summarizing application of free use zone on Global
Information Infrastructure); Litman, supra note 3, at 40 (advocating user's "right to read" and suggesting
that Copyright Act should be amended to clarify that "an individual's ordinary reading, viewing, or
listening to an authorized copy of a work does not invade the copyright owner's rights"); see also
Samuelson, supra note 3, at 137-38, 189, 191 (arguing against extension of copyright to such uses, or their
digital equivalents, at least until such time, if any, that it becomes apparent that some such protection is
required in digital markets).
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to the digital equivalents of such uses would disturb copyright's traditional
balance and would amount to an unwarranted and unprecedented incursion into
individual liberties.40 They contend that the Copyright Act should be
amended, if need be, to make clear that individuals should be permitted to
make and transmit copies of works online to friends or family for personal use,
that public libraries should be able to afford patrons remote access to digital
works in library collections so long as the patron does not keep a permanent
copy of the work, and even that commercial publishers should be prohibited
from charging prospective customers for electronic browsing through the
publishers' digital products.40 '
The democratic paradigm eschews the neoclassicist principle that copyright
owners should be entitled to appropriate the entire consumer surplus whenever
and wherever market transactions and comprehensive price discrimination are
possible. At the same time, however, the paradigm would see no reason to
cling to hard copy distinctions in the digital network environment. Digital
network technologies will radically alter copyright markets. "0 " Specifically,
widespread digital dissemination will substantially diminish author revenues
from the sale of hard copies. As this occurs, authors will become increasingly
dependent on revenues from digital dissemination-and on legal mechanisms
that ensure that they can receive such income. With that in mind, and in order
to continue to provide a robust public subsidy for authors' autonomous creative
expression, copyright will have to be extended to many digital uses. That
extension would constitute a substitute for copyright owner rights that will
have a far diminished utility in the digital market and not an onerous
expansion of copyright's scope.
Consider, for example, library patrons' remote access to digital collections.
In the hard copy universe, only one patron at a time can borrow any given
book from the library. Persons who want to keep a book permanently or who
need to see the book before another patron returns it must buy their own copy.
With remote digital access, however, hundreds or thousands of patrons will be
able to access the book at the same time. In addition, many people who might
otherwise have wanted to buy their own permanent copy will now settle for
being able to access the book online whenever they wish. Given technological
and cultural constraints, in the near term this would likely occur much more
400. See Nil Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearings on H R 2441 Before the Sub&onun on
Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary. 104th Cong 11996) 1statement o
Consumer Product on Technology) (maintaining that legislation implementing Whte Paper
recommendations would have far-reaching negative conscqucnces regarding personal pnsac)>. Barlo%,,
supra note 21, at 86 (asserting that broader and more ngorous enforcement of intellectual propert) in
cyberspace will "inevitably threaten freedom of speech").
401. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 12, at 631-32: see also AMERICAN ASS*" OF RIi~EARCH
LIBRARIES. STATEMENT ON LAWFUL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (1995) ( assting that "u.lithout
infringing copyright, the public has a right to expect ... to read. to Isten. or sies. publicly marketed
copyrighted material privately, on site or remotely").
402. See Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 1477-78: supra note 21.
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with libraries' sound recording collections than with books, but as online
access offers more of the comforts of having one's own hard copy and,
possibly, as new generations of readers become less desirous of the "feel" of
a hard copy, it will happen with increasing frequency with books and other
written material as well.40 3
Authors and their publishers will have two basic possibilities for making
up the resulting loss in hard copy sales. They could exact from libraries a large
up-front payment in an amount calculated to cover the expected loss in revenue
or they could charge a much smaller amount for each remote access use.4
While minimalist critics seem to assume that such per use charges would be
levied against library patrons, thus undermining libraries' traditional role in
providing patrons with free access to their collections, there is no reason that
libraries (or other public institutions) could not assume all or part of such
charges for needy patrons. Moreover, per use charges have a certain advantage
over up-front fees in that they could provide at least a rough indication of the
kind of works that library patrons wish to access, enabling libraries to tailor
their purchasing decisions and authors to tailor their creating decisions
accordingly.405 Either way, libraries or remote access patrons will have to
make up the loss in author revenue resulting from digital remote access.
Otherwise, as authors cut back on production or rely more heavily on state or
private patronage, libraries will have far fewer and far less diverse "sustained
works of authorship. ' 4°
A similar analysis would apply to online "browsing," the calling up of all
or a portion of a work on the network user's computer screen without
403. See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1823-25. Butsee CRAWFORD & GORMAN, supra note 21, at 17-22
(doubting whether computer and display technology will ever equal advantages of reading books and
lengthy texts on printed page).
404. The up-front payment could take one or more of several types of fees. It might be: (I) a license
fee for permitting a library to make digital reproductions of certain hard copy works in its collection; (2)
a license fee for downloading and storing in the library's computer permanent copies of new works that
are created in digital format; or (3) a blanket license fee for unlimited digital display of the works to the
library's remote access patrons. To some extent, publishers already engage in similar price discrimination,
charging libraries and other institutional subscribers of certain journals a significantly higher subscription
fee than that charged to individual subscribers. See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d
913, 936 (2d Cir. 1994) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (noting that plaintiff journal publisher charged institutional
subscribers double normal subscription rate in expectation that employees would copy articles for personal
use). At the same time, newspaper and journal publishers often charge teachers and students a lower rate
than other users.
405. Much the same benefit could be achieved by calculating the library's blanket license fee in
accordance with a system that yields statistical samples of patron uses, such as that in employed by
ASCAP, the Copyright Clearance Center, and other collective licensing organizations. See DAVID
SINACORE-GUINN, COLLECTIVE ADMINISTRATION OF COPYRIGHTS AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES, PROCEDURES, AND ORGANIZATIONS 383-91 (1993) (discussing various forms
of collective blanket licensing). Given bounded rationality distortions, patron per use charges would yield
only imperfect information about audience receptivity to author's works and, partly as a result, should not
serve as a basis for expanding copyright's scope. See supra text accompanying note 241. But everything
else being equal, given a choice between a flat fee that takes no account of patron interest and a charge
per use system that does, the latter might be preferable.
406. See supra text accompanying note 272.
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downloading a copy to disk. Such activity should not fall within the ambit of
copyright owner prerogatives simply because it has social value or because,
given current technology, it might be construed to involve the making of a
"copy" of the browsed work in the computer's random access memory."
But neither should it be exempted from copyright merely because it can be
analogized to "reading" a book or newspaper. The extension of copyright over
online browsing, or for that matter, personal downloading, should instead
depend on a measured assessment of the extent to which such activities, if
permitted on a mass scale, would erode existing copyright markets. In making
such a determination, moreover, it must be kept in mind that audience
payments do not merely provide an incentive for the creation and
dissemination of original expression. They must also be sufficient to subsidize
a vital and independent sector of expressive activity. To be certain, charges for
such digital uses would represent an audience "tax," no less than whatever
incremental amount copyright adds to the price of books or newspapers. "
But such a tax, paid in some form and for some use or another, is a necessary
source of funding for a central component of our system of free expression.
At the same time, the democratic paradigm would not support author and
publisher appropriation of a greater portion of the consumer surplus than is
necessary to support self-reliant and diverse authorship. To that end it would
view with considerable skepticism the neoclassicist embrace of collective
licensing as a panacea for overcoming transaction cost barriers to private use
licenses.4° Collective licensing organizations, like ASCAP and the Copyright
Clearance Center, typically enforce the copyrights of their members by
granting users a blanket license to use the works in the organization's
catalogue.1 In so doing, they enable authors to receive payment from
widely dispersed users, many of whom might otherwise infringe with impunity,
and they provide users with the opportunity to deal with a single licensor for
a broad panoply of works. Neoclassicists extol such organizations as evidence
of the market's ability to generate private solutions to transaction cost barriers,
407. The White Paper would extend copyright over online browsing for both reasons See supra note
66. For a further, cogent critique of this formalist approach. see Litman. supra note 353. at 37
408. In assessing the financial burden that such charges might impose on users. ho, cer. one iiust
take into account the vastly reduced price for digital, as opposed to hard copy. distibution. and the sa'.ing,
in time and money in being able to view a work from home rather than has mg to go to a bookstore.
library, or newsstand. See Volokh. supra note 21. at 1809. 1825 (discussing inexpensie clectrunic
distribution of music and text). Moreover, charges for such digital uses might be considerably less mtrusisc
and onerous than some minimalist critics fear. Charges could take place automaticall) and mechanically.
much like toll charges on a phone bill or. more likely, as a lump sum license fee. added to the uscr's
monthly Internet access provider bill, that would cover all instances of browsing or dounloading
409. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21. at 218-23 (discussing ASCAP and Copyright Clearance
Center); Merges, supra note 168; Merges. supra note 164. at 2669-70 (maintaining that "the history of
collective rights organizations such as ASCAP supports the main theoretical point that a property rule
for [intellectual property rights] can be transformed into a voluntary liablit) rule. in the form of an
effective institution to carry out [intellectual property rights) transactions")
410. See SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 405, at 383-90.
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thus obviating the need for statutory compulsory licenses, fair use, and other
limitations on proprietary copyright."' However, they forget that collective
licensing organizations are plagued by problems of monopoly power and
pricing." 2 For that reason, both in the United States and in other countries,
such organizations are typically subject to considerable state-enforced
constraints on the license fees they may exact and the extent of the rights they
may represent.41 3 To the extent that private use licenses, including those for
library remote access, are administered by collective licensing organizations,
the democratic paradigm would accordingly prescribe a system of state
regulation to ensure that user license fees remain within reasonable limits.
42 4
C. Transformative Uses
Digitization makes possible the infinite manipulability of existing works,
opening up a myriad of possibilities for transformative uses. These may range
411. Robert Merges's recent paean to collective licensing takes this neoclassicist embrace to new
heights. Merges lauds collective licensing organizations as paradigmatic institutions of private ordering,
remarkably shunting to the side the extensive government regulation of such organizations in both the
United States and abroad. Compare Merges, supra note 168, manuscript at 45 ("antitrust enforcement ...
has appeared to constrain [ASCAP] somewhat"), with Stanley M. Besen et al., An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Collectives, 78 VA. L. REV. 383, 387-88, 395 (1992) (stating that "collectives (such as ASCAP]
have been subject to detailed regulation" governing types of licenses that collectives may offer and
administer, levels and distribution of license fees, collective membership restrictions, collective obligations
to nonmembers, and appropriate damages for infringement). In particular, Merges concludes, relying on the
relative infrequency of fee-setting litigation, that ASCAP fees continue to be "established by negotiation,"
just as "in the past," before its 1950 antitrust consent decree. See Merges, supra note 168, manuscript at
46. Here Merges neglects the "New Institutionalism" literature (on which he otherwise heavily relies)
showing that economic agents will often transact against the backdrop of state entitlements and institutions
without actually resorting to them. See id. at 23-26 (canvassing New Institutionalism literature). It seems
highly likely that users' automatic right to an ASCAP license upon application, coupled with their right to
petition the court for determination of a "reasonable fee" in the absence of agreement and the underlying
threat of private antitrust action, heavily color ASCAP license negotiations, even if few users have actually
filed a petition for judicial determination of fees. See infra note 413.
412. Collective licensing organizations pool the copyrights of their members, thus enhancing their
power in negotiating with users. ASCAP and BMI operate pursuant to the terms of consent decrees issued
in connection with an antitrust action brought by the Department of Justice. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1979) (describing ASCAP and BMI consent decrees). They have also been
the subject of numerous private antitrust actions. See generally Simon H. Rifkind, Music Copyrights and
Antitrust: A Turbulent Courtship, 4 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. I (1985) (discussing antitrust challenges
to ASCAP to illustrate evolving relationship between copyright and antitrust laws).
413. See SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 405, at 604-07. Under its Consent Decree, ASCAP may not
institute or commence suit against motion picture exhibitors and may license synchronization rights and
motion picture theater performing rights only in limited circumstances. See United States v. ASCAP,
1950-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,595, at 63,752-53 (§§ IV(F)(l), V(C)(l)-(5)) (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (Amended
Final Judgment). In addition, any user automatically acquires an ASCAP license merely by applying to
ASCAP for the license. See id. at 63,753 (§ IV). If the user is unable to negotiate a license fee, it may
petition a judge of the Southern District of New York to fix a "reasonable fee." See id. at 63,754 (§ IX(A)).
In any such proceeding ASCAP bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of its proposed fee.
See id. at 63,754 (§ IX(A)).
414. State regulation would not be needed if each author or publisher were free to negotiate his or her
own user charges since this practice would not pose the problem of monopoly power that is endemic to
collective licensing. The Copyright Office has begun a project to allow such individualized licensing online.
See supra note 384.
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from modifications and adaptations of a single work to multimedia works that
incorporate an array of discrete components from numerous existing
works.4 15 They may include transformative works that bear only a scant
resemblance to the existing work as well as those in which the existing work
or works are easily recognizable.
As discussed in Part I, through most of the nineteenth century authors
were free to transform existing works so long as they made a substantial
independent contribution. But today, transformative uses that are deemed to
appropriate the original work's expression, and not just its idea, fall within the
exclusive control of the holder of the copyright in the original work, unless
excused as fair use. Copyright now includes an exclusive right to make
derivative works. Moreover, the reproduction right has expanded dramatically.
In addition to substantial literal or near literal copying, it now encompasses
nonliteral "total concept and feel" similarity and literal copying of small
fragments of the original work. In effect, copyright's reproduction right now
provides an implicit derivative right largely coterminous with the explicit
one.
416
The neoclassicist approach would give the owner of an existing work the
exclusive right to authorize any such transformative uses. Neoclassicists
recognize that a copyright owner's exclusive right to make derivative works
may well go beyond what is necessary to provide an incentive for the creation
and dissemination of the original work." 7 They argue, however, that the
derivative right serves to direct investment towards those works that are
capable of being developed in ways that consumers want, including, for
example, books that are well suited to screen adaptation or motion pictures and
television programs with characters that can readily be spun off into product
merchandising.4 s
415. So-called "'multimedia" works are works that combine text. music. still image. graphics, and lull.
motion video in digital format. See Jennifer D. Choe. Interactive ,fultunedia: A ,New Technalogv. Tests the
Limits of Copyright, 46 RuTGERS L. REv. 929. 931 (1994) As the Nil Whie Paper points out, the term
"multimedia" is a misnomer; such creations actually involve the fixation of vori's of '.anous categories in
a single medium. See Nil WHITE PAPER. supra note 6. at 41-42 Hoveer. since *'multimedia" is the term
that is commonly used, I will use it here as well.
416. See supra text accompanying notes 71-76. Even a broad reproduction nght is not entirely
coterminous with the derivative right. The reproduction right may only be infringed by an unauthorized
fixation in copies or phonorecords. whereas the denvati.e right may be infringed by a nonfixed
performance. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476. at 62 (1976). reprinted tn 1976 US CC AN 5659. 5665
Nimmer asserts, however, that the derivative right is "'completely superfluous" since any infringement of
that right would also infringe the reproduction right or the performance right See 2 NIs'itER 0%
COPYRIGHT, supra note 56, § 8.09[A]. at 8-123. Professor Goldstein has cogently argued that in order to
be a derivative work, as opposed to merely a substantially similar reproduction, the sork should inolve
a "contribution of independent expression to an existing work [that] effccti'el) creates a ncv vork for a
different market." GOLDSTEIN, supra note 18. § 5.3.1. at 5-82
417. See supra note 144.
418. See supra note 145.
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Some copyright expansion critics, on the other hand, have suggested that
the derivative right should be effectively eliminated.4 9 If this were the case,
secondary authors would be free to create adaptations and translations of
existing works, as was generally the case until the late nineteenth century.
Other critics have proposed that the derivative right should be subject to a
compulsory license.420 In that event, secondary authors would be entitled to
produce and disseminate transformative works without owner authorization
upon payment of a statutory license fee or judicial damage award.
The democratic paradigm would reject both the neoclassicist and
minimalist positions. It would advocate varied treatment for different types of
transformative uses in an effort to maintain author incentives without unduly
suppressing secondary borrowing. From the democratic perspective, a broad
derivative right poses an unacceptable burden on expressive diversity. Given
copyright owners' propensity to private censorship and systematic ability to
demand supracompetitive license fees, copyright owners' expansive control
over transformative uses unduly stifles the creative reformulation of existing
expression, serving in the process to bolster cultural and market-based
hierarchy.42' The neoclassicists' claim that the pricing system will induce
owners to invest in the development of a full range of expression is too
uncertain to outweigh such a burden.422 Seen in that light, it would be
preferable to allow free competition and a diversity of expression among
secondary authors in the adaptation of existing works and their components.
On the other hand, in many instances the elimination of the exclusive
derivative right would undermine the incentive that copyright provides for the
creation of the original work. This problem would be particularly acute
whenever an adaptation maintains the essential content of the original work in
the same or another form. If the holder of the copyright in a book did not have
the exclusive right to authorize translations, for example, the book could freely
be translated into a foreign language and then back into the original language,
419. See, e.g., Jaszi, supra note 9, at 304-05 (denouncing derivative right and total-concept-and-fecl
test for reproduction right infringement as outmoded vestiges of Romantic view of authorship); Lunney,
supra note 30, at 650 (maintaining that derivative right should be limited to "those instances where an
individual has exactly or near exactly reproduced a copyrighted work in a new language or medium of
distribution"); Sterk, supra note 30, at 1217 (concluding that derivative right is "generally inconsistent with
the incentive justification for copyright" and doubting whether its abolition would "increase overall
litigation rather than just shift boundary lines").
420. See Hamilton, supra note 97, at 120-22 (1994) (citing sources).
421. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text. In addition, although copyright's democratic
paradigm admittedly does not generally distinguish between works of political speech and works of
entertainment, a rule that encourages studios to produce and invest in those films and television programs
that can best be used to sell coffee mugs, T-shirts, keychains, and other consumer items bearing character
likenesses hardly serves the objective of robust democratic discourse. See GREGORY J. BATTERSBY &
CHARLES W. GRIMES, THE LAW OF MERCHANDISE AND CHARACTER LICENSING, § 2.03(1], at 2-9 to 2-12
(1995) (describing how desire to maximize potential for product merchandising and promotional tie-ins




competing directly with the book in its primary market. 23 Likewise, works
that are quite similar to the original, including edited films and television
programs, are sometimes viewed as derivative works of their unedited
versions,424  and these could act as market substitutes for the unedited
versions.
In addition, a derivative right is sometimes necessary to avoid "multiple
taker" problems.425 Without the ability to exclude multiple transformative
users, it is highly unlikely that anyone would create derivative works that take
a number of months or years to produce and require a significant capital
investment. An example would be the production of a motion picture based on
a popular novel. Few studios would invest the tens of millions of dollars that
is generally required to produce a commercial full-length feature film without
the right to prevent would-be competitors from releasing a film based on the
same novel.426 To the extent that such capital and time intensive derivative
works contribute to our public discourse (and not because of the neoclassicist
direction of investment rationale), we may wish to accord an exclusive
derivative right, so long as it would not unduly burden noncompetitive
transformative uses.
In contrast, there are other instances in which limitations on owner ability
to prevent transformative uses would appear to support expressive diversity
without undermining copyright incentives. A case in point involves so-called
"cover recordings" of songs that have previously been recorded and distributed
to the public.427 Section 115 of the Copyright Act provides for a compulsory
license for cover recordings, enabling performers to make their own renditions
of previous recordings upon payment of a statutory fee to the holder of the
copyright in the original musical work.2- Unlike motion picture adaptations,
423. The same would be true of two-dimensional drawings of three-dimensional sculptures. dolls and
toys, and vice versa. For that reason the holder of a copyright in a three-dimensional graphic vork may
prevent an unauthorized two-dimensional representation of the work, and the holder of a copy right in a twso-
dimensional drawing may prevent an unauthorized three-dimensional representation of the drasing See.
e.g., Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A. Fruendlich. Inc.. 73 F.2d 276. 278 (2d Cir 1934). King Features
Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1924). This rule does not apply with regard to utilitarian
aspects of a three-dimensional useful article, whether embodied in the article or depicted in a tso-
dimensional design. See I NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT. supra note 56. § 2.081H], at 2-149. id § 8 07. at 8-104
424. See, e.g., WGN Continental Broad. Co. v. United Video. Inc .693 F2d 622. 625 (7th Cir 1982)
(holding work that deleted parts of new program constituted infringing denvatie sorkj. Gilliam ' ABC.
538 F.2d 14, 21 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that unauthorized editing of work. if proven. sould constitute
infringing derivative work, going beyond scope of license to make copies of 'work)
425. A multiple taker problem exists when an owner who lacks the right to exclude shill not pa, a
prospective taker to prevent a taking because the owner would subsequently hase to pay another
prospective taker not to take, and then another and another. See Kaplow & Shasell. Propert% Rules. iupra
note 247, at 765-66 (identifying multiple taker problem as limitation of liability rule regimes in some
circumstances).
426. See Bernard Weinraub, Two Filns. One Subject. Uh-Oh In Hollvitood. the Race is On. N Y
TiMEs, June 23, 1994, at CII (reporting as highly unusual contemporaneous deselopment by tso major
studios of motion pictures based on same story about threatened escape of deadly i irus from medical lab)
427. See AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSic LIcENSiNG 656-60 (2d ed 1996)
428. The compulsory license is available only when a recording of the song has been previously
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cover recording artists do not appear to be particularly deterred by the
possibility of multiple transformative uses.429 In fact, many popular songs are
the subject of numerous cover recordings.4 '3  Nor does the section 115
compulsory license appear to have unduly dampened incentives to create and
record original musical works. Indeed, in many instances the holders of
musical work copyrights grant permission to produce a cover recording at less
than the statutory rate.43'
Much digital manipulation would appear to impose no greater burden on
copyright incentives than does the cover recording compulsory license. A
prime example is digital sampling. Digital sampling involves the use of
computer technology to copy short segments from existing recordings, texts,
or motion pictures for inclusion in transformative sound recording or
multimedia works.432 So long as the sampled material does not constitute the
signature theme of the original work and so long as the sampler has made her
own significant creative contribution to the secondary work, such
transformative uses are generally free from multiple taker and market
substitution problems (unless one broadly defines the relevant market, in
neoclassicist fashion, to include any possible transformative use).433
distributed in the United States with the copyright owner's permission. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (1994).
Section 115 also requires that notice be given to the copyright owner and that the cover artist refrain from
changing the "basic melody or fundamental character of the work." Id. The statutory fee is dependent on
when the original phonorecord was produced and currently varies from 4.0 cents to 6.6 cents per song per
copy, or .75 cents to 1.25 cents per minute of playing time, rounded up to the next minute, whichever is
larger. See 37 C.F.R. § 255 (1995).
429. A cover recording does not constitute an independently copyrightable derivative work, "except
with the express consent of the copyright owner." 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2).
430. As of November 1995, for example, the Beatles songs "Yesterday" and "Eleanor Rigby" had been
the subject of 72 and 51 cover recordings, respectively. See Beatles Still Under Cover: A Look at Statistics
That Shape Our Lives, USA TODAY, Nov. 22, 1995, available in 1995 WL 12679375.
431. Telephone Interview with Charles Sanders, In-House Counsel for the Harry Fox Agency (Nov.
16, 1995). The agency acts as the agent for a large number of musical work copyright owners in granting
cover recording and other mechanical recording licenses. According to Mr. Sanders, only about 40% to
50% of the approximately 150,000 cover recording licenses that the Agency issues each year are at the
statutory rate, and this figure does not include the many below rate in-house licensing transactions between
record companies and their affiliates. The primary reason for the issuance of cover licenses below the
statutory rate, he explains, is that recording contracts typically include a control composition clause, which
requires the songwriter/artist to provide the record company with a rate on that person's songs that is three-
quarters of the statutory rate. Other typical instances of below statutory rate licenses include packaged
recordings of older artists and record club releases. See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 427, at 659-60.
432. See David Sanjek, "Don't Have to DJ No More": Sampling and the "Autonomous" Creator, 10
CARDOZO ARTs & ENT. L.J. 607, 612 (1992) (describing use of Musical Instrument Digital Interface
synthesizers, which take audio signals and convert them into string of computer digits that can be held in
random access memory, retrieved, scrambled, and introduced into given recording).
433. This would not be so where the entire original work is only a couple of phrases or sounds, as
in the case of the short, original samples that are created for compilation in sound recordings, known as
"samplers," which are sold to musicians who wish to incorporate samples in their own works. See Anita
M. Samuels, Freeze-Dried Music: Just Add Artists, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1995, at A2 (reporting increasingly
widespread use of samplers). In this case, however, while the entire sampler would generally be protected
as a compilation against the literal or near-literal copying of its selection and arrangement of samples, it
is questionable whether the individual samples, each taken separately, would be sufficiently original to
qualify for copyright protection. See I NINIMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 56, § 2.01[B], at 2-17 to 2-18
(stating that short phrases do not generally qualify for copyright protection unless they exhibit sufficient
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Accordingly, depending on the quantitative and qualitative importance of the
sampled material for the original work and the nature and extent of the
sampler's own contribution, such transformative uses should either qualify as
a fair use, with the burden on the plaintiff to show market substitution, or be
subject to some form of compulsory license.4
Such a regime would generally maintain copyright owner remuneration for
transformative uses of more than immaterial isolated components of the
original work, but would do so through liability rules, rather than neoclassical
property rules. It would thereby promote multifarious digital uses of existing
components without impairing copyright incentives. Prevailing uncertainties
regarding whether sampling constitutes infringement and the significant costs
involved in seeking and obtaining permission to use sampled material have
often made the use of existing content in multimedia works prohibitively
expensive, thus obstructing the development of this new form of
expression.435 This problem has been exacerbated by the reluctance, under
today's property rule regime, of many content owners to issue blanket licenses
for transformative uses of their works and by the tendency of many of those
who are willing to license to insist on full per copy royalties even when the
multimedia work incorporates only a small excerpt of the licensed work.'6
In such a case, contrary to the neoclassicist view of compulsory licenses
as obstacles to the formation of market solutions to licensing barriers,4 "
certain liability rule regimes might actually be more conducive to overcoming
those barriers than a property regime.4 3' By imposing a liability rule, the
democratic paradigm would in effect force content owners to bargain under the
shadow of a compulsory license, thus leading to the development of private
collective licensing institutions for multimedia uses of existing content."' In
creativity). But see Tin Pan Apple Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co. 30 U S.PQ.2d (BNA) 1791 tS D N Y 1994)
(declining to hold, as matter of law, that defendant's digital sampling of ,ords "ltugga-Hugga'" and 'Brr"
from plaintiff's song constituted noninfringing copying of noncopynghtablc material)
434. Among the possible types of compulsory licenses are state detemined across-the-board fees.
individualized judicial damage awards, and voluntary negotiations under the shadow of binding arbitration
in the event of negotiation failure. For a brief discussion of these alternauves and their possible
ramifications for efficient bargaining, see supra note 248.
435. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. 102D CONG.. FINDING A BALANCE COSFLPTER
SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE CHALLENGE OF TECIINOLOGICAL CiHANGE 173 (1992),
Choe, supra note 415, at 948-49. There are two principal sources of legal uncerlaint) regarding the use
of sampled material. First, it is unclear whether any given instance of digital sampling constitutes a
noninfringing de minimis or fair use. See supra note 75. Second. green that much content %%a5 created and
licensed prior to the advent of multimedia technology. it is often unclear whether licensees hase the right
to sublicense multimedia uses. See Jane C. Ginsburg. Domestic auid Internutional Copiright Issuen
Implicated in the Compilation ofa Multimedia Product. 25 SETON HALL L REV 1397. 1409-11 (1995)
436. See Kevin J. Harrang, Licensing Issues tit Creatig and Pubhshing Multimedta Sofmare Products.
in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, DRAFTING LICENSING AGREEMENTS 289 (1995). Choc, supra note 415. at
948-49, 980-82 (noting absence of collective licensing institutions designed spcficall) for multimedia
uses as obstacle to multimedia development).
437. See, e.g., Krier & Schwab. supra note 123. at 464; Merges. supra note 164. at 2662-64
438. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
439. See supra note 248.
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contrast to licensing under a property rule regime, a content owner could not
extract the prospective user's surplus as a bribe for agreeing to license the
work."4 But the liability ceiling could be set so that owners would generally
receive sufficient compensation to maintain a robust incentive for the creation
of original works."' Given the vital importance of transformative uses for
diversity of expression,44 even if one views such a regime as a partial
transfer of wealth from authors of existing content to transformative authors,
this transfer is fully warranted by copyright's democracy-enhancing
objectives. 443
D. Displacement of Copyright by Contract
Placing substantial amounts of original expression in electronic databases,
together with technological means of preventing unauthorized user access,
copying, and manipulation, will accord online content providers with the far-
reaching ability to obtain, through the laws of property and contract, the sort
of broad, monolithic control over such expression that copyright doctrines such
as fair use, the idea/expression dichotomy, and limited duration might
otherwise preclude.4" The neoclassicist approach regards positively or with
equanimity such contractual expansion of copyright owner rights.
Neoclassicists' legal marginalism and tendency to view social policy through
the lens of bilateral market transactions leads them to elevate contractual
arrangements over the fundamental democratic interest in maintaining a vibrant
440. See Kaplow & Shavell, Property Rules, supra note 247, at 771 (noting that "[u]nder property rule
protection, when owners sell things, they tend to receive more than the value they place on them; they are
generally able to extract some of the buyers' surplus," whereas under "the liability rule, owners' valuation
is all that they are in principle awarded").
441. Commentators generally agree that whatever may be their benefits for efficient resource
allocation, liability rules have a socially inefficient tendency to reduce owners' ex ante incentives to invest
in productive activity and development concerning the asset that is subject to the rule. See, e.g., Ayres &
Talley, Solomonic Bargaining, supra note 247, at 1083; Kaplow & Shavell, Property Rules, supra note 247,
at 722. In the case of sampling, however, the transformative use would act as a market substitute neither
for the original work nor for traditional adaptations, such as translations, motion picture versions, or
dramatizations. A liability rule for sampling would thus not be expected to dampen owner incentives with
regard to the creation and development of these works. A liability rule for sampling would, in theory,
dampen owner incentives to invest in works that can easily be broken down into easily sampled
components, but since, with digital technology, all works can be easily broken down in that manner, that
theoretical incentive distortion would have little real consequence.
442. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1171 (1994) (emphasizing that "the
creation of transformative works" serves copyright's fundamental objectives and thus lies at "the heart of
the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space").
443. Neoclassicists sometimes argue that income tax and direct subsidies are superior to legal rules
as a means of meeting distributional goals. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 225 (raising possibility
of direct cash subsidies to users as altemative to limiting copyright holder entitlements); Kaplow & Shavell,
Property Rules, supra note 247, at 77 1. However, government subsidies for transformative uses of protected
expression would have the same deleterious effect on author autonomy as would government subsidies for
the creators of such protected expression. Even if the neoclassicist preference for income tax and direct
subsidy holds in other areas, it makes no sense in this area of copyright.
444. See supra text accompanying notes 87-93.
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public domain." 5 Indeed, neoclassicists effectively treat copyright itself as
if it were the result of buyers' and sellers' undertakings, which the government
simply enforces." 6 As Judge Frank Easterbrook, a leading exponent of
neoclassical law and economics, puts it: "A federal law of intellectual property
may promote enforcement while duplicating the terms that would
(presumptively) be set by contract. If Congress misunderstands the optimal
terms, any of the entitlements pre-set in the law may be eliminated by
contract."447
In a recent opinion authored for the Seventh Circuit in ProCD Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 44 a case upholding the enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses,
Judge Easterbrook made clear that, in his view, copyright limitations, no less
than entitlements, are freely abrogable by market actors." 9 Coupled with the
White Paper's support for the displacement of copyright by online licensing,
Judge Easterbrook's opinion represents a significant and ominous incursion of
the neoclassicist approach into the digital arena./5 In ProCD, the plaintiff
sought, through its shrinkwrap license, to obtain copyright-like protection for
an electronic database that, following the Supreme Court's ruling in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., "5' lay in the public domain
and could not be copyrighted. Judge Easterbrook neatly dispensed with the
argument that state enforcement of such a contract should be preempted under
section 301(a) of the Copyright Act.4 52 He insisted that federal law should
not generally preempt state enforcement of contractual terms and conditions
since such "private ordering" is "essential to the efficient functioning of
445. See supra text accompanying notes 179-81.
446. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 8. at 113-14; cf Palmer. supra note 353. at 280 (aserting that
intellectual property rights "are creatures of the state" and not, as neoclassicists claim. "'the product of an
evolutionary process of interaction among interested parties that is later ratified through legal sanctions-)
447. Easterbrook, supra note 8. at 114.
448. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
449. Id. at 1454-55.
450. For a discussion of the White Paper's support for shnnkwrap licensing and online licensing. see
supra text accompanying notes 88-93.
451. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). In Feist, the Court held that compilations that lack ecen a modicum of
creativity in their selection or arrangement are, as a matter of constitutional mandate, ineligible for
copyright protection. See id. at 363-64.
452. Section 301(a) of the Copyright Act preempts any
legal or equitable rights [under state law] that are equivalent to any of the cxclus'.c nghts
within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that
are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright
as specified by sections 102 and 103.
17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1976). The ProCD Court agreed that the plaintiff's database met the "'subject matter
of copyright" requirement even though, under Feist,. unoriginal databases are not protected by copyright
See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453. It held, however, that state enforcement of the shnnk% rap license did not
meet the equivalent right requirement and thus that section 301 preemption did not apply. See id at 1455
Judge Easterbrook simply ignored another possible, independent ground for federal preemption, the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which has been held to preempt state law that contravcnes
federal intent to place certain types of creations in the public domain. See Bonito Boats. Inc % Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989) (striking down Florida patent statute as disruptise to national
uniformity mandated by Patent and Copyright Clause of Constitution).
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markets." '453 At the same time, he argued that shrinkwrap licenses are merely
"private transactions" that "affect only their parties." '454 Given this micro-
characterization, he blithely eluded the argument that standardized contracts
that systematically proscribe user copying of public domain material may
frustrate the social policy behind copyright law's delicate balance of incentive
and access.455 As Judge Easterbrook enunciated the Court's holding, "a
simple two-party contract" does not meet the section 301(a) preemption
requirement that it be the "'equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright' and therefore may be enforced. 456
Minimalist critics are resolutely opposed to the expansion of copyright
owner control. But in attacking copyright, some arrive at a legal marginalist
position that is remarkably similar to that of the neoclassicists. In so doing,
they exhibit a naive faith in user ability to sidestep copyright owner control
without state intervention.4 7  Digital content providers enjoy an
unprecedented capacity, through a combination of contract, digital encryption,
and electronic monitoring, to prevent unauthorized access to and uses of
expression and information stored in computer databases. Minimalists
underestimate this capacity when they argue that "the best place to look for the
appropriate compromise between compensation to owners and accessibility for
the public is the marketplace rather than formal regulatory structures. 458
453. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455.
454. Id. at 1454.
455. Judge Easterbrook also argued that contractual limitations on copyright user rights are
commonplace and elicited a number of inapt examples in purported support of that contention. These
include trade secrets contracts (which are truly customized, bilateral transactions), home video rental
contracts (because copyright does not extend to video rentals, these contracts are based on the video store's
property right in the tape), and contracts for the provision of data searching services (which concern the
provision of personal services, not copyright). See id.
456. Id. at 1455 (citation omitted).
457. On the other hand, the notion that state institutions will necessarily intervene in the broad public
interest is no less naive. Congress has exhibited a marked tendency to delegate the policy choices regarding
copyright policy to industries that have a direct stake in proposed legislation. See generally Jessica Litman,
Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REv. 275 (1989); Thomas P. Olson, The Iron
Law of Consensus: Congressional Responses to Proposed Copyright Reforms Since the 1909 Act, 36 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 109 (1989). The proper response to that tendency, however, is not public choice
nihilism, but a renewed effort to bring the public interest to bear in legislative and administrative
decisionmaking. See. e.g., Litman, supra note 3, at 53-54 (insisting that Copyright Office act more
decisively and aggressively to represent public before Congress); see also RADIN, supra note 23, at 214-23
(presenting cogent critique, from Deweyan perspective, of public choice theory's reductive description of
democracy as marketplace of self-interested profit maximizers). A prime example of such effort has been
the work of the Digital Future Coalition, composed of 27 organizations representing creators, consumers,
and distributors of information and formed in the fall of 1995 "to work towards a thorough, broad and
balanced Congressional debate of U.S. copyright law and policy." See What is the DFC?, DIGITAL FUTURE
COALITION HOME PAGE (visited Oct. 12, 1996) <http:llwww.ari.netldfc/dfc/dfcdeschtm>.
458. Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 411-12; see also Barlow, supra note 21, at 128 (calling for content
protection based on encryption rather than intellectual property law); Palmer, supra note 353, at 284-99
(arguing, on libertarian and market efficiency grounds, that private ordering through technological fences,
product bundling, and contractual arrangements are superior to state-defined intellectual property rights).
But see Litman, supra note 353, at 45 (noting that, assuming availability of technological controls and
adhesion contracts, "[e]ven if the copyright grant is narrowed in scope, the public will need some of Its
rights made explicit").
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The democratic paradigm, on the other hand, would affirmatively disallow
attempts to use standard contracts to expand copyright owner or content
provider control over works that are made available to the public. In contrast
to neoclassicist (and minimalist) legal marginalism, the democratic paradigm
emphasizes that copyright represents a careful balance of owner right and user
access designed to serve the public's paramount interest in self-reliant
authorship and democratic discourse. Truly bilateral agreements, such as those
providing for the nondisclosure of confidential information or prohibiting the
copying of custom prepared material, do not generally implicate this public
interest. But content provider attempts to circumvent copyright limitations
while disseminating expressive works to the public would run afoul of the
fundamental public policy underlying the Copyright Act and the Copyright
Clause of the Constitution, even if knowingly and willingly agreed to by users.
That public policy, so vital to our democratic institutions, cannot be
subordinated to market vicissitudes and the vagaries of private contract." 9
Under the democratic paradigm, therefore, such "private legislation" would be
preempted.460
VI. CONCLUSION
Copyright, James Madison wrote in the Federalist Papers, is an instance
in which the "public good fully coincides ... with the claims of
459. I do not mean to imply here that Congress should be unable, under the Commerce Clause. to
accord protection against unauthorized uses of unoriginal compilations of data and other %,orks that are
ineligible for copyright. In so doing, however, Congress should, as with copyright. seek to obtain a balance
between incentive and access that best serves the public interest in expressive divetsity and the diffusion
of information.
460. The term "private legislation" was coined by Friednch Kessler to connote contracts of adhesion
that were standard throughout an industry, thus representing the danger of pivate concentration of power
See generally Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract. 43
COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943). Neoclassicist Robert Merges concurs that such private legislation that effects
the "wholesale subversion of an important federal policy" should be preempted, no less than would state
legislation with the same effect. See Merges, supra note 22. at 1613 But Merges would be considerably
more solicitous of contractual prerogatives than would the democratic paradigm as I have crafted it, He
would impose a caveat on preemption, limiting preemption to a nebulous category of circumstances in
which the offending licensing provision has become "totally pervasive." Id.
I would argue that state enforcement of online access contracts should be subject to possible
preemption under current law, although any detailed consideration of that admittedly difficult question is
beyond the scope of this Article. Once an expressive work is made available to all members of the public
who are willing to agree to a standard contract governing the terms of access and use. state enforcement
of that contract does, it seems to me. meet both the subject matter and equivalent rights requirements for
statutory preemption under section 301(a). In addition, and this would be the grounds for preemption most
in line with the democratic paradigm, state enforcement of online access contracts that seek systematically
to avoid fair use, idea/expression dichotomy, or durational limitations on owner control over publicly
disseminated works would "'stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress' reflected in the Copyright Act and of the fundamental purposes of the
Copyright Clause, and thus should be preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546. 561 (1973) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz. 312 U S
52, 67 (1941)).
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individuals. '4 6' Few of Madison's contemporaries would have disagreed. The
nascent republic, they believed, required an educated, independent-minded
citizenry. Consequently, both the Copyright Clause of the Constitution and the
first federal copyright statute-with their proclaimed purposes of promoting the
"progress of Science" and encouraging "learning"-reflected a view of authors
as educators and of literary works as instruments of pedagogy and
patriotism.
462
The copyright that the Founders envisioned would serve these objectives
was a narrow, short-term right to make literal or near-literal copies of printed
material. Today's copyright law bears only a scant resemblance to this original
formulation. Our understandings of democratic governance have also evolved
considerably since the founding. Today, we celebrate a degree of diversity of
view, value, and experience that extends far beyond that contemplated in the
early Republic. But given the central importance of a vital and pluralist civil
society for democratic self-rule, then as now, copyright's fundamental role in
supporting our democratic institutions has remained constant. By underwriting
a sphere of self-reliant authorship, free from state or private patronage, and by
placing limits on the propertization of creative expression, copyright helps to
ensure the diversity and autonomy of the voices that make up our social,
political, and aesthetic discourse.
Despite the intentions of some of its proponents, neoclassicist economics
vitiates copyright's support for a democratic civil society. Its expansive view
of copyright's scope upends copyright's delicate balance between author
incentives and public access. Its exacting adherence to rarefied marketplace
models sharply constricts copyright's breathing space for transformative uses
of existing works, stifling the free exchange of ideas. Its reduction of authors'
expression to a* vendible commodity undermines copyright's promotion of
political competency and disregards the importance of creative expression for
our democratic institutions.
The democratic paradigm emphasizes, in contrast, that copyright is, like
many institutions of civil society, in, but not of, the market. Its scope must be
broad enough to assure the independence and vitality of civil society's
communicative sphere, but not so broad as to smother expressive diversity.
While the democratic paradigm may incorporate neoclassicist insights about
how copyright operates in the market, it makes clear that copyright's
paramount objective is not allocative efficiency, but citizen participation in
democratic self-rule.
461. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 272 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
462. The Copyright Clause empowers Congress "[t]o promote the progress of science ... by
securing, for limited times, to authors ... the exclusive right to their respective writings." U.S. CONST.,
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The title of the first federal copyright statute was: "An Act for the encouragement of
learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies,
during the times therein mentioned." Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § I, I Stat. 124, 124.
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The democratic paradigm has particular poignancy for copyright's central
role in the computer network environment. In that context the paradigm denies
the neoclassicist vision of cyberspace as a "celestial jukebox, '" 63 a place
where copyright owners are entitled to full payment for each and every use of
their works. It also rejects the fantasy, put forth by some minimalist copyright
critics, of a hacker's heaven, a realm free from our bourgeois "obsession" with
"authorship" and "plagiarism." ' The democratic paradigm posits, instead,
that copyright should be defined and delimited to engender an information
infrastructure populated with a lively interplay of sustained works of
authorship. Such an infrastructure-more aptly described as a digital public
square-would best enhance the democratic character of civil society.
463. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 197-236, 251 (using mcaphor but disclaiming credt for its
creation).
464. See supra text accompanying notes 263-68.
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